

HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 3d Marine, Marine #23
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96301

3/RBH/dac
5750
7 Dec 1965
0079-65

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines


Subj: Command Chronology

9th Mar. Dist.
Control No. 0000765
Copy No. 1 of 6

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

- Encl: (1) S-1 Chronology
(2) S-2 Chronology
(3) S-3 Chronology (Includes *Sutro 164-174 only*)
(4) S-4 Chronology
(5) Air Support and Defense Chronology
(6) Medical and Dental Chronology
(7) Communications - Electronics Chronology
(8) Artillery, Naval Gunfire, and Fire Support Chronology
(9) Combined Unit Journal

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Command Chronology for this Command is submitted.


JOSHUA W. DORSEY III
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET

1. Reporting Unit. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, FMF
2. Period Covered by Report. 1-30 November 1965
3. Date of Submission of Report. 7 December 1965
4. Commanding Officer.
 - a. Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM H. LANAGAN 1-30 November 1965
5. Location of Command Post at End of Period. Coordinates (AT 975705)
6. Map. ABE Series L701, Sheet 6658 IV
7. Staff Assignments.

Executive Officer	1-30 Nov 1965	Major A. G. CONER
S-1	1-30 Nov 1965	1stLt R. F. GORMAN
S-2	1-30 Nov 1965	Capt G. G. DRAKE
S-3	1-23 Nov 1965	Capt G. V. GARDNER
	24-30 Nov 1965	Major C. D. DEAN
S-4	1-23 Nov 1965	Major C. D. DEAN
	24-30 Nov 1965	Capt G. V. GARDNER

8. Subordinate Unit Commanders.

H&S Co 3d Bn 3d Marines	1-30 Nov 1965	Capt L. M. ORSBORN
Co I 3d Bn 3d Marines	1-30 Nov 1965	Capt J. C. M. MORRIS
Co K 3d Bn 3d Marines	1-30 Nov 1965	Capt D. A. RAMSEY
Co L 3d Bn 3d Marines	1-30 Nov 1965	Capt F. W. DE MARTINO
Co M 3d Bn 3d Marines	1-30 Nov 1965	Capt C. L. RUSHING Jr.

S-1 BUREAUCRACY

1. Personnel

a. Monthly strength (average)

<u>LC Off</u> 35	<u>LC Enl</u> 1002	<u>Navy Off</u> 3	<u>Navy Enl</u> 54
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b. Battle Casualties

0

Non-battle Casualties

2

c. Rotation during month

<u>LC Off</u> 4	<u>LC Enl</u> 11	<u>Navy Off</u> 0	<u>Navy Enl</u> 0
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d. Replacements received

<u>LC Off</u> 1	<u>LC Enl</u> 31	<u>Navy Off</u> 0	<u>Navy Enl</u> 3
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e. Personnel Summary. ~~Attached~~ *NONE*

f. Periodic Personnel Reports. Attached

2. Staff Studies and Estimates. None

3. Local News Papers. None

4. Photographs. None

5. Journal. No journal is maintained as such. A chronological record is maintained of all messages received in this Command.

6. Discipline, Courts-Martials, Office Hours.

a. No unusual disciplinary problems

b. Court Martials 1 Special Court Martial
 3 Special Court Martials pending
 In Cadr OH 4 completed, None pending

c. There were no Summary Court Martials or General Court Martials during the month of November.

d. Company Commander's Office hours - 20 completed, None pending

7. Morale, PX, Postal Affairs, Liberty, R&H

a. Morale in this Command is considered to be high.

b. PX services. While aboard ship during the movement to Da Nang, the ship's store was available to all hands. Since arriving at Da Nang a Mobile PX has been made available for use and it has been possible to utilize the PX services at the 9th Marines CP. The PX services are considered satisfactory at this time.

1
ENCLOSURE (1)

c. Postal Affairs. Mail service has been adequate except for the period of time that the Battalion was embarked aboard ship.

d. Liberty. There is no liberty policy for this Command.

e. MOR. Monthly quotas for MOR flights during the month of November were received from the 4th Marines. Due to the move of the Battalion and the unavailability of personnel due to operational commitments only those quotas that could be filled with personnel present were utilized.

8. Chaplain Support, Religious Services, Schedules

a. The Battalion Chaplain scheduled and conducted Protestant services for CI and company personnel during the month of November. Catholic services were also scheduled by the Battalion Chaplain.

b. No set schedule for divine services has been established at this time. The Battalion Chaplain will be scheduling divine services weekly until a routine schedule can be established.

9. Civil Affairs, Military Government, Community Relations, Results of MEDCAF Progress, Supplies distributed, projects completed and in progress.

a. During the month of November the Civil Affairs Program has been nearly non-existent in this Command, due to unit displacement and operational commitments.

b. Present plans are to start a MedCap schedule in the newly-assigned TACR. In addition, the TACR is being canvassed to determine the best places for starting a Civil Affairs Program.

Periodic Personnel Report #25

Period Covered: 220001H^{PST} - 032400H Nov 65

1. Strengths

- a. See PDS report period ²⁸ 022400H - 032400H

2. Replacements

a. During this reporting period, this unit received 5 Marine Corps enlisted and 1 Navy enlisted from CONUS.

3. Discipline, Law and Order

- | | |
|---------------------------|------|
| a. AWOL or deserters | None |
| b. General Courts Martial | None |
| Special Courts Martial | None |
| Summary Courts Martial | None |
| Battalion Commander's OH | 1 |

4. Prisoners of War

a. During this reporting period 13 POW's were taken and turned over to the Regimental Collection Point.

5. Graves Registration

a. There were no personnel from this command killed or wounded during this reporting period. There were also no KIA's processed or buried through our BAS during this reporting period.

6. Morale and Personnel Services

- a. Morale is considered high.
- b. Personnel services are not satisfactory due to limited amounts of PX supplies available.

7. Civil Affairs

a. Liaison has been made with the American Advisors located at Ly Tin. Plans for a civil affairs program of a more advanced degree were discussed.

b. MEDCAF was run in An Tan on 31 October 1965. Approximately 200 people were treated.

8. Personnel Procedures

- a. Nothing to report.

Copy #1
3rdBn, 3rdMar
Chu Lai, Vietnam
041200H Nov 65

9. Interior Management

a. Nothing to report.

10. Civilian Employment

a. There are no civilians employed by this battalion at the present time.

11. Miscellaneous

a. Nothing to report.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. H. LANAGAN

R. F. GORMAN
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Battalion Adjutant

Periodic Personnel Report ~~104~~

Period Covered: 240001H Nov'65 - 022400H Dec'65

1. Strengths

- a. See PDS report for period 240001H Nov'65 - 022400H Dec'65.

2. Replacements.

- a. There have been 6 replacements received during this reporting period.

3. Discipline, Law and Order.

- | | |
|---------------------------|------|
| a. AWOL or Deserters | None |
| b. General Court Martials | None |
| Special Court Martials | None |
| Summary Court Martials | 1 |
| Battalion Commander's OH | 3 |

4. Prisoners of War.

- a. No Prisoners of War taken during this reporting period.

5. Graves Registration.

- a. There were no personnel from this command killed during this reporting period. There were no RIFs processed or buried by TAG during this reporting period.

6. Morale and Personnel Services.

- a. Morale is considered high.
b. Personnel services are considered adequate.

7. Civil Affairs.

- a. None during this reporting period. Civil Affairs Program is just starting in the TAMU.

8. Personnel Procedures.

- a. Nothing to report.

9. Civilian Employment.

- a. There are no civilians employed by this unit at the present time.

Company
3rd Battalion
Da Nang, Vietnam
022400Z Dec 1965

10. Internal Organization.

- a. The Battalion C.I. occupies 47 hard-backed G.F. tents.

R. F. Gorman

R. F. GORMAN
By Direction

lateritic and most of the hill is brush covered. The south slope of the hill terminates in rice paddies and these form the north bank of the SONG CAU DO.

6. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

a. VC activity during November consisted only of isolated small arms harassing fire incidents by individuals or small groups.

b. There were 7 VC initiated incidents in the Battalion's TAORS during November, excluding the period 16-19 November during which Operation "BLUE MARLIN" was in progress. These consisted of:

- (1) 4 incidents of small arms fire
- (2) 3 attempts to infiltrate through perimeter (unsuccessful).

7. TARGET INFORMATION. No significant targets were reported during November.

8. PATROL REPORTS. Attached as Appendix (1). (Original Only)

9. DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES. Attached as Appendix (2). (Original Only)

10. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT. Attached as Appendix (3). (Original Only)

11. A.O. REPORTS. Nothing significant reported by aerial observers.

12. PRISONER REPORT. There were a total of 2 VCC and 55 VCS apprehended during the reporting period.

13. ENEMY CASUALTIES. There was one known VC killed that probably resulted from the airfield raid on the night of 27-28 October, but whose body was not found until the 3rd of November (See INTISUM # 169).

14. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT. Three (3) grenades found on VC body found 3 November. One (1) VC grenade taken on "BLUE MARLIN" 18 November.

15. CAPTURED SUPPLIES. None.

ENCLOSURE (2)

S-3 CHRONOLOGY

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.

a. On 3 November 1965 Company L occupied part of the vacated positions of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines while that unit participated in Operation BLACK FERRET. The 3d platoon of Company L was helilifted to a point 24 miles North of CHU LI where a disabled helicopter was located. The platoon set up a perimeter defense and received sporadic small arms fire. The helicopter was determined to be unsalvagable and the platoon retracted. During the lift-off from the area of operation the helicopters were fired on by carbine and light automatic weapons resulting in two Marine WIA who were flown immediately to B Company, 3d Medical Battalion. While in the objective area three VCs were apprehended and were subsequently turned over to the Regimental Collection Point.

b. On 4 November 1965 a patrol from Company I discovered a dead Vietnamese male in the water of a rice paddy at (BT 518062). He was wearing black shorts and had a wound in his right leg which was bandaged. It was estimated that he had been dead approximately 5-6 days. It was surmised that this man was one of the VC who attacked the airfield 28 October 1965, was wounded and later died of his wounds trying to escape.

c. On 6 November 1965 Company L was alerted to be lifted to the DA NANG area, mission and duration of deployment unknown. By 1820 all elements were airborne. Also the 3d Republic of VIETNAM Marine Battalion arrived and was billeted on the beach adjacent to 3d Battalion CP. Amtrac familiarization was conducted in order to acquaint the Vietnamese Marines with USMC amphibious procedures, techniques and tactics.

d. During the period 12-13 November 1965 Companies I, K and H&S embarked aboard naval shipping to participate in Operation BLUE MARLIN and on conclusion of the operation move to the DA NANG area. BLT 3/3 was augmented for BLUE MARLIN by the attachment of Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

e. During the period 16-19 November 1965 BLT 3/3 conducted a search and destroy mission Operation BLUE MARLIN South of HOI AN, bounded on the left by the TRUONG GIANG and on the right by the SOUTH CHINA SEA (Map VIETNAM, Scale 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6658 I, II and IV). During the entire operation BLT 3/3 met with light, scattered, unorganized resistance. At 190700H BLT 3/3 commenced backloading which was completed by 1000H. See After Action Report #42.

f. During the period 19-30 November 1965, 3d Battalion 3d Marines occupied a Battalion CP located (LT 975705) South of the DA NANG air field. The Battalion in its assigned mission as division reserve attached Companies I and K on 27 November 1965 to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines to support a sweep in the 3/9 TAOB. On 29 November 1965 Company L was reverted to OpCon 3/9 with the mission of assisting in the pacification program underway in its assigned area.

2. NEW DEVELOPMENTS. Not applicable

ENCLOSURE (3)

3. PROBLEM AREAS. Not applicable

4. TRAINING. During the reporting period designated Marines of this Battalion attended school on the Seismic Intrusion Device (SID), conducted by Headquarters 2/9, and instruction regarding employment of the Claymore Mine.

- Handwritten notes:*
1. 100-100-100-100
2. 100-100-100-100
3. 100-100-100-100
5. a. SITEEPS #164-174 (See Appendix (4))
b. WEEKLY SITUATION OVERLAY (6w 27 Nov) (See Appendix (5))
c. After Action Report #42 (See Appendix (6))
d. Op Order #19-65 (See Appendix (7))
 * Frag Order 89-65

LOGISTICS CHRONOLOGY

1. Journal See APPENDIX (A)
2. Estimates It is considered that each company should have at least three stoves for installation in G. P. Tents to provide drying facilities for clothing and equipment during the monsoon season.
3. Staff Studies N/A
4. Supply Requirements See APPENDIX (B). (Outstanding Priority 02 and 05 Requisitions)
5. Procurement Problems N/A
6. Problems and Solutions
 - a. Storage
 - (1) Problem Adequate protection for Class I and Class V supplies.
 - (2) Solution Provide adequate and appropriate materials for the establishment of waterproof bunkers.
 - b. Evacuation and Hospitalization of POW's N/A
 - c. Transportation
 - (1) Problem Transportation is insufficient for adequate support of Battalion Administrative, Tactical, and Logistical commitments.
 - (2) Solution Adequate stockage of repair parts and/or replacement end items to keep authorized motor transport vehicles operational, both for this organization and supporting motor transport units. It is recommended that a truck platoon be placed in direct support of each Battalion.
 - d. Maintenance
 - (1) Problem Shortage of repair parts, end items, and adequate test equipment.
 - (2) Solution Re-evaluate current processing of Priority requisitions, and priority assignment of shipping. Insure prompt delivery of filled requisitions to unit assigned.
 - e. Construction and Fortification
 - (1) Problem None

f. Sanitation

(1) Problem None

7. Deadlined Equipment by Type

	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
a. <u>Motor Transport</u>		
	M-422	6
	M-274	7
b. <u>Comm-Eqpt</u>		
	PRC-6	10
	PRC-10	18
	PF-3240	1
	PU-181	2
	TTS-21	2
	PRC-41	2
	PRC-47	1
c. <u>Ordnance</u>		
	M-60	2
	M-79	1
	3.5	4
	Flamethrower	1
	81mm	1
	AN/ M-4	1

8. Employment of Indigenous Personnel

a. An approved local laundry is employed by this Battalion in the CP area.

9. Embarkation As previously reported, and has since been confirmed by our recent move, the embarkation posture of this Battalion is less than desirable, because of insufficient quantities of mount-out boxes, rifle boxes, and now, considering recent transfers of certain personnel, a lack of sufficiently trained embarkation personnel.

ENCLOSURE (4)

S-4 Journal
 Month of November

IN	OUT	SER.NO.	ENTRY
			1 Nov 65
0645		1	3 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I & M co.s, 1 to L & K co.s, 1 to Chaplain for civil affairs.
0845		2	Trk returned fm civil affairs run and returned to FISU due to radiator leak.
	0900	3	Req into TAR for an additional 2 Helo for 2 Nov re-supply to Hill 69.
1000		4	L co. reported trk broken down and returned to FISU.
1025		5	Helo resupply to CP #1. 46 cans wtr.
	1100	6	Helo returned 43 cans fm CP #1.
	1600	7	Semi-monthly D/L rpt submitted to 4th Mar.
	1600	8	Equip Density rpt submitted to 4th Mar.
	1600	9	New Items Comm/Elect Equip rpt submitted to Division.
	1930	10	Selected T/A Items rpt submitted to Division.
			2 Nov 65
0800		1	3 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I & M co.s, 1 to K & L co.s, and 1 for CP area.
	1335	2	Helo resupply to CP #1. 80 cs MCI/Heat and 40 cans wtr.
	1355	3	Helo returned 40 cans fm CP #1.
	1400	4	Trk rpt'd fm FISU. Disp to messhall.
			3 Nov 65
0630		1	4 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I & M co.s, 1 to L & K co.s, 1 to messhall and 1 to supply.
	1330	2	Helo Resupply to CP #1. 45 cans wtr.
	1350	3	Helo returned 46 cans fm CP #1.
			4 Nov 65
0745		1	5 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I&M co.s, 1 to L&K co.s, 1 to H&S co. and 1 to supply.
	1340	2	Helo resupply to CP #1. 46 cans wtr.
	1355	3	Helo returned 50 cans fm CP #1.
	1700	4	Wkly Log Stat rpt submitted to 4th Mar.
			5 Nov 65
0715		1	1 trk rpt'd fm FISU. Disp to messhall.
	0830	2	4 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I&M co.s, 1 to L&K co.s, 1 to H&S co. and 1 to supply.
	1340	3	Helo resupply to CP #1. 48 cans wtr.
	1355	4	Helo returned 48 cans fm CP #1.
			6 Nov 65
0615		1	5 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I&M co.s, 1 to L&K co.s, 1 to supply, 1 to messhall and 1 for PX run.
	1330	2	Helo resupply to CP #1. 46 cans wtr.
	1345	3	Helo returned 40 cans and 81mm boxes fm CP #1.
			7 Nov 65
0630		1	7 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 3 disp to 106's, 1 to I&M co.s, 1 to L&K co.s, 1 to messhall and 1 to supply.

SECRET

IN OUT	SER.NO.	ENTRY
1440	2	Helo resupply to CP #1. 42 cans wtr.
1510	3	Helo returned 44 cans fm CP #1. 8 Nov 65
0630	1	8 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to I&M co.s, 2 to K&L co.s, 1 to H&S co., 1 to messhall, 1 to supply, 1 for PX run and 1 for Vietnamese Marines.
1330	2	Helo resupply to CP #1 cancelled due to weather. 9 Nov 65
0630	1	7 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 1 disp to each letter co., 1 to H&S co., 1 to messhall and 1 to supply.
1330	2	Hel resupply to CP #1 cancelled due to weather. 10 Nov 65
0630	1	10 trks rpt'd fm FISU. 2 each disp to letter co.s, 1 to messhall and 1 to supply.
JOURNAL SUSPENDED DURING MOVE TO DA NANG		
0730	1	25 Nov 65 7 trks rpt'd fm 9th MT. 3 disp to supply, 2 to messhall, 1 to H&S co., and 1 to M co.
1630	2	All gear in fm EST ramp. 10 trks fm HQ MT released. 26 Nov 65
0730	1	6 trks rpt'd fm 9th MT. 3 disp to supply, 1 to messhall, 1 to H&S co., and 1 to M co.
0730	1	27 Nov 65 8 trks rpt'd fm 9th MT. 3 disp to supply, 2 to messhall, 1 to H&S co., 1 to M co. and 1 to club NCO.
0945	2	1 trk disp to 9th Mar Post Office.
1300	3	TD-18 req fm 9th Mar to dig grease sump, command bunker and trash dump. 28 Nov 65
0730	1	7 trks rpt'd fm 9th MT. 3 disp to supply, 2 to messhall, 1 to H&S co., and 1 to M co.
1145	2	4 trks disp to 1/9 area to pick up I & K co.s 29 Nov 65
0730	1	7 trks rpt'd fm 9th MT. 2 disp to messhall, 2 to supply, 1 to H&S co., 1 to L co., and 1 to M co.
1200	2	5 trks disp to 1/9 area with L co. 30 Nov 65
0730	1	8 trks rpt'd fm 9th MT. 3 disp to supply, 2 to messhall, 1 to H&S co., 1 to M co., and 1 to MT.

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>DOC #</u>	<u>DDD</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>
Wire, MX-306	6145-160-7795	04397	22 May 65	20	02
Wire, RL-159	6145-243-8466	04398	"	15	02
Connector	6140-981-5867	04400	"	30	02
Antenna, AT-271	5820-242-4967	04416	29 May 65	10	02
Kit, Electrolyte	6140-981-5864	04543	01 Jun 65	6	05
Brush, Chamber	1005-610-8828	04514	30 May 65	10	05
Magazine, 45 Cal.	1005-550-8694	04527	"	100	05
Antenna, AT-1042	5985-733-6045	04537	01 Jun 65	1	05
Brush, Bore	1005-556-4174	04575	"	300	05
Brush, Chamber	1005-690-8441	04578	"	200	05
Battery, BA-42	6135-120-1010	04587	"	150	05
Terminal	5940-689-9999	04601	05 Jun 65	6	05
Lamp Reticule	6240-796-6915	04647	11 Jun 65	2	05
Lens Paper	6640-240-5851	04649	"	1	05
Wrench, Lens	1090-885-8451	04652	"	2	05
Mount, Body	1090-829-6623	04653	"	2	05
Bag, Carry	8105-446-5987	04654	"	6	05
Bag, Tool	5140-878-9804	04655	"	1	05
Filter, Light	5850-796-8758	04656	"	1	05
Lamp, Light	6240-796-6916	04657	"	2	05
Nut	5310-045-1063	04665	12 Jun 65	8	02
Nut	5310-045-1063	04666	"	8	05
Extinguisher, Fire	4210-202-9858	04683	15 Jun 65	1	05
Tube, Jacket	2530-772-8056	04692	"	1	05
Seal, Plain	5330-724-3171	04698	"	1	05
Watch, Wrist	6645-808-1407	00001	05 Jul 65	48	05
Magazine, 45 Cal.	1005-550-8694	00015	"	220	05
Kit, Locking Device	2510-076-7764	00094	"	20	05
Cup, Leather	7310-379-2498	00095	"	25	05
Valve, Flame	7310-379-2594	00098	"	24	05
Valve, Air	7310-379-2569	00099	"	25	05
Tube, Manifold	7310-379-2588	00100	05 Jul 65	25	05
Battery, BA-414	6135-125-5256	00317	16 Jul 65	4	05
Battery, BA-279	6135-240-3200	00340	"	200	05
Cable Assy Conduit	5935-770-0175	00343	"	1	05
Terminal Assy PSIT	5935-790-0179	00344	"	6	05
Fuse 5A 32V	5240-284-4131	00345	"	6	05
Battery Box	6140-981-5860	00346	"	2	05
Cover, Battery Box	6140-981-5858	00348	"	2	05
Motor 60 CTS	6107-798-0347	00354	"	2	05
Teletypewriter	5815-892-1031	00357	"	2	05
Insecticide, Powder	6840-242-4222	00436	27 Jul 65	10	05
Binoculars 6X30	6650-530-0973	00479	"	7	05
Pocket Ammo M-14	8465-823-6956	00795	14 Aug 65	600	05
Soap, Laundry	7930-224-7901	00863	19 Aug 65	6	05
M-274	2320-064-6373	00988	24 Aug 65	1	05
FRC-47	5820-861-3539	01237	16 Sep 65	1	02
Hand Set H-35PT	9965-163-9941	01314	20 Sep 65	225	05

APPENDIX B

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>DOC #</u>	<u>DDD</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>
Battery BA 279	6135-240-3200	01316	20 Sep 65	50	02
Electron Tube	5960-243-5025	01337	23 Sep 65	15	05
Electron Tube	5960-188-6588	01335	"	15	05
Acid	6810-249-9354	01636	15 Oct 65	2	05
Crystal Unit	5455-194-6471	01648	16 Oct 65	5	05
Crystal Unit	5955-194-6500	01649	"	5	05
Crystal Unit	5955-892-3281	01651	"	6	05
Reel, Quip Cell	5605-487-7122	01796	22 Oct 65	2	05
M-274	2320-064-6373	01806	23 Oct 65	2	05
M-274	2320-064-6373	01931	26 Oct 65	1	05
Battery BB 429/U	1090-446-5920	01942	"	11	05
Battery BB 451	6140-889-1027	01527	07 Oct 65	3	02
Spoon Mess	7340-243-5390	02042	02 Nov 65	250	05
Fork Mess	7340-243-5391	02043	"	275	05
Knife Mess	7340-240-7436	02044	"	250	05
Fan, Mess Kit Cover	7340-242-5110	02045	"	150	05
Pocket, M-14	8465-825-6936	02052	"	100	05
Pocket, 45 Cal.	8465-255-8415	02053	"	25	05
Mattress, Pneumatic	8465-254-8887	02055	"	400	05
Liner, Helmet	8415-240-2512	02055	"	150	05
Cap, Canteen	8465-242-7843	02056	"	75	05
Bag, WP	8465-261-6909	02057	"	200	05
Magazine Assy M-14	1005-628-9048	02058	"	225	05
Brush, M-14	1005-690-8441	02059	"	520	05
Rod, Pistol	1005-556-4102	02060	"	250	05
Magazine, 45 Cal.	1005-550-8694	02061	"	220	05
Connector Plug	5935-180-8149	02076	03 Nov 65	1	05
Element, Oil Filter	4310-217-3588	02077	"	6	05
Element, Fuel Filter	2910-287-5473	02078	"	6	05
Kit, Electrolyte	6140-981-5864	02079	"	6	05
Cable, Telephone	6145-226-8862	02080	"	10	05
Cable, Telephone	6145-243-8466	02113	04 Nov 65	20	05
Tablet, Iodine	6850-264-9042	02162	"	300	05
Refrigerator 8CuFt	4110-287-5850	02198	25 Nov 65	2	05
Refeigerator ME-10	4110-289-7965	02199	"	1	05
Antenna, RC-292	5820-497-8554	02222	"	4	05
Table, Elec.	6625-792-3060	02224	"	1	05

AIR SUPPORT AND DEFENSE CHRONOLOGY

1. Significant Events.

a. 3/3 moved from CHU L/I, under OPCON of the 4th Marines to DA NANG and OPCON of the 9th Marines.

b. Enroute to DA NANG, this Battalion participated in Operation BLUE MARLIN (Phase II).

2. New Developments. Not applicable

3. Problem Areas.

a. The average time, from request to arrival for medical evacuations, is 30-40 minutes.

b. The Battalion TACP is T.O. strength, but it is impossible to field all teams most of the time due to equipment deficiencies. Batteries (BE 451) and/or PRC 41's cause this problem.

c. This Battalion has been unable to utilize helicopters effectively for any tactical lifts since the advance time requirements were lengthened.

d. It is important that scheduled resupplies etc for a unit on the move, arrive at the scheduled time and place. If the resupply is not on time it slows down the tactical operation or stops it completely.

e. In the past this Bn has encountered problems with two or more frequencies (UHF) designated by one color code. Request higher units ensure common frequency designations.

4. Contributions. Not applicable.

5. Air Support and Defense.

a. Number of Air Support Requirements. Not applicable

b. Target Analysis. Not applicable.

c. Number and Type of Air Missions.

	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Completed</u>
(1) Troops	0	0
(2) Logistics	10	9
(3) Admin	3	1
(4) Recon	9	6
(5) Spot/Observe	2	1
(6) Evac	4	3

ENCLOSURE (5)

SECRET

6. Air Employment During Major Operations, Problem and Solution Encountered.

BLUE MARLIN was the only major operation for the period. The battalion evacuated 54 VCS by helicopter and had two U.S. medevacs. UH-1E aircraft were on station running recon/observation missions during the hours of daylight the first two days. In one instance the UH-1E received fire and very rapidly returned fire with rockets and machine guns. Upon investigation, by ground units, no VC were found, but blood and indications of speedy movement were found. No C.A.S. was utilized. One FAC team was without his PRC-41 during most of the operation. Due to the frequency of such occurrences and importance of UHF gear to the mission of a FAC, it is suggested: (1) The battery (BB-451) supply be brought up to T.E.; (2) The T.E. for a battalion be increased by one PRC-41 to ensure a spare UHF radio. It is also suggested that spare batteries and PRC-41's be added to the T.E. of repair agencies to replace those sent in by battalions for repair.

7. Existing Air Defense Capabilities. Passive only. The only air defense capability a battalion has is in its small arms capability.

ENCLOSURE (5)

MEDICAL AND DENTAL CHRONOLOGY

1. Battalion Aid Station Chronological Data

a. Significant Events. During the initial 10 days of establishing the battalion at its new location, heavy rains and delayed availability of equipment caused great difficulties in maintaining adequate field sanitation and personal hygiene. Associated with this was a several fold increase in new cases of afebrile enteritis. At present, the majority of these problems have been corrected.

b. New Developments. Nothing to report.

c. Problem Areas. There has been an overall improvement in the availability of medical and organic sanitation supplies with the move from Chu Lai to Da Nang.

d. Other contributions Under the cognizance of the Battalion Medical Officer. 371 civilians were treated in the hamlets of An Tan and Long Binh during the first half of the month. An additional 37 civilians were treated during Operation Blue Marlin and in the new area.

2. Patient Statistical Data

a. Average daily number of patients seen. 35

b. Number of referrals to C-Med and B-Med. 24

c. Routine Medical complaints. Skin rashes, infections, diarrhea and colds.

d. Significant diseases peculiar to the area

(1) Malaria - 02 confirmed

(2) Dengue - 01 possible

e. Number of emergency treatments and type. 09

(1) Lacerations - 05

(2) Trauma, back - 01

(3) Burns - 02

(4) Heat exhaustion - 01

f. Innoculations and prophylactic medicine administered

(1) Innoculations - 613

(2) Malaria prophylaxis - 4,000

g. Dental referrals. 60

ENCLOSURE (6)

COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS CHRONOLOGY

1. Status of Communications Equipment. As of 30 Nov 1965 it is considered good with an overall average of 75% availability.
2. Inoperative or Unserviceable Equipment.

<u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ECHELON OF REPAIR</u>	
		<u>3d ech.</u>	<u>2d ech.</u>
17	AN/PRC-10	10	7 (calibration)
"	AN/PRC-6	1	6
	AN/PRC-41	1	1
	Telephone TA-1/PT		13
	Switchboard SB-22/PT		1
	Freq Meter AN/URM-32		1

3. Security Violations. None.
4. Amount of Message Traffic Sent and Received.
 - a. Sent - 5.
 - b. Received - 216.
5. Overages and Shortages of Personnel. 3/2533's, 1/2541, 1/2543. No shortages exist.
6. Operational Training Conducted.
 - a. Maintenance of equipment - 12 hours.
 - b. Communication's security - 8 hours.
7. Summary of Operations and Lessons Learned. Blue Marlin was the major operation for the month with the following lessons learned:
 - a. Radio set AN/PRC-6 is unsuitable for operation in the coastal area operated in.
 - b. Wire communication's between company sized units is not practical because of the normal fast moving situation plus the difficulty of installing wire at night thru submerged rice paddies.
 - c. Radio set AN/PRC-25 gives dependable, lightweight communications under all circumstances encountered.
8. Regimental/Battalion Phone Book. No regimental phone directory required; however a line route map and circuit diagram have been prepared and delivered to Regimental Hdq.

9. Equipment and Personnel Located in Area Other Than the DA NANG Enclave
No personnel are located outside the DA NANG enclave but one radio set AN/PRC-25 is located at 7th Marines Headquarters in CHU LAI. This occurred during operation Blue Marlin when Co 4, 1st Bn, 7th Mar was detached from Blt 3/3 and returned to CHU LAI with the radio. Steps are now being taken to recover the radio.

ARTILLERY, NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CHRONOLOGY

1. Artillery.

- a. Significant Events. Not applicable
- b. New Developments. Not applicable
- c. Problem Areas. Not applicable
- d. Other Contributions under the cognizance of each Executive/Special Staff Officer. Not applicable.
- e. Number of Missions Fired. 12

f. Types of Missions Fired.

(1) Observed.

(a) Actual Fire Missions

(b) Registrations

(2) Unobserved. H and I fires

g. Total Number of Rounds Fired by Type.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO. RFB</u>
M107	0
105	511
155H	0
155G	48
8 in.	27
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>586</u>

h. Surveillance of Missions Fired.

- (1) 091240 November 1965: 8" fired on suspected VC platoon. No surveillance.
- (2) 091300 November 1965: 155 guns fired on suspected VC platoon. No surveillance.

i. Number of Enemy Killed and/or Wounded as a Result of Fire Missions.

(1) Body Sight. Unknown

(2) Estimated. Unknown

2. Naval Gun Fire. Not applicable

3. Fire Support Coordination.
- a. Significant Events. Not applicable
 - b. New Developments. Not applicable
 - c. Problem Areas. Not applicable

NOTE: All times Hunter
otherwise indicated

OFF 01 010001H November 65
CLOCKED: 012400H November 65

TIME		SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
IN	OUT	#			
0015		1		SW 24 all secure.	
0038		2		Bridge guard fired MG at several people crossing railroad tracks results(?)	AG noti
0104		3		SW I to SW 2 saw 10 people 100M south of bridge people fired at bridge 2 rds bridge fired back with MG got illumination still investigating	SW 6 at AG noti
0400		4		SW I, K, and L Neg SITREP	
0405		5		SW L rept trip flare set off by dog	
0600		6		SW 2/4 all secure	
0715		7		WH I to WH 3 I-13-A has has returned	
0805		8		WH K SITREP neg	
0807		9		WH L WH 3 SIT re, neg	AG noti
0935		10		OF 69 request permission to fire 3.5 and small arm. (permission granted)	AG noti
0945		11		TS - Cadaver, when VCS are apprehended wearine a watch recommend immed time check to assist in verification since VC time is one hour later then local time.	SW 2 at AG noti
1058		12		SW I to SW 3 I-1-C departed	
1058		13		FM AG to SW 3, send one plt by choppers (choppers provided by AG) to protect downed chopper(coords) - (AT 914246) Immediately.	
1059		14		SW 3 to SW L have one plat to be pick ed up at LZ barecat to protect downed chopper at coords (AT 914246).	SW 6 noti
1130		15		AG to SW 3 put rest of L Co on alert and stand by	L noti
1131		16		SW L to SW 3 helos have arrived at LZ Barecat	AG noti
1136		17		AG to SW 3 the reason rest of Company was put on stand by was because there is VC on other side of river where chopper is downed	L noti
1138		18		SW L to SW 3 1st plt (45 ENL, 10ff) left LZ barecat for downed chopper.	AG noti
1200		19		SW I Sit Ref, all secure Neg Contact	
1210		20		SW L to SW 3 Sit Rep Neg Contact.	
1247		21		Land shark choppers circling LZ barecat. No one at LZ	AG noti
1250		22		AG SW 3 launch a 2nd plt take FAC team	L noti
1251		23		SW 3 to 81's Antracts notified to bring 81's in 1st section to L Co position to assist in operation of down chopper	noti
1252		24		Landshark to SW 3 choppers refueling will be on way to LZ barecat ASAP	L noti
1301		25		LS to SW 3 choppers on way	L noti
1304		26		SW L to SW 3, 2d plt w/total of 52 men including FAR team & Co lifted LZ barecat for downed chopper at coord: AT 914246	AG noti

ENCLOSURE (9)

CONFIDENTIAL

3d Battalion, 3rd Marines

NOTE: All times H unless
otherwise indicated

OINEL: 010001H Nov 1965

CLOSED: 012400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER.#	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
IN	OUT				
1425		27		WH I - WH 3, WH I-1-C returning to CP	
1440		28		AG to SW 3 the 2 platoons at coords (AT914246) will leave at 1700 and arrive back at approx 1800	
1450		29		TS all stations - subject Lost ID card Roger BRONN Jr. ser 2046435 - 11May45 lost vic B Co CP on 29 Oct 65	
1400		30		SW 24 to SW 3 surveillance on arty mis- sion of 31 Oct 1VC wounded; now at LY Tin being treated. Rept of 1 VC Plt to attack CHU LAI will 1 nov or 2 nov	
1415		31		SW I to SW 3, I 4-C has 5 VCS they left them in LY TIN.	
1543		32		WH I WH 3 I-1C has ret neg sit rep	
1601		33		WH I to WH 3, sit rep neg	
1800		34		From SW 24 intelligence rept	
1845		35		SW L listening post at 533064 - 0730 to dawn	
1845		36		SW 24 intelligence rept	
1850		37		AG spot rept	
1855		38		SW 24 FF ambush rep	
1855		39		AG to SW L has ret.	
1900		40		Road block rept	
2008		41		WH I, L - WH 3 sit rep neg contact	
2000		42		AG 2 reevaluation of mess - 010450H journal #30	
2016		43		TS - all stations lost ID cards subject L/CPL Larry R Guynes and Fuderson C. SR No. 3267715	
2155		44		SW L s2 3 3 men in front and from L Co CT 525060 from those coord moving toward C Dtry moving toward NW they are moving in 10 Yd rushes	
2207		45		WH K WH 3 sit rep neg contact	
2225		46		SW K SW 3 partol 1 departed	
2330		47		SW I 2A departed	
2400		48		SW I K L sit rep all secure.	

ENCLOSURE (9)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

OPENED: 020001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 022400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESS.GES, ORDE.S	ACTION
IN	OUT	#			M,S,T,F
0100		49	020100	Tipsy reports 3 to 5 people heading for lines towards C Dtry. Pat of 6-7 L Co Marines sent to investigate.	
0200		50	020200	SW 2/4 all secure	
0215		51	020215	K 1 returned, no contact	
0230		52	020230	L Co, swept area, found nothing	
0300		53	020300	SW 24 all secure	
0345		54	020345	I 2 A returned, no contact	
0400		55	020400	SW L, I and k Neg Sit Rep	
0400		56	020400	SW 24 all secure	
0500		57	020500	SW 24 all secure	
0800		58	020800	I 3 C has departed, I,K, and 1 Neg Sit Rep	
0800		59	020800	Intelligence report from 24	AG Noti
0900		60	020900	SW 24 PF ambush for 2 Nov 2000-0400 at coord entered in msg.	AG Noti
0920		61	020920	SW I - SW 3 I 3 C crossed	
1010		62	021010	LY TIN rept 195 dud, want blown	
1015		63	021015	I 3 C reached CP #4	
1150		64	021150	SW I SW 3, I C pat ret Neg Contact	
1200		65	021200	WH I, K Neg Sit Rep	
1304		66	021304	AG 2 16 men moving thru rice paddies coord BT 417097. AG checking out now	SW L Noti
1331		67	021331	AG 3 to SW 3 rept chopper down. have one plat coords will follow, ready	SW L Noti
1227		68	021227	AG to SW 3 Noti that they (LCo) should tell choppers to land at IZ firefly to pick up FAC tm	SW L Noti
	021355	69	021355	01's noti and are moving to SW L position	
1356		70	021356	AG Sw 3 downed chopper located in GS BT 1329	
1410		71	021410	SW L one plat lifted on LZ Darecat	
1425		72	021425	SW L number of personnel on airlift was 43 Enl & 2 Off it was 3d plat	
1510		73	021510	MEDCAF treated 49 in AN TAN & 35 in LONG BINH	
1545		74	021545	Co from 2/4 moving to 7th Mar tonight. L tomorrow to fill in lines	
1610		75	021610	Intelligence rept from 2/4	
1611		76	021611	K, L and I Neg Sit Rep	
1612		77	021612	Major WATLARC wants L Co down to the 7th Marine by 0600	
1318		78	021818	AG 3 L Co is pulling out from down chopper coords of GS BT 1329 rept 2 WIS's no confirmed	SW 6 Noti
1830		79	021830	SW L rept 3 VCS are taking them to Regt, Collection Point	
1831		80	021831	AG 3d Flt L Co is on way back in.	
1838		81	021838	SW L 3 rept VCS where capt in vic of downed chopper	AG Noti
1845		82	021845	WH 24 Intelligence rept	AG Noti

ENCLOSURE (9)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marine

*NED: 020001H Nov 196

*OSED: 022400H Nov 196

TIME		SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESS., GES., ORDERS	ACTI
IN	OUT	#			M, S, I
1845		82	021845	WH 24 to WH 3 intelligence report	AG N
1845		83	021845	WH 24 to WH 2 2 VC Co at (BT 390140)	AG N
1940		84	021940	FF: Ambush reports	
1945		85	021945	AG 3 20 Vietnamese in black shirts & pajamas spotted south of rnk camp	
1950		86	021950	AG 3 20 Vietnamese now at (BT 534043)	
2005		87	022005	All personnel of L 3 who were lifted have returned with the exception of HM flowers who is at D Med with the two WIA's	
2010		88	022010	K Co informed of IF ambush at (BT 505068) informed to alter accordingly	
2015		89	022015	Road Block report	
2016		90	022016	WH L Neg Sit Rep	
2017		91	022017	SW I, K Neg contact	
2020		92	022020	FF ambushes phoned in to AG	
2030		93	022030	K 3 A cancelled FF ambush	
2035		94	022035	SW L dog set off flare in front K Lines	
2040		95	022040	AG 3 reports flare in area of Hill 69	
2045		96	022045	Hill 69 says flares 5 miles North of their position along HW #1.	
2100		97	022100	All Co informed of Black out and 100% alert	
2115		98	022115	Dendix sent sqd out to investigate rept of 20 VC found moving East from rnk. Set ambush (BT 532047)	
2235		99	022235	L Co TFS spotted 3 to 4 people 370 yds will keep target under observation	
2245		100	022245	I 4 A departed	
2300		101	022300	SW 2/4 all secure	
2400		102	022400	SW I, K, L neg sit rep	
2400		103	022400	SW 24 all secure.	

ENCLOSURE (9)
CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marine
OPENED: 030001H Nov 1969
CLOSED: 032400H Nov 1969

IN	TIME		SER #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
	OUT					
0005			104	030005	I 5 A has departed	
0010			105	030010	I, K and L Neg Sit Rep	
0200			106	030200	SW 24 line check	
0410			107	030410	SW I, K, L and 24 Neg Sit Rep	
0545			108	030545	EW L preparing to move out in 5 min.	
0800			109	030800	EW K, I and SW 3 Sit Rep Neg	
0810			110	030810	AG at 1400 a plat from A Co 1/4 Mar will report S-3 put in pos SW corner of airfield	
1015			111	031015	EW 24 1 VC ambush at (DT 441099) about 4 VC. Pat plt	
1104			112	031104	WH I WH 3 WH K 9C has returned neg cont	
1245			113	031245	SW K 9C has returned no contact	
1250			114	031250	SW 24 reported movement of VC. 147th Co	
1450			115	031450	I Co G-3 patrol has returned	
1525			116	031525	I Co found decomposed body at (DT 518062)	
1545			117	031545	AG 3 Road block on MSR to	
1600			118	031645	I, K and L Neg Sit Rep	
1645			119	031645	Sgt Gerald Emerick will go to M.I.G. MGI tomorrow with Lt. Brown	
2010			120	032010	OX 3 reports tracer round going out from airfield	
2015			121	032015	Check of units reveals tracer round in question coming from area of 1/4	
2018			122	032018	FF Ambush reports.	
2019			123	032019	I, K and L Neg Sit Rep	
2025			124	032025	Intelligence report	AG Noti
2030			125	032025	FF Ambushes	
2048			126	032048	FF Ambush site at 505070	
2049			127	032049	From 24 drop the last one sights of FF Ambushes has change see mess	
2049			128	032049	Road Block Report see mess	AG not
2125			129	032125	Relay through K TTS 69 wants illum	
2128			130	032128	Permission granted	
2129			131	032129	FF All Neg Contact	SW 3
2135			132	032135	one more illumination	
2215			133	032215	FF all secure	
2240			134	032240	I 7-A has returned	
2300			135	032305	I, I and L has departed	
2301			136	032301	FF Neg Sit Rep	
2330			137	032330	I 8 A has departed	

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE* All times H unless
 otherwise indicated

TIME		SEC	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS		ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG		M, S, T, F
0015		138	040015	SW K Neg Sit Rep	
0100		139	040100	SW 24 line check, very weak almost unreadable	
0100		140	040100	FF A Neg Sit Rep	
0130		141	040130	WH I and K Sit Rep Neg	
0140		142	040140	WH K 1 has returned	
0144		143	040144	SW 24 all secure	
0200		144	040200	FF Neg Sit Rep	
0230		145	040230	K 2-A has departed	
0300		146	040300	FF A Neg Sit Rep	
0305		147	040307	Heard 4rds SA fire	
0307		148	040307	61's rept rds came from MAG area	
0309		149	040309	AG rds came from OX req illum at OX 18	
0350		150	040350	AG OX sweeping down beach be on alert	
0400		151	040400	WH I & K Neg Sit Rep	
0530		152	040530	AG rept 1 infil at (BT 542065 threw a concussion grenade no casualties	
0817		153	040817	WH I Sit Neg Contact	
1310		154	041310	SW I 3 departed	AG Noti
1330		155	041330	SW I 3 is at CP #1	AG Noti
1350		156	041350	SW 3 is at CP #2	AG Noti
1426		157	041426	SW I 3 at CP #3	AG Noti
1440		158	041440	SW I 3 is at CP #4	AG Noti
1441		159	041441	SW I C has departed	AG Noti
1505		160	041505	SW I 3 at CP #5	AG Noti
1540		161	041540	SW I 3 reached CP #6 and is returning	AG Noti
1545		162	041645	SW I rept 1 rnd of SA fire at (BT 412078)	AG Noti
1605		163	041605	SW 24 Intelligence rept	AG Noti
1615		164	041615	SW I and K Neg Contact and SW I 3 at CP # 3	
1640		165	041615	AG 2 Intelligence rept	
1641		166	041641	SW I 3 at CP #2	
1707		167	041707	SW I 3 at CP #1	
1720		168	041720	SW I has ret	
1950		169	041950	SW I roadblock report	AG Noti
2010		170	042010	SW I and K Neg Sit Rep	
2030		171	042030	FF 1 Sit Rep All Secure	
2031		172	042031	SW 24 all secure	
2035		173	042035	Line check	
2040		174	042040	I Neg sit rep	
2035		175	042035	SW 24 FF Ambushes	AG Noti
2100		176	042100	SW K layout at (BT 533064)	
2105		177	042105	FP 1-A Neg Contact	
2150		178	042151	SW K have target at 180 M at AZ of 249	
2220		179	042220	FP A-1 Sit Rep all Secure	
2220		180	042220	SW K 14 A has depar	
2230		181	042030	SW I 9A has dept	
2250		182	042250	AG 3 Bendix rec carbine fire vic (BT 414014)	
2300		183	042300	I 10/A has dept	
2305		184	042305	FF A/1 all secure	
2310		185	042310	TS spotted 3men are searching area now	
2315		186	042315	OX to SW 3 gun position VN manned UP	
2400		187	042400	SW I Sit Rep Neg	
2400		188	042400	AG 3 OX will burn brush on beach in about 1 hour	

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE* All time is H
unless otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 050001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 052400H Nov 1965

TIME	SER			ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESS, GES, ORDERS
0030		189	050030	SW K 14 A has departed
0200		190	050500	SW 24 Sit Rep all quiet
0230		191	050230	SW K 14 A returned no contact
0233		192	050233	FF 1 Sit Rep Neg
0240		193	050240	7th Tm Cmdr sends intell summary
0255		194	050255	SW 9A has returned neg contact
0322		195	050322	FF 1 Sit Rep Neg Contact
0335		196	050335	SW I 15A has returned
0350		197	050350	SW I 10A has returned
0359		198	050359	SW 24 all secure
0410		199	050410	FF Sit Rep Neg
0715		200	050710	AG see msg concerning demo Tm
0718		201	050718	K is at the party
1020		202	051020	I 11C at phase line
1022		203	051022	L-5 req chopper to pick up 1 man at DC LZ and go to QUANG NAI to pick up 2 men and 137rds
1028		204	051028	All plt on airfield to be release except 1/4
1029		205	051029	I 14C at CF#1
1053		206	051053	I 11C at CF# 2
1100		207	051100	81mm Mortars begin to register on Hill 51
1110		208	051110	FF A1 req 49 C rats
1130		209	051130	I firing close to I 11C
1144		210	051144	WH K Neg Sit Contact
1155		211	051155	WH I 11C at CF#3
1222		212	051222	WH I 11C at CF #4
1254		213	051254	WH I 11C at CF#5
1307		214	051307	I 11C returned
1312		215	051312	I 11C now boarding transportation back
1315		216	051315	Smokeroom C will use otherside of AS tomorrow afternoon
1319		217	051319	FF A 1 req info on C-rats
1420		218	051420	EOD is blowing up 3.5 duds in vic Hill 69
1427		219	051427	L Co Pat has returned
1445		220	051445	Fsy war & CA meeting at Regt O club
1535		221	051535	Intelligence Report from SW 24
1600		222	051600	SW I Sit Rep Neg Contact
1620		223	051620	SW L is on way back from 7th Mar
1720		224	051723	SW L has returned req trans for 1/4
1810		225	051820	SW K 3 dep.
1815		226	051915	SW 24 Intelligence
1854		227	051854	WH 24 FF ambushes
1930		228	051920	Drige watch report
2005		229	052005	WH I sit rep neg
2050		230	052030	OF 1 repts SA fire vic of 1st bridge on HW 1
2109		231	052109	WH I I 12 A has left CF
2150		232	052150	SW I 12A has departed
2130		233	052130	AG intelligence summary
2400		234	052400	SW K, I and L Sit Rep Neg Contact

ENCLOSURE (9)

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

OPENED: 060001H Nov 1965

CLOSED: 062400H Nov 1965

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

TIME	SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION	
IN	OUT	#		M,S,T,F	
0030		235	060030	L Co cancelled chopper to QUANG NAI	
0031		236	060031	OX 3 repts information rept see msg	
0032		237	060032	Impressive 3 repts flare vic N end of AS	
0100		238	060100	Flare was hand lumm from Arty position	
0135		239	060135	1 Trac will not be back tonight	
0225		240	060235	Flames are getting ready to fire	
0340		241	060340	Flames ready fo fire	
0400		242	060400	I, K and L Neg Sit Rep	
0635		243	060635	I L2 A has returned I reports fire fight on the other side Hill #69 forces ?	
0648		244	060648	Forces unknown	
0800		245	060800	SW 24 Neg Sit Rep	
0800		246	060800	SW I, K and L Sit Rep No Contact	
0750		247	060750	SW 24 insom report see msg #247	
1550		248	061550	AG 3 1 Co to fly to DA NANG 1630 L Co	
1616		249	061616	OF 69 - I Co pat recieved SA fire ret to Hill 69 from coords 469078 at 1600H	
1640		250	061640	L Co will be committed to a field operation	
1631		251	061631	SW L, is aboard aircraft and taking off	
1820		252	061820	L departed total is 167	
1840		253	061840	K Co from 3/7 is now occupying L position	
1845		254	061845	SW 24 FF ambushes	
1915		255	061915	K 3/7 144 Enl, 7 Off and 8 Navy	
1925		256	061925	Road Block Rept (see Msg)	
1925		257	061925	Correction on FF ambushes, cancel 12& 13	
1950		258	061950	Impressive 3 can't make 0700 meeting. K rep at coord point 1830-1900 tomorrow	
2000		259	062059	K Co I Co Neg Sit Rep	
2040		260	062040	3 Amtracs will be available 0800 tomorrow	
20 50		261	062050	SW 24 Intelligence report	
2205		262	062205	Zipper lip 6 req lumm at (5'6066)	
2258		263	062258	K 20A has departed	
2305		264	062305	SW 24 all secure	
2400		265	062400	K and 24 Neg Sit Rep	

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines,
OPENED: 070001H November 1965
CLOSED: 072400H November 1965

IN	TIME	SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
	OUT #				M. S. T. F
0230		266	070230	K-20-A has returned.	SW 3- Noti
0330		267	070330	K-23-A has departed	
0357		268	070357	L-Neg Sit Rep	
0359		269	070359	K-Neg Sit Rep	
0403		270	070403	I-Neg Sit Rep	
0455		271	070455	SW 24- Neg Sit Rep	
0615		272	070615	K-21-A has returned	
0800		273	070800	SW k to SW 3 Sit Rep Neg	
0917		274	070917	SW I 13-C has departed	
1220		275	071220	WH I, K Neg Sit Rep	
1252		276	071252	FC 1 reports that a unknown type jet dropped two 250lb bombs at (BT 456075)	AG noti
1304	277		071304	I 13 C returned	
1335	278		071335	Request helo evac for possible civilian casualties, Dr also.	
1345	279		071345	False to SW 3 K-3/7 will be relieved today by another Co from 3/7	
1400	280		071400	Col Martin to SW 3- he is sending CIT men to talk with Vietnamese on coming operation.	
1405	281		071405	SW I 10 casualties at village	
1422	282		071422	SW I 1 Marine being evac suffering from smoke inhalation.	
1437	283		071437	SW I 2 Vietnamese evac to B Med 8 to LY TIN	
1500	284		071500	SW I-6 bombs hit at 455078 3 houses levelled other houses damaged.	
1600	285		071600	SW L the switch between M Co & K Co 3/7 is 50% in position	
1720	286		071720	AG 3 FF Co reports a VC Co at (BT 425065)	
1905	287		071905	Capt Hilger needs sqd to meet him at LY TIN to investigate bombing	
1910	288		071910	FF ambushes reports see message	
2000	289		072000	Lost wallet: PFC Richard T. KCHA 2131606 ID card, shotcard, 30 MFC	
2000	290		072000	I, K and L Neg Sit Rep	
2000	291		072000	Bridge Report	
2010	292		072010	FF: ambush adds two position	
2105	293		072105	I 16-A has departed	
2106	294		072106	Impressive A to FP noti Pvt CHANEY that he will be lifted out at 0700	
2225	295		072225	I 17 A has departed	
2245	296		072245	TFS reports movement in front 5-8 people	
2300	297		072300	I 15-A has departed	
2301	298		072301	I 14-A has departed	
2345	299		072345	K 23-A has departed	
2346	300		072346	Doney Hero relays Prominence found body washed ashore	
2350	301		072350	K Neg Sit Rep also 24, L and I	

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE* All times H unle.
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OP. D: 080001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 082400H Nov 1965

TIME	IN	OUT	SEC	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
			#			M,S,T,F
0025			302	080025	K 22/A has returned	
0055			303	080055	SW 24 chocking line	
0150			304	080150	I 15 A has returned	
0150			305	080150	SW 24 line check	
0235			306	080235	SW K 23 A has returned	
0355			307	080355	SW I Net Sit Rep	
0400			308	080400	SW K neg sit rep	
0400			309	080400	SW L 3/7 Neg Sit Rep	
0715			310	080715	Booth to SW man found on beach 569039	
0815			311	080815	SW L 3/7 Neg Sit Rep	
1200			312	081200	SW 2 To AG VIETN/MISE have left 3/3 CP	
1200			313	081200	SW I Neg Sit Rep	
1255			314	081255	I civil affairs at CP #1	
1500			315	081500	I civil affairs ret to Hill #69	
1600			316	081600	I has two layouts I 18A & 19 A	
1920			317	081920	SW I neg sit rep	
1920			318	081920	PF ambushes	
1923			319	081923	LL line down	
1935			320	081935	Now back in contact with L on LL	
1935			321	081935	Add one PF ambush site see msg	
1945			322	081945	SW L Neg Sit Rep	
2000			323	082000	Roadblock rept	
2010			324	082030	SW I and K neg sit rep	
2040			325	082040	TPS 2. spotted 8 people 529064	
2045			326	082045	TPS 21 lost target	
2125			327	082125	SW I 19A has dept	
2155			328	082155	SW I 18A has dept	
2155			329	082155	Dendix: man running East at 523036 dressed in shorts, illuminated, man dissappeared	
2200			330	082200	AG 2 SW 2 int'l rept	
	2212		331	082212	WH 3 to WH L same msg as received from AG Msg #29	
2320			332	082320	SW I 18 A & 19 A has dept	
2355			333	082355	SW K 25 A has dept	
2357			334	082357	SW K and I Neg Sit Rep	

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

TIME	OUT	SER #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
0200		335	090200	SW K 23 A has depart	
0235		336	090235	SW I 19A returned	
0255		337	090255	SW K neg sit rep	
0400		338	090400	SW K 24A has returned	
0400		339	090400	SW K, I and L sit rep neg	
0515		340	090515	Weather report see Msg	
0800		341	090800	SW I, K and L neg sit rep	
0820		342	090820	A plat from B 1/4 replaced PP on the AF	
1137		343	091137	AG rept that 62 cargo boats at 496076	bridge
1120		344	091120	SW 3 Plat 1/4, req to check rept on 62 cargo noti boats at coords 490766	
1237		345	091237	WH I sit rep neg	
1520		346	091520	K neg sit rep	
1800		347	091800	SW 24 fire mission complete	
1840		348	091840	TFS is down, will try to raise again 1/2 hr	
1900		349	091900	SW 24 PF Ambush repts	
1906		350	091906	Dendix 6 F 2/4 will effect liaison tomorrow in preparation for our displacement	
1915		351	091915	Bridge report	AG Noti
1925		352	091925	SW 24 Intelligence rept	6 Noti
1955		353	091955	S, K, and K sit rep neg	
2045		354	092045	SW K grenade thrown right flank K position pat sent to investigate no contact	
2120		355	092320	SW I 19 A departed	
2250		356	092250	SW I 18 A departed	
2400		357	092400	SW I, L and K sit re neg	

NOTE* All Times H unlc
otherwise indicated

2d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 100001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 102400H Nov 1965

TIME	IN	OUT	#	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
0105			358	100105	SW 24 all secure	
0100			359	100100	I 18 A retruned Neg contact	
0300			360	100300	SW 24 all secure	
0320			361	100320	K 25 C returned No contact	
0347			362	100347	K 27 A has returned	
0353			363	100353	WH L sit Neg	
0356			364	100356	WH K sit rep neg	
0359			365	100359	SW I neg sit rep	
0627			366	100627	SW K 27A has returned	
0630			367	100630	AG 1 Intel rept	
0800			368	100800	SW K and I neg sit rep	
0915			369	100915	missing ID card info given to S-2	
1150			370	101150	SW L sit rep neg	
1400			371	101400	can send patrols out past 2000 M on targets of opportunity.	
1400			372	101400	Dist 2 Intell rept	
1400			373	101400	Dist 2 Intell rept	
1400			374	101400	Dist 2 Intell rept	
1400			375	101400	Dist 2 Intell rept	
1800			376	101800	TS to SW 2 Intell rept	
2000			377	102000	L Co layout departed	
2002			378	102002	SW I 21A has departed	
2030			379	102030	Roadblock rep see msg	
2040			380	102040	FF ambushes	
2107			381	102107	L sit rep all secure	
2125			382	102125	K 28 A depart	
2230			383	102230	K 20 A depart	
2345			384	102345	K 28 A returned	
2350			385	102350	SW 24 Intell rept	

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 110001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 112400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT	#			M,S,T,F
0240		386	110240	AG to SW 3 A green star cluster went off at (BT 5405)	
0300		387	110300	SW 24 Line check all secure	
0400		388	110400	SW I, KL and M neg sit rep	
0500		389	110500	SW 24 line check all secure	
0645		390	110645	SW K 20 A has returned	
1510		391	111510	Cadaver Pvt Klien lost I D card	
1510		392	111510	Cadaver Pvt Conawa lost ID card	
1930		393	111930	Intelligence report	AG Noti
2000		394	112000	Intelligence report	AG Noti
2100		395	112100	PF ambush sites	AG Noti
2115		396	112125	K enformed of PF ambush sited that would interfere with patrol	AG Noti
2116		397	112116	K req to run 17 A	
2117		398	112117	mess from SW 3 to K perms granted	
2118		399	112118	FP 24 Info rept	
315		400	112315	Rept of small arms fire at C Btry	
2400		401	110400	L and 24 all secure	

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 120001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 122400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	ACTION		
IN	OUT	#	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	M,S,T,F
0017		402	120017	K 29 A has departed	
1305		403	120305	K 29 A has returned	
0315		404	120315	K 30 A has departed	
0545		405	120545	K 30 has returned	
1830		496	121830	PF ambushes see msg	

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

OPENED: 13 Nov 1965

CLOSED: 13 Nov 1965

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

IN	TIME	OUT	SER	#	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
0800				407	130800	Started embarkation	M,S,T,F

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Dattalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 140001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 142400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG		M,S,T,F
1015		408	141015	WH 3 to WH 4 MP detachment and ITT possi bly located at REGT Prisoner compound	
1025		409	141029	CO I & K req to attend meeting on APA 248	
1037		410	141037	LSD 22 SP req to attend meeting	
1210		411	141210	Get CO Co A on APA 248 in time to attend meeting 141400H	
1715		412	141215	TS req you locate and forward this units interpreters ASAP interpreters have not rept back from DA NANG	
1910		413	141910	WH product actual req 15 more men for working party loading seabags	
2112		414	142112	Monroe 1 advises interpreters located SAIG N ETA within 3 days	

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 150001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 152400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT	#			M,S,T,F
1127		415	151127	WH 6 to WH 4 - Supply officer AKA 104, Flat Cmdr, 4th Plat Co A 1st Amtrac Bn CO Co I, K, CO Btry C, Flat Cmdr SP Bn meeting in wardroom APA 148 151330H Nov 1965	

NOTE: All times H unless otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
 OPENED: 160001H Nov 1965
 CLOSED: 162400J Nov 1965

TIME	SER			ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS
0615		417	160616	OP Plan 1-65 previously designated Op Order 1-65 execute phase II
0710		418	160710	Command group Alpha disembarked ship
0730		419	160738	Command Group landed at Orange Beach (A)
0735		420	160735	Command Grp Bravo landed
0740		421	160740	I, K, A are all in position neg sit rep
0830		422	160830	Positions as follow in msg
0930		423	160830	WH 6 informed I to move objective C, A to move to B
0940		424	160940	CLF junk fleet taking small arms fire at (BT 205562)
0945		425	160945	K neg contact
0955		426	160955	FFC MOSLEY, MOSES 2110617 being evac sprained back
1010		427	161010	A is on objective B
1015		428	161015	WH 6 informed K to move A
1025		429	161025	Send pat to (BT 243432) to check out VCS in trench
1040		430	161040	CLF, last elements of WH landed
1052		431	161052	WH 6 informed all Co keep WH advised of front line positions every 30 min
1055		432	161055	I Co just passed objective B
1105		433	161105	K present position is SE corner of obj A
1110		434	161110	I present position is BT 248448)
1120		435	161120	I received 2 rds s/a fire K received fire from left flank, I directly in front of obj C fire was from low trench, lined paj.
1125		436	161125	I found bunker with 2 crossbows in trench
1130		437	161130	A found trench one half mile long with 3 bunker lined with panzi stakes
1135		438	161135	K present position is at (BT 255452)
1140		439	161140	Cmd grp A displaced to (BT 258449)
1145		440	161140	A trench is loc at (BT 241435)
1150		441	161150	A pat neg contact
1155		442	161155	I front lines in center of obj C receiving S/A fire
1158		443	161152	A recon pat returned neg contact
1200		444	161200	K working SE corner of obj A, found several abandoned houses.
1205		445	161205	I reports people in Hamlet frightened but friendly
1220		446	161220	I found bundle of panzi stakes in vill
1226		447	161226	K 2/3 thru obj A
1228		448	161228	A mission changed to (BT 223458)
1230		449	161230	I completed sweep of obj C about to move fwd
1235		450	161235	K secured A attempting to contact I
1235		451	161236	K has injured Vietnamese man at beach, req LVT
1240		452	161240	A pat ret with one VCS
1250		453	161250	K at (BT 247453)
1255		454	161255	sending A 3 Viet interp by helo hold VCS till further word

ENCLOSURE (9)

Battalion, 3d Marines
 OPENED: 160001H Nov 1965
 CLOSED: 162400H Nov 1965

NOTE: All times H unless
 otherwise indicated

TIME	IN	OUT	SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
			#			M,S,T,F
1258			455	161258	Vietnamese man suffering shrap wound	
1300			456	161300	K has 9 VCS	
1305			457	161305	I at PL Grape	
1307			458	161307	VCS brought to CG B	
1310			459	161310	11th Ranger Bn front line	
1315			460	161315	WH 6 informed I to secure	
1318			461	161318	K will block NE side of D	
1323			462	161223	I present pos (BT 241432)	
1330			463	161330	ifo on A VCS see msg	
1332			464	161332	WH 6 informed A to move out	
1338			465	161332	I entering obj D	
1340			466	161340	I entering obj D	
1340			467	161340	A has crossed phase line Grape.	
1600			488	161600	I receiving s/a arms fire	
1615			489	161615	A req 1700 helo resupply	
1625			490	161625	11th Ranger Bn encountered plat of VC	
1630			491	161630	WH 6 A permission fire across river	
1632			492	161632	WH 3 SP CL sit rep see msg	
1634			493	161634	A resented position (BT 220460)	
1650			494	161650	CGA displaced present pos (BT 237495)	
1700			495	161700	I picked up 2 VCS at (BT 230246)	
1705			496	161705	I secured obj foxtrot	
1710			497	161710	K secured obj E	
1715			498	161715	K crossed PL FIG	
1915			499	161915	CGB established CP	
2000			500	162000	chopper resupply cancelled	

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE All times H unless
otherwise indicated

1 Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 170000Z Nov 1965
CLOSED: 172400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS		ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG		M,S,T,F
0525		501	170525	sporatick firing in CGB CP	
0530		502	170530	WH 6 SPCL sit rep neg	
0600		504	170500	WH SPCL sit rep	
0630		505	170630	WH 6 informed A to hold fast	
0635		506	170635	WH 6 meeting at CP I and K hold fast	
0650		507	170650	I reached CGB CP area	
0725		508	170725	LVT went to Kilo Position picked up WH6	
0730		509	170730	SPCL sit rep see msg	
0756		510	170756	situatue 68 SPCL	
0830		511	170830	I leaving CP	
0845		512	170845	K leaving CP	
0855		513	170855	A resu ply concluded	
0900		514	170900	CGA moved out	
0930		515	170930	I received 4 rds fire at (BT 225495)	
1000		516	171000	WH 6 position at (BT 222487)	
1002		517	171002	K entering vill	
1005		518	171005	WH 3 pos at (BT 222487)	
1015		519	171015	WH 3 picked up 1 VCS	
1030		520	171030	I sending guide to pick up 3 men who can ide ntify VC in area	
1040		521	171040	I found a dike and a well came together	
1042		522	171042	K holding at present position	
1050		523	171050	informed WH 6 of CGB position (BT 234502)	
1100		524	171100	Posi reports I see msg	
1115		525	171115	I received 2 rd fire from one man across river	
1120		526	171120	K taken under fire by undetermined No.	
1140		527	171140	I has captured 6 VCS at (BT 197505)	
1155		528	171155	I & K holding fast	
1205		529	171205	front lines as observed see msg	
1210		530	171210	I & K moving out	
1215		531	171215	A departing for PL	
1215		532	171215	WH 3 SPCL sit rep see msg	
1220		533	171220	A at (BT 190488)	
1300		534	171300	I received 4 rds S/A fire from (BT 200517)	
1330		535	171330	A at pos (BT 188492)	
1345		536	171345	I has come across buildings used as VC meeting places	
1355		537	171355	SPCL sit rep see msg	
1615		548	171615	I received fire from F	
1640		549	171640	WH 6 to SPCL have finished	
1705		561	171705	SPCL wants to be kept advised of lift of A	
1725	5:52	552	171725	front line positions CGA and I at (T 225538) K ab (BT 218538)	
1920		553	171920	CGA arrived at CP location on beach at (BT 225537)	

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE: All times H unless otherwise indicated

Battalion, 3d Marines
 OPENED: 180001H Nov 1965
 CLOSED: 182400H Nov 1965

TIME	SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT	#		M,S,T,F
0150		554	180150 msg from monroe see msg	
0230		555	180230 advise time you will be in position for lift	
0335		556	180335 air lift elements will be ready at brown beach	
0422		557	180422 ref your 180415 time is base holding beach security until back loading is complete	
0800		558	180800 AMQNRAPD by helo acknowledge receipt	
0840		559	180840 req brief final sit rep of OP's ashore including box score	
0935		560	180935 swept assigned area. 3 VC wounded & evac	
1035		561	181035 swept complete	
1035		562	181035 rep pers will reembark to accompany gear	
1040		563	181040 WH will stay aboard and debark at Da Nang	
1050		564	181050 following no. of pers are being reembarked to ships see msg	
1350		565	181350 advise time you will be in posi for lift	
1350		567	181350 see msg	
1400		568	181400 CH - 37 down vic brown Beach	
1440		569	181440 please provide coords of downed CH 37	
1445		570	181445 coords of downed CH 37 are (BT 226538)	
1500		571	181500 Two main force VC Co's were encountered by ARVN during operation and are presumed to still in area	
1512		572	181512 received small arms fire from our front	
1525		573	181525 Copters delayed	
1540		574	181540 in view of delay req 500 meals to be del out posi	
1614		575	181614 need 4 hours to lift WH.	
1620		576	181620 scat 3 B rept 3 men wearing black pj armed with rifle moving into vill at (BT 221518) will attempt to capture	

NOTE* All time H unless
otherwise indicated

1st Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 19000H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 24000H Nov 1965

TIME		SER		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG		M,S,T,F
1925		587	191915	Sen 3 to SW assumes defense of FLSG Asp #1, relieving fertilize. SW 1 chopped to SW effective 191830H	
1545		588	191545	I patrol reports back	

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3^d Battalion, 3d Marines
O. ED: 20001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 202400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	INCIDENTS, MESS GES, ORDERS		ACTION
IN	OUT #	DTG			M.S.T.F
0930	589	200930	Spot rept from Fertilize 3 see msg		
0935	590	200935	Sen see msg		
1300	591	201300	SW K patrol has departed		
1315	592	201315	SW I 3 patrol has departed		
1545	593	201545	I reports patrol returned		
2345	594	202345	12 - 15 men spotted about (AT 974697) running into bushes, across the river		

3a Battalion, 3d Marines

OPENED: 210001H Nov 1965

CLOSED: 212400H Nov 1965

NOTE* All time H unless
otherwise indicated

TIME		SER	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION	
IN	OUT	#	DTG	M,S,T,F	
0525		595	210525	I Co Neg sit rep	
0718		596	210718	From Monroe to SW 2 daily weather forecast	
1812		597	211812	HOA CAM SW 2 there will be two Co coming down road at 0400	K&I Noti
1825		598	211825	Monroe sends daily weather report	
2045		599	212045	HOA CAM SW 2 two co operation has been cancelled	

NOTE* All time H unless
otherwise indicate

IN	TIME	SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT #				M.S.T.F
	0030	600	220030	SW 3 to Sen Neg Sit Rep	
04	0400	601	220400	SW I Neg Sit Rep	
05	0500	602	220500	SW M Neg Sit Rep	
08	0830	603	220830	SW to provide security for Axehandle operation msg from Sen	
11	1120	604	221120	Sherriff - delete plat from recon and comm plat 9th Mar	
11	1130	605	221130	Sen sends road report see msg	
11	1435	606	221435	Sen road condition B unable unloading of gear from beach.	SW 4 Noti
14	1445	607	221445	Sen 3 to SW 3 L has been noti of alert status being changed from 6 hours to 3 hours	
17	1730	608	221730	107mm Btry (+) 1/12 has arrived	Sen Noti
22	2220	609	222220	HST Co. 3d SP has arrived	Sen Noti
22	2220	610	222220	Sen construction on river barrier on SONG CAU DO SOU 23 Nov 1965 postponed.	
20	2030	611	222030	WA CONG out post sighted movement to their West flank and request allu.	
23	2350	612	222350	Weather report fm monroe see msg	

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

OPENED: 230001H Nov 1965

CLOSED: 232400H Nov 1965

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

IN TIME	OUT # SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
0112	613	230112	S M line check	
0730	614	230730	Monroe to SW 2 weather report see msg	2 Noti
1848	615	231845	Monroe to SW 2 weather report	2 Noti

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 240001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 242400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	INCIDENTS, MESS GES, ORDERS		ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG		M,S,T,F
0705		616	240551	Daily weather forecast	
1035		617	241035	Sen road from 9466 to 9261 has unusual amount of foot traffic	
1110		618	241110	Sen change from 3 hours to 12 hours effective as of 241200	Units Noti
1850	1735	619	241735	To Senator 3 layout patrols from I co see msg	
		620	241850	weather report see msg.	

NOTE: All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 250001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 252400H Nov 1965

IN	TI E	SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
1355		621	251355	Sen To SW 3 smoke room will have ambush during 1900H and 0600H from 25 through 28 Nov vicinity (A T 987713)	
1730		622	251730	K's LP reported to Regiment	
1800		623	251800	weather report	
2000		624	252000	Capt Dalbey ALO Noti of choppers from 1-1 at 0830 at LZ	

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

OPENED: 260001H Nov 1965

CLOSED: 262400H Nov 1965

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

TIME		SER	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT				M,S,T,F
0035		625	260035	HOA CAM reports one Marine missing between front gate and HOA CAM dependant housing. Unit unknown	
0107		626	260107	HOA CAM reports missing Marine has been found and turned over at road	
0120		627	260120	HOA CAM noti to send man-all arrangements made to receive him	
0135		628	260135	Sen 3 noti us missing Marine was ours	
0825		629	260825	weather report see msg	
1742		630	261742	HOA CAM info report	
1930		631	261830	weather report	
2105		632	262105	SW L C departed	SW 2 noti
2200		633	262200	SW L D departed	Sen Noti
2210		634	262210	SW L LP at (AT 975701) at 2000 noticed man moving back & forth on dike which is now on bank of river at coord 975700, watched for approx 1 hr at approx 2100 fired 8 rds individual fled	Sen Noti

ENCLOSURE (9)

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 270001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 272400H Nov 1965

IN	OUT #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESS GES, ORDE S	ACTION M,S,T,*
0100	635	270100	SW L C has returned	
0200	636	270200	SW L D has returned	
0820	637	270820	Monroe 3 weather report	
0825	638	270825	Sen 3 see msg	
0845	640	270845	SW L B returned Neg contact	
1115	641	271115	Sen sends msg see msg	
1120	642	271120	I and K Co alerted for move trucks on way	
1200	643	271200	Sen patrols from HOA CAM	
1230	644	271230	Fertilizer I co report to Fert CP K Co report to I CP 025655, guide to be on road.	

NOTE: All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 280001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 282400H Nov 1965

IN	OUT	SER #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M,S,T,F
0800		645	280800	Monroe to Motherhood - Weather report	S-2
0830		646	280830	I-1-C departed 0810	
0845		647	280845	SI L to SW 3 L-1-A returned to CP	
1225		648	281225	To S-3 Actual see Msg	
1535		649	281535	I-1-D returned	
1830		650	281830	K has returned	
1905		651	281905	Sen 2 reports (B-2) possibility of motar att.	
	1940	652	281940	All Co's have been notified of poss motar attack	
2005		653	282005	K-1-A has dep	
2005		654	282005	Int report from Sen-2	
2017		655	282017	Sen 6 to SW 3 request report on minor explosion	
2400		656	282400	Sen 3 to SW3 activate DAO GET	
2400		657	282400	SW L Patroll K-1-A has just returned L Co	

NOTE: All times H unless
otherwise indicated

3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 290001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 292400H Nov 1965

TIME	OUT	SER #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION M.S.T.F
0050		658	290050	Went off DOA net	
0105		659	290105	K-2-A departed	
0415		660	290415	K-1A returned 2400	
0515		661	290515	K-2-A returned	
0630		662	290630	L-2 LP's returned	
0815		663	290815	K-3-A departed 0740	
0900		664	290900	Intell report from Reg	
1029		665	291020	K-3-A returned	
1305		666	291305	Info on FMF pac inspection from Sen 3	
1315		667	291315	L has displaced from CP	
1325		668	291325	Comm O, MT, Bn Supply and Bn Med Off noti of FMF pac inspection	
1310		669	291310	L Co to Fertilize of OpConn	
1335		670	291335	K-4-A departed 1250	
1410		671	291410	SW L is departing for Fert CP	
1445		672	291415	Msg from Sen 3 see msg	

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: All times H unless
otherwise indicated3d Battalion, 3d Marines
OPENED: 290001H Nov 1965
CLOSED: 292400H Nov 1965

TIME		SER	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT	#	DTG	M.S.T.F
1530		673	291530	SW I - K-2-A has returned
1805		674	291805	Intell rept from smokeroom see msg
1806		675	291806	SW I noti of smokerooms rept
1820		676	291820	Smokerooms adds to msg
1840		677	291840	SW K observes approx 1 plat of what appears to ARVN training, carrying a flag
1907		678	291907	Weather rept
1930		679	291930	Fertilize - SW L's plat is at coord 995681
2017		680	292017	Fertilize 3 to SW 3 see msg
2022		681	292022	Fertilize 3 to SW 3 see msg
2035		682	292035	L-L-D delay departure until 292100 ret at 300100
2035		683	292035	Motherhood - chg of password
2040		684	292040	weather report
2055		685	292055	WH I L D crossed IP
206		686	292206	Sen modify reference A of frag order 65-65
2210		687	292210	Sen 3 SW 3 L will remain fertalize control until 020800H
2210		688	292210	SW I L D departed

3a Battalion, 3d Marines

OPENED: 300001H Nov 1965

CLOSED: 302400H Nov 1965

NOTE* All times H unless
otherwise indicated

TIME			INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION
IN	OUT #	DTG		M,S,T,F
0035	689	300035	SW I D is approaching friendly lines	
0052	690	300052	SW has reached friendly li es	
0200	691	300200	SW I has returned	
0800	692	300800	L LA depart-d	
1120	693	301120	SW L LA returned	
1300	694	301300	Plan relief SW L see msg	
1435	695	301435	WH to WH 3 have rec 3 rds from SW direction	
1525	696	301525	Amtracs just arrived at 106's	
1955	697	30;955	K LA has departed	
2002	698	302002	K LA has returned	
0200	699	300200	KLB has dept	

PATROL REPORT

UNIT: CO, "I"
 PLACE: CHU LAI
 TIME: 051300H NOV 65

COMBAT PATROL

MAPS: SERIES L701, SHEET 6757 III

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 1ST PLATOON COMPANY "I"

1 OFFICER	2 M-60 MACHINEGUNS	1 AN/PRC-10 RADIO
41 ENLISTED	2 M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS	
2 CORPSMEN	2 3.5 ROCKET LAUNCHERS	

2. MISSION: COMBAT PATROL ALONG THE PATROL ROUTE.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 050830H

4. TIME OF RETURN: 051300H

5. ROUTE: SEE ATTACHED OVERLAY

6. OBSERVATION - ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

THERE WAS NO OVERT VC CONTACT DURING THE PATROL, IN FACT THE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS OBSERVED WAS LESS THAN ORDINARILY WOULD BE EXPECTED IN AN AREA SUCH AS THIS. THE PATROL ROUTE IS EASILY TRAVERSED BY FOOT TROOPS AND PRESENTS NO DIFFICULTIES. IN AS MUCH AS THE PATROL TOOK ONLY 4½ HOURS, NO RESUPPLY WAS NECESSARY AND LOCAL WATER SUPPLIES WERE NOT USED.

ONE HOUSE LOCATED VICINITY OF (BT 445077) WAS THOROUGHLY SEARCHED AS BEING SUSPICIOUS. THE HUT IS WELL HIDDEN IN BRUSH AND SHRUBS. IT IS BIG ENOUGH TO SLEEP 8 MEN. IT WAS SUSPICIOUS SINCE INTRICATELY MADE STRAW MARKERS WERE FOUND ON THE TRAIL ABOUT 100 METERS FROM THE HOUSE WITH THE LONG STEM OF THE MARKER POINTING TOWARD THE HOUSE. (THESE MARKERS ARE ENCLOSED AND A SKETCH IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT) THE HUT HAD BEEN RECENTLY USED BUT AFTER USE IT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY SWEEPED OUT. THE ENTIRE AREA AROUND THE HUT WAS SURROUNDED BY FIGHTING HOLES FROM COORDINATES (BT 445077) TO (BT 455064). THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRAILS AND MANY FIGHTING HOLES SPACED ALONG THEM ABOUT EVERY 20 METERS.

30 FEET SOUTH FROM THE HUT WAS A MORE ELABORATE CAVE THAN THAT USUALLY FOUND FOR VILLAGERS USE. THE CAVE HAD A VERTICAL SHAFT SIX FEET DEEP AND A CROSS SECTION SIX FEET BY FOUR FEET. AT THE BOTTOM WAS A LATERAL SHAFT APPROXIMATELY THREE FEET HIGH AND WIDE ENOUGH FOR A FULL GROWN VIETNAMESE TO ENTER WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THIS SHAFT WENT STRAIGHT FOR TEN FEET AND THEN TURNED LEFT FOR TEN MORE FEET WHERE IT ENDED IN A CIRCULAR ROOM SEVEN TO EIGHT FEET IN DIAMETER AND THREE FEET HIGH.

THE PATROL WAS NOT EQUIPPED WITH DEMOLITIONS AND NO STEPS TO DESTROY THE TUNNEL WERE TAKEN. NO SIGN OF ACTUAL VC OCCUPANCE WAS FOUND.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. NO CONTACT.
9. CONDITION OF PATROL, INCLUDING DISPOSITION OF ANY DEAD OR WOUNDED.
GOOD - - NONE.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. NONE

/s/Lt. Simmons
LT. SIMMONS
1st Plat/1/3/3


11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THESE NEW MARKERS MAY INDICATE A SAFE HARBORING POINT FOR VC OR A VC SYMPATHIZERS HOUSE. THE HUT FOUND BY THE PATROL POSSIBLY IS A VC LAYOVER OR RENDEZVOUS POINT. CLOSE SURVEILLANCE OF THIS HOUSE MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE.

C. L. Deh

PATROL OVERLAY



43
+ 10

UNIT: CO, "I"
PLACE: CHU LAI
TOD: 050830H NOV 65
TOR: 051300H NOV 65
POD: (BT 454087)
POR: (BT 467074)



49
+ 05

SKETCH OF STRAW MARKERS:



INTSUM # 167


1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 010800H THROUGH 020800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 011450H, SWAIN 24 REPORTED SURVEILLANCE OF ARTILLERY MISSION OF 31 OCTOBER VIC (BT 422110): 1 VC WOUNDED. VC IS AT LY TIN BEING TREATED.

012155H AND 020100H, AN TPS/21, LOCATED VIC (BT 529065) REPORTED A STRONG CONTACT WITH 3 PERSONS MOVING NORTHWEST FROM (BT 525060). MEN WERE MOVING IN 10 YARD RUSHES. WHEN A TANK STARTED AND ILLUMINATION WAS FIRED THE PERSONS HASTILY WITHDREW TO THE WEST.
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. NO INTERPRETER WAS UTILIZED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
8. SWAIN - 24 REPORTS:

011450H, 1 VC PLATOON INTENDS TO ATTACK CHU LAI VILLAGE ON THE NIGHT OF 1 NOVEMBER OR 2 NOVEMBER, VICINITY OF (BT 506057). (C/4). SOURCE: PF PLATOON LEADER.

011820H, 1 VC SQUAD (16-20 MEN) AT SCHOOL HOUSE (BT 441099), KIDNAPPED 4 YOUNG STUDENTS FROM AN TAN. SQUAD POSSIBLY PART OF THE 150TH COMPANY. WEAPONS: L-BAR AND SMALL ARMS. 100 VC REPORTED AT SCHOOL HOUSE AT 011800H (BT 441099). INTENTIONS OF VC UNKNOWN. AN ARTILLERY MISSION WAS FIRED ON REQUEST OF THE LY TIN DISTRICT CHIEF. AT THIS TIME, DUE TO DARKNESS AND THE LACK OF OBSERVERS IN IMPACT AREA NO EVALUATION OF THE ARTILLERY FIRE CAN BE MADE.

011845H, PFS AT KY LIEN HAVE AMBUSH SITES AT (BT 506058), (BT 504063) AND (BT 502066). PF PLATOON LEADER EXPECTS ATTACK BY VC PLATOON ARMED WITH 3 BARS AND ASSORTED SMALL ARMS, ON VILLAGE HEADQUARTERS AT AN TAN (BT 505062) ON 1 OR 2 NOVEMBER 1965. (C/4).
10. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.


C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 168

1. SWAIN - 2

2. PERIOD 020800H THROUGH 030800H NOVEMBER 1965

3. a. COMPANY "L" REPORTED THAT DURING THE SALVAGE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED AT THE DOWNED HELICOPTER VIC (BT 289133) SPORADIC SMALL ARMS FIRE, BOTH CARBINE AND MACHINE GUNS, WERE DIRECTED AT THE HELICOPTER AND SALVAGE PARTIES. FIRE WAS RETURNED VIGOROUSLY AND ACHIEVED THE DESIRED EFFECT OF SUPPRESSING THE HARRASSING FIRE, PERMITTING THE SALVAGE CREW TO CONTINUE THEIR WORK. DESPITE LARGE BUT UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF VC IN THE AREA, THE SMALL MARINE PLATOON SUCCESSFULLY DISCOURAGED THE VC INTERVENTION, LIMITING THE ENEMY TO A HARRASSING ROLE. TWO USMC WERE KIA WHEN VC SMALL ARMS FIRE HIT THE HELICOPTER DURING RETRACTION. FIRE WAS RETURNED BUT ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY CASUALTIES WAS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO THE MOVEMENT OF THE HELICOPTERS. THREE VCS WERE APPREHENDED AT THE SITE OF THE DOWNED HELICOPTER AND FORWARDED TO THE CHU LAI COLLECTION POINT. VC CLOTHING WAS FOUND IN TWO FIGHTING HOLES VIC (BT 289133). THE GEAR INCLUDED KHAKI TROUSERS AND SHIRT, A WOOL UTILITY JACKET AND GREY WOOL BLANKET, RICE SACK AND BUNDLE OF PAPERS AND WALLET WITH I.D. CARD.

022235H, TFS/21, LOCATED AT COMPANY "L" POSITIONS SPOTTED 3 TO 4 PEOPLE. TARGET WAS KEPT UNDER OBSERVATION. AT 030100H, THE TFS/21 REPORTS THE PEOPLE HEADING FOR LINES TOWARD "C" BATTERY. A PATROL FROM COMPANY "L" WAS DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE. DUE TO DARKNESS AND THE DISTANCE, THE TARGET PERSONS WERE ABLE TO EVADE THE COMPANY "L" PATROL.

4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.

6. AN INTERPRETER WAS UTILIZED WITH THE COMPANY "I" ROADBLOCK.

8. SWAIN 24 REPORTS:

020800H, (C/3) INTELLIGENCE: 1 VC PLATOON STOPPED 3 BUSES AT 011730H, AT (BT 397150) AND TOOK 80 BAGS OF RICE TO COORDINATES (BT 400161) AND (BT 391140). A CAVE HAS BEEN DUG IN DUC BO AREA WITHIN 500 METER RADIUS OF (BT 380155). AN INFORMER CAN LEAD US TO THE CAVE.

021610H, (B/2) INTELLIGENCE: 1 VC MF BN (304TH), STRENGTH 300, MOVED FROM (BT 370993), DURING THE NIGHT OF 01 NOVEMBER TO (BT 425062) BY 021200H. WEAPONS AND INTENT UNKNOWN.

021830H, INTELLIGENCE REPORT WITH DTG OF 011830H: 1 VC MF BN (304TH) STRENGTH 300, LE QUANG THAN MOVED FROM QUANG NGAI TO (BT 377037-382036) WITH 1-81MM MORTAR, 2-60MM MORTARS, 1-RUSSIAN MG, AND 1 AN/PRC-10, AND WITH ENOUGH BARS AND RIFLES FOR ALL PERSONNEL. UNIFORMS GREY WITH CAPS, SANDALS. INTENT TO ATTACK AND HARRASS KY SANH, OTHER FOXTROT

UNITS , MORTAR FIRE ON MARINE UNITS AND ISOLATED OPS AT KY LIEN
AND KY SANH. (F/6).

10. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILLAN SOURCES DURING
THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

100 10/26/65
C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 169


1. SWAIN - 2

2. PERIOD 030800H THROUGH 040800H NOVEMBER 1965

3. a. 030630H, SW 24 REPORTS APPROXIMATELY 4 VC IN AMBUSH POSITION VICINITY (BT 441099). AMBUSH WAS DISRUPTED BY P.A.T. PLATOON LEADER WHEN VC STOPPED BUS. NO CASUALTIES RESULTED ON EITHER SIDE.

040305H, SW WHISKEY REPORTED 3-4 ROUNDS SA FIRE VICINITY OF OXWOOD. AG INFORMED SW THAT OXWOOD HAD REQUESTED ILLUMINATION AND WAS SENDING PATROL DOWN BEACH TO SEARCH FOR POSSIBLE INFILTRATOR.

4. a. 1 VC KIA - SWAIN "I" AT 031525H FOUND A DECOMPOSED BODY VICINITY OF (BT 518062). BODY WAS MALE WEARING BLACK SHORTS WITH BANDAGE ON LEG. CORPSMAN ESTIMATES DEAD AT LEAST 6 DAYS. (S-2 COMMENT: POSSIBLY RESULT OF RAID ON AIRFIELD NIGHT OF 27-28 OCTOBER).
8. 031320H, SW 24 REPORTS 1 VC MF COMPANY (147TH) COMMANDED BY NGUYEN TA LOCATED VIC (BT 425062). WEAPONS CONSIST OF 2 CAL..30 MACHINE GUNS, 1 57 MM RECOILESS RIFLE, 1 60MM MORTAR, 2 GRENADE LAUNCHERS. TROOPS WEARING GREEN UNIFORM WITH GAPS AND BOOTS. INTENT UNKNOWN, 2/3 OF TROOPS SPEAK WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCENT. (SOURCE: DISTRICT AGENT, C/3).
10. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.


C. G. DRAKE
By direction

170
INTSUM # 169

1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 040800H THROUGH 050800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 042150H, TPS/21 REPORTED TARGET 180 YARDS OUT VIC (BT 520065). TARGET WAS UNIDENTIFIABLE MOVING IN INTERMITTANTLY. ILLUMINATION REQUESTED AND FIRED. 042310H, TPS/21 REPORTED TARGET WAS 3 MEN AND THE AIRWING VISUALLY SPOTTED 3 MEN IN FRONT OF THEIR AREA IN COMPANY "L" POSITION FROM 100-175 YARDS. AT 042330H, TPS/21 LOST TARGET AT 200 YARDS VIC (BT 520065).
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. TWO INTERPRETERS ARE BEING UTILIZED WITH COMPANY "L" ON PATROLS WHILE MANNING THE 1/7 MLR.
8. SW 24 REPORTS:
041605H, 1 VC BN (34TH) LOCATED AT (BT 409099 - 412094 - 413089 AND 416093). WEAPONS UNKNOWN. (C/2)
10. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE LAST INTSUM.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

11/16/65
C. C. DRAKE
By direction

1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 050800H THROUGH 060800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 052005H, CP 1 AT HILL 69 REPORTS SPORADIC SA FIRE VIC OF FIRST MAJOR BRIDGE ON HIGHWAY # 1 NORTH OF THE CP. APPROXIMATE COORDINATES OF (BT 430110). OBSERVED 3 TRACER ROUNDS FROM THIS AREA.

060648H, COMPANY "I" REPORTS A FIREFIGHT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF HILL 69 VIC (BT 435053). COMPANY "I" REPORTS HEARING SA, MORTARS AND POSSIBLY 3.5 AND M-79 ROUNDS. FORCE UNKNOWN.


060750H, SW 24 REPORTS LARGE VOLUME OF FIRE VIC (BT 410041). A PF SGT REPORTS MARINES HAVE MADE CONTACT WITH 1 VC BN (304TH) IN THIS AREA. 60MM MORTARS, LMG AND BARS ARE BEING USED. VC BN LOCATED AT (BT 403034 - 410041 - 410036 - 420042 - 407067). PF SGT REPORT CAME TO SW 24 AT 060630H.
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. THE TWO INTERPRETERS BEING UTILIZED WITH COMPANY "L" IN 1/7'S POSITIONS WERE RETURNED TO SWAIN CT.
8. SWAIN 24 REPORTS:
 - 1) INTELLIGENCE REPORT (C/3 - NATIONAL POLICE); 1000 VC, MANY ARE CHINESE, LOCATED (BS 380994) (BT 367008 - 357017). UNIT UNKNOWN. EQUIPMENT UNKNOWN. UNIFORMS - ALL KINDS, SOME WEAR HELMETS AND SOME WEAR CAMOUFLAGE HATS. (DISTRICT HQ HAS REQUESTED RECON OF AREA)
 - 2) 1 VC BN MOVED TO COORD (BT 407090 - 403097 - 405096). UNIT UNKNOWN. EQUIPMENT: 1-81MM MORTAR, 2-60MG, 1-LMG AND UNKNOWN NUMBER OF BARS. (BOTH REPORTS CAME FROM VC CELL MEMBER AND DUE TO THIS, LY TIN HQ FEELS BOTH UNITS MAY ATTACK LY TIN AREA. BOTH REPORTS ORIGINATED 5 NOVEMBER - SOMETIME IN THE MORNING.)
10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 172


1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 060800H THROUGH 070800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 061616H, COMPANY "I" PATROL RETURNING TO HILL 69, RECEIVED ONE ROUND SMALL ARMS FIRE VIC (BT 469078). COMPANY "I" COULD NOT DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF THE FIRE, SO NO FOLLOW UP ACTION WAS TAKEN.
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. NO INTERPRETERS WERE UTILIZED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
8. SWAIN 24 REPORTS:

062050H, INTELLIGENCE REPORT (C/2): 1 VC BN, ABOUT 300 MEN, TO ATTACK AT (BT 497066) OR (BT 429109) SOMETIME TONIGHT, 6 NOVEMBER 1965.
10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.


C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 173

1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 070800H THROUGH 080800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 072220H, THE TFS/21 LOCATED AT (BT 531066) REPORTED A PARTY OF 5-8 PEOPLE VIC (BT 523062) MOVING 250-600 METERS IN FRONT OF MARINE POSITIONS. DUE TO LIMITED NATURE OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE TFS CONTACT, THE EXACT ACTIVITY OF THE VC COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE VC APPARENTLY WERE NOT ATTEMPTING TO INFILTRATE OUR POSITIONS. IMMEDIATELY TROOPS IN THE AREA OF THE CONTACT WERE ALERTED AND ILLUMINATION WAS PREPARED BUT NOT FIRED SO THAT SHOULD THE VC ENTER THE KILLING ZONE, INSTANT MASSED, ILLUMINATED FIRE WOULD HAVE DESTROYED THEM. AT 072500H THE CONTACT FADED DUE TO MOVING INTO A DEFILED AREA. THE OPERATORS ASSUMED THE PARTY WITHDREW AS NO FURTHER CONTACTS WERE OBTAINED. (S-2 COMMENT: ON 02 AND 04 NOVEMBER (INTSUM # 168 AND 170) SIMILAR CONTACTS OF SMALLER PARTIES HAVE BEEN MADE IN THIS GENERAL AREA. THESE COULD BE VC RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES OR SOME LOCAL VIETNAMESE ACTIVITIES OF A LESS SINISTER NATURE).
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. NO INTERPRETER WAS UTILIZED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
8. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.


C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 173-A

1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 080800H THROUGH 090800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 082040H, TFS/21 LOCATED (BT 531066) OBTAINED CONTACT WITH 5-8 PEOPLE MOVING PARALLEL TO HIGHWAY 1 AT COORDINATES (BT 529064). CONTACT MAINTAINED UNTIL 2045H WHEN TARGET DISSAPPEARED PRESUMABLY INTO DEFILADE. FIRE WAS WITHHELD IN ANTICIPATION OF VC CLOSING TO VISUAL SIGHTING RANGE. ILLUMINATION WITHHELD FOR SAME REASON. TRAGET DID NOT CLOSE. NO FURTHER CONTACT. (S-2 COMMENT: PREVIOUS SIMILAR TARGET CONTACTS INDICATE THAT THE VC OR LOCAL CIVILIANS ARE USING THIS AREA AFTER CURFEW AS A ROUTE TO BY PASS 2/4 ROADBLOCKS ON HIGHWAY 1. AMBUSHES HAVE BEEN PLANNED TO COVER THIS AREA.

AN TAN VILLAGER REPORTS (F/3): 2 VC CAME TO THE BORDER BETWEEN KY HA AND KY LIEN AT A POINT APPROXIMATE VICINITY OF (BT 526068) AT 071600H NOV. USED BINOCULARS AND DREW A DIAGRAM OF THE AIRSTRIP, THEN WITHDREW TO VIC OF LANG BINH. AT THE SAME TIME/DATE: 2 VC DRESSED AS WOODCUTTERS CAME TO A HILL NEAR HLZ NEAR AN HAI HAMLET OF KY HA VILLAGE (BT 524115) TO DRAW A MAT THEN MOVED OUT TO ANOTHER AREA LEAVING WOOD BEHIND.

4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.

6. NO INTERPRETER WAS UTILIZED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

8. AN TAN AGENT REPORTS: 1 PLATOON OF VC GUERRILLAS (ABOUT 30 MEN) CO: BY HOYNATAN DUC, APPEARED AT KY-BICH (BT 359137) AT 071900H. WFNS: 2-AUTOMATIC RIFLES, MANY SMALL ARM. INDIVIDUAL WEATONS.


AT 071700H, 1 VC (HC) COMPANY (ABOUT 100 MEN) CO: UNKNOWN, CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF QUANG NGAI AND ARE STATIONED AT TU-NY (BT 366002) AND KY-SANH (BT 368008). THEY WORE GREY UNIFORMS, RUBBER SHOES AND SCARFS MADE OF PARACHUTE CLOTH. WEATONS: 1 MACHINE GUN, 1 AN/FIC-10. INTENT: INCREASE HARASSMENT AND ATTACK MARINE UNITS AT KY SANH, ALSO INTEND TO ENLARGE UNIT IN TICH-TAY HAMLET, KY SIEN VILLAGE.

LY TIN AGENT (C/4): 06 OCTOBER, 200 VC, CO: THANG, ARMED WITH 2 M-60 MACHINE GUNS, 1 ROCKET LAUNCHER AND 1 57RR, WITH 100 WORKERS. THEY INTEND TO HARASS USMC UNITS IN KY HOA, KY XUAN AND ONG BO BRIDGE. (SENIOR ADVISORS COMMENT: POSSIBLY PART OF THE 94TH BN)

LY TIN AGENT (SOIC AGENT C/3): ACCORDING TO A SQUAD LEADER FROM THE MILITIA OF KY SANH VILLAGE, A VC COMPANY, CO: TRAN TRUNG DUNG, HAS SENT SUICIDE DEMOLITIONS TEAM ARMED WITH 4 BLOCKS OF TNT, 4 SUB-MACHINE GUNS, WEARING CAMOUFLAGED UTILITIES. INTENTIONS: TO BLOW THE AN TAN BRIDGE. (SENIOR ADVISOR'S COMMENT: LOCAL FORCE ELEMENTS)

LY TIN 2D DIVISION AGENT REPORTED (C/3): 1 VC COMPANY, CO: CHAN NGOC XICH, ARMED WITH 1 60 MM MORTAR, 1 MACHINE GUN, MOVED TO (BT 403077). SENIOR 2D DIVISION ADVISOR'S COMMENT: POSSIBLY A/19 COMPANY; ALSO KNOWN AS 150TH AND COULD BE KNOWN AS 94TH BN)

10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.


C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 174


1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 090800H THROUGH 100800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. 091235H, SWAIN 24 REPORTS 1 PLATOON OF VC VICINITY OF (BT 395173) AND (BT 405125). A REQUEST WAS MADE FOR H&I FIRES FOR THAT AREA. REQUEST WAS GRANTED AND H&I FIRES WERE FIRED. SURVEILLANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

092015H, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE COVER OF DARKNESS, INCLEMENT WEATHER AND THE TERRAIN, A VC MOVED CLOSE TO THE SWAIN "K" LINES IN VICINITY OF (BT 515064) AND THREW ONE CONCUSSION TYPE GRENADE WHICH DETONATED HARMLESSLY IN A FLOODED RICE PADDY WITHOUT INJURY TO ANY MARINES OR SIGNIFICANT PROPERTY DAMAGE. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTY IN LOCATING THE TARGET, ONE ROUND WAS FIRED WHICH FRIGHTENED THE GRENADE THROWER AWAY. A FIRE TEAM WAS QUICKLY DISPATCHED TO SEARCH THE AREA FROM WHICH THE GRENADE WAS THROWN BUT THE INDIVIDUAL HAD APPARENTLY HASTILY DEPARTED IN A GENERALLY WESTWARD DIRECTION.

4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. NO INTERPRETER WAS UTILIZED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
8. SWAIN 24 REPORTS:

091925H, C/3: 3 VC BATTALIONS EXPECTED TO HIT TONIGHT, ONE AT AN TAN, ONE AT LY TIN DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, AND ONE AT THE ONG DO BRIDGE.

10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.


C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 175

1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 100800H THROUGH 110800H NOVEMBER 1965
3. a. SM-24 RPTS 1 VC PLATOON RECON AREA VICINITY (BT 424096). THIS PLATOON COMMANDED BY PHAM TRACH TRUNG (DST EVAL C-3).
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. NO INTERPRETER WAS UTILIZED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
8. SWAIN 24 REPORTS
 - a. 1 MAIN FORCE BN JOINED BY THE DO THE CHAP COMPANY LOCATED VIC (BT 360146-373153-358152). TIME SIGHTED 091000H. (DST EVAL C-2).
 - b. A DISTRICT PLATOON JOINED THE 94TH MAIN FORCE BN LOCATED VIC (BT 390097-384103-397107). TIME OF SIGHTING WAS 091000H. WEAPONS CONSIST OF 1-81MM MORTAR, 2-60MM MORTARS, 12 BARS.
 - c. THE 304TH MAIN FORCE BN MOVED FROM VIC (BT 4099) TO (BT 457029-425035-434043). STRENGTH 300 WEAPONS 1-81MM MORTAR, 2-60MM MORTAR, 1-57RR, 2-30MG, 1-50MG, 9BARS, 30 SMG, 30 M91, 2 PRC-10.
 - d. THE 75TH RF BN (CO DO THE CHAP) MOVED WITH 304TH TO SAME VICINITY. STRENGTH 250 WEAPONS 1-81MM, 2-60MM, 2-30MG, 1-57MM RR, 1 RKT LAUNCHER, 2-PRC-10. 75TH BN HAS 25 FEMALE MEMBERS. THESE 2 BN INTEND TO ATTACK TARGETS VIC (BT 478075-429109-4009-4010-4909).
10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

C. G. DRAKE
By direction

INTSUM # 176

1. SWAIN - 2
2. PERIOD 110800H TO 120000H NOVEMBER 1963
3. a. NO ENEMY CONTACT DURING PERIOD.
4. a. NO DEAD. NO WOUNDED.
6. NO INTERPRETER WAS AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD
8. SWAIN - 24 REPORTS FROM LY TIN
 - a. POLICE AGENT RPT (C-3) 117/106 BN STRENGTH 300, CC TAG WAS LOCATED VIC (BT 375062) AT 110900H. INTEND TO COMBINE WITH LOCAL GUERRILLAS AND ATTACK GOVERNMENT TROOPS. WEAPONS CONSIST OF 2 AAMG, 3-LMG, 1-81MM MORTAR, 2-57MM RR, 21-BARS, 2 PRC-10, 2 GENERATORS, 5 ROLLS OF WIRE.
 - b. PF AGENT RPTS (F-6) 3 VC COMPANIES AS FOLLOWS: 1 CO (603 BN) CC LAI VIC (BT 4300). WEAPONS 1-81MM MORTAR, 1-LMG, 6-BAR, 2-SMG. 1 CO (654 BN) CC HOANL, VIC (BT 4305) WPNS UNE. 1 CO (654 BN) CC TRAN THO DUNG, VIC (BT 4202) WEAPONS 2-60MM MORTARS, 1-LMG, 6-BAR.
 - c. LY TIN SICC AGT (C-4) RPTS 94TH BN COMMANDED BY NGUYEN TAI TRON LOCATED VIC (BT 425015-435014-430017).
 - d. ON 10 NOV 20/82 REGT STRENGTH 1,600 MOVED TO KY THANH VILLAGE. WEAPONS ARE 4-81MM MORT, 2-RKT LAUNCHERS, 6-60MM MORT, 12-LMG, UNIT HAS 400 MEN AND 200 WOMEN LABORERS ACCOMPANYING.
 - e. 304/108 BN STRENGTH 300 LOC VIC (BT 428025-437029-425035-434043). REPORTED COMBINING WITH 75TH BN AT THESE COORD. 304TH BN KO CHAU HOC KICH. CC 75TH BN DO THE CHAP. WPNS 304TH 2-60MM MORT, 1-81MM MORT, 1-57MM RR, 2-LMG, 1-HMG (50 CAL), 9-BAR, 30-SMG, 30-M-1, 2-PRC-10 WPNS 75TH BN 1-81MM MORT, 2-60MM MORT, 2-LMG, 1-57MM RR, 1-FLAME THROWER, 2PRC-10.
10. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
11. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
12. NO CHANGE SINCE INTSUM # 169.
13. NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES.

C. G. DRAKE
By airection

HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, Marine #23
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
o/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California, 96601

2/CGD/rpt
3800
271630H Nov 65

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment (Attn: S-2)
Subj: Intelligence Summary # 177, Period ending 271630H November 1965

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation for the period

A. Characteristics of the Area of Operation. No Change.

B. Enemy Military Situation

(1) Company "I" chopped to 3/9. No enemy contact.

(2) Company "K" chopped to 3/9. No enemy contact.

(3) Company "L" - while furnishing security for Battalion Command Post, a listening post of Co "L" at (AT 975701) at 262115H observed a person moving along the bank of the SONG TUY LOAN at (AT 975700). At 262100H illumination was fired by an adjacent unit and, because the individual took exceptional evasive measures and attempted to seek concealment in the bushes, the listening post opened fire with one M-14. Eight rounds were expended. The infiltrator ceased his activities. At first light the area was searched but the VC had made good his escape. Foot prints of a person apparently wearing boots were found and what appeared to be a concealed operation point.

(4) Company "M" - Regimental Reserve and Security for ASP#1. No Enemy contact.

C. Report of information of VC received directly from civilians

No information was received from VN civilians.

D. Viet Cong casualties:

	For 24 Hour <u>Reporting period:</u>
KIA (Confirmed)	0
KIA (Possible)	0
VC Captured	0
VC Captured (WIA)	0
VC Suspects	0

E. Destroyed and captured enemy material. None.

F. Destroyed enemy positions and/or fortifications. None.

C. G. DRAKE
By direction

HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, Marine #23
3rd Marine Division (Rein), RMP
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California, 96601

2/CGD/rpt
3800
30 Nov 65

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment (Attn: S-2)
Subj: Intelligence Summary # 178, Period ending 301630H November 1965

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation for the period

- a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation. No Change.
- b. Enemy Military Situation
- (1) Company "I" - No enemy contact.
 - (2) Company "H" - No enemy contact.
 - (3) Company "L" - chopped to 3/9.
 - (4) Company "M" - Regimental Reserve and Security for ASP#1. No Enemy contact.
 - (5) H&S Company - Detail furnishing security for bridge construction crew vicinity (AT 972699) received 3 rounds of sniper fire from a south westerly direction vicinity MC BAN #2 (AT 968698). Exact origin of fire was undetermined and river barrier prevented immediate search of area. 301480
- c. Report of information of VC received directly from civilians
No information was received from VN civilians.
- d. Wiet Cong casualties: For 24 Hour
Reporting period:
- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| KIA (Confirmed) | 0 |
| KIA (Possible) | 0 |
| VC Captured | 0 |
| VC Captured (MIA) | 0 |
| VC Suspects | 0 |
- e. Destroyed and captured enemy material. None.
- f. Destroyed enemy positions and/or fortifications. None.

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines
DA NANG, VIETNAM
291200H Nov 1965

Special Intelligence Report on Phase II of Operation "BLUE MARLIN" to accompany After Action Report #42 dtd 211200H Nov 1965.

Ref: (a) BLT 3/3 Op Ord 19-65
(b) MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 Series L701, Sheets 6658 I and II

1. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATION

a. Topography. The Battalion's objective area is bounded on the east by the South China Sea; the north by the SONG CUA DAI; the west by the TRUONG GIANG and on the south by a line drawn through (BT 239416) and (BT 263428). The area encompassed by these boundaries is basically a barrier reef composed mainly of sand lightly consolidated with scrub brush and pines. The area is approximately 3000 meters east to west at the south and widens to approximately 6500 meters east to west at the north. The area is 15,000 meters north to south and the highest point is 24 meters above mean sea level at (BT 244432). A ridge runs parallel to, and approximately 1000 meters east of the TRUONG GIANG. The dunes slope rather steeply to the riparian flood plain along the TRUONG GIANG. The center of the area of operations is somewhat depressed as there is a ring of dunes along both sides of the area.

In general, the density of population increases towards the north and out bound from the center of the area in response to more arable land. The area bounding the TRUONG GIANG is densely populated forming an almost complete border of houses along the western flank of the area of operation. The flood plain along the TRUONG GIANG is a low, fertile plain dissected by paddy dikes and small meandering streams. It is subject to partial and complete flooding. It affords poor to impassible trafficability for tracked vehicles when flooded and poor to moderate when dry. Wheeled vehicles will find it impassible in most conditions except when prior foot route reconnaissance can be made. It will afford poor to fair trafficability for foot troops.

In the sandy area pools of water remain after heavy rains. These should not affect tactical use of the terrain by foot troops or vehicles.

Trafficability of the sand areas will vary from fair to poor based on information from aerial photo interpretation. Tracked vehicles should be able to negotiate virtually all sand terrain while wheeled vehicles will find trafficability usually poor improving to moderate on sand that is partly water saturated such as along the beach.

There are no roads in the objective area. Most trails are mere foot trails without sufficient width to be classified as roads. Vegetation is mainly scrub pines and bushes and should not be impassable or, if locally impassable, it should be possible to maneuver around with tracked vehicles. Wheeled vehicles may find the combination of hummocks and vegetation locally impassable. Hummocks may make trafficability for tracked vehicles poor in places.

Air observatic over the dune areas will be excellent. The trees and brush will provide some concealment for VC and foot troops. In built up areas concealment for foot troops from both ground and air observation will be excellent. Ground observation in the sand dunes will vary from excellent to moderately good. Cover will be lacking except in some of the more eroded areas. The rice paddies will provide little concealment for attacking troops and very little cover. Observation over these paddies should be excellent. Fields of fire generally correspond with observation. In built up areas fields of fire will be greatly reduced.

One political boundary crosses the area of operations. The boundary between the provinces of QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN crosses from west to east passing northeast from (BT 170496) to (BT 205523). This boundary should be noted as VCS apprehended must be sent to appropriate collective centers according to their home province.

In the area of operations the TRUONG GIANG is estimated to average about 0.8 meters in depth, varying in width from 15 meters minimum to 500 meters maximum. The streams width and depth are controlled by the tides in the South China Sea. The bottom is silt/sand as are the banks. The stream is navigable by shallow draft native boats. The current is normally weak but subject to tidal variation at the extremities.

Aerial photo indicate potential LVT entry points at (BT 218462) and (BT 216464). LVTs will have difficulty leaving the river but ramps may be dropped on the bank and troops debarked at (BT 214463) and (BT 210463). The TRUONG GIANG has a number of fish traps located throughout its course along the objective area flank. These traps conceivably could interfere with LVTs operating in the stream.

The topography of the objective area is largely controlled by the soil. The entire area is composed of sand only partially stabilized by pine trees and other plants. A line of sand dunes form a berm immediately inland from the high water line which is unconsolidated for the most part. Inland from the dune, pine trees which appear to have been deliberately planted form a wind break and serve to consolidate the soil.

Relief therefore is slight, with uniform and gentle slopes, except the bank of stream beds which are steeply incised. Most of the streams are contained between levees of sand three to ten feet high since the lack of relief and shallow water table induce flooding unless steps are taken to keep the streams within bounds. Because these levees are quite numerous, especially in the central portion of the objective area where they would form an obstacle to all vehicles and provide cover and concealment for foot troops. High ground is not critical due to the relative lowness of the dunes and the restrictions on observation and fields of fire imposed by cultural features of vegetation.

Observation along the beach is, of course, excellent but in most of the objective area observation is limited by vegetation or houses. Some open areas exist varying in size up to several hundred meters long and several hundred wide in the central portion. Fields of fire and observation over these is generally excellent.

In some of the older stands of pine, observation and fields of fire are good but the newer planted areas the pine trees have been pruned at the top with the result that they form a bush, two to seven feet high with rather thick foilage that hinders vision. Within the hamlets along the coast observation and fields of fire are limited by houses and some trees and bushes. The hamlets are generally rather open. Houses are well separated and hamlets cover a large area. The same basic pattern prevails in the farming hamlets

within the central portion of the objective area except that much more vegetation surrounds the houses and tends to further limit observation and fields of fire.

No roads were found in the area but well developed trails run throughout the objective area connecting the hamlets and individual houses. Only a very few foot bridges were found so that most streams had to be forded. As the streams generally were shallow they presented no obstacle to troop movement. Many of the trails lead along the small dikes between paddies and vary in width so that no generalization as to width can be made. Some of the main trails were seven to eight feet wide with trees lining both sides. Travel by vehicles off the beach is difficult even for tracked vehicles due to soil limitations and lack of a road net. Any vehicular traffic should be the subject of a foot reconnaissance prior to commencing the movement. In the area along the dunes many of the older pines are seven to ten inches in diameter and upwards of 35 feet high and due to close spacing present obstacles to vehicle traffic.

Many areas were suitable as landing zones for helicopters throughout the area. Some are large enough in the central portion and along the beach for twenty helicopters but most are limited to two to four aircraft. Due to lack of details on the maps and the lack of visible land marks on the ground, point location in the objective area are extremely difficult if not impossible except along the beach. The older map edition with relief shown in hachures is easier to use in this area.

House types were fairly uniform throughout the region. In each cluster of homes, one or two made of stucco with tile roofs were found but the majority were bamboo matting with thatched roofs. Many were only one room. Judging from the houses and family shrines, the area is not rich. Houses are not closely grouped but generally are separated by small garden plots with a few trees, cactus plants or fences.

One cultural feature that was noted at the retraction beach is a dike of sand built across the beach exit with cacti to stabilize the sand. In areal photos it appears to be a ditch or trench but upon inspection appears to be a dike to prevent flooding of the area immediately inland in the event of high tides and winds. No emplacements for automatic weapons were found or other military positions in relation to the feature.

b. Weather. During Phase II of Operation Blue Merlin, weather was never a controlling factor. Early morning rains and rain during the night of 18-19 November caused inconvenience and discomfort to the troops, but did not materially interfere with operations. The night helicopter lift of Company "I" commencing at 182055H was not prevented by weather, but darkness and weather increased the risks and slowed down the operation. High sensible temperatures in the afternoons did not detract from troop efficiency due in part to short periods of high temperatures, availability of full or partial shade in much of the area and slowness of movement imposed by the search and clear operation. Due to the water table being almost at the surface, runoff after a rain quickly appears in stream beds. Unless care is taken in siting of camps, supplies or positions in draws on stream beds could result in flooding in the event of even light rains.

Rains also increase trafficability of some sands. This increased trafficability is effective only while the sand is semi-saturated. Bottoms in the slow flowing streams may not reflect this increased trafficability due to semi-saturation, especially those streams with organic material collected on the bottom.

c. Enemy Strength and Components. The only VC encountered were in small groups or individuals. Teams seemed to consist of two to five or seven with some individuals acting alone firing harassing fire with small arms.

Reports from villagers indicate that hard core VC units are not stationed in the objective area but visit periodically. The size of this visiting unit reportedly is about 20 men.

Local Force VC are armed with carbines, at least one heavier automatic weapon and possibly a few Thompson Sub-Machine guns or M3A1's since after the Reconnaissance Platoon fire fight a .45 caliber expended round was found in the VC position. During the fire fight the VC used M-26 grenades and a VC home made fragmentation grenade was found. Markings were mostly obliterated except for "4-24-65" stamped around the wooden fuze assembly of the VC grenade.

A helicopter was taken under fire by machine guns and a crewman wounded at (BT 197523). Observers say that this was definitely a machine gun but could not determine make or caliber.

The local populace appeared to be neutral in attitude toward the U.S. Forces and talked fairly freely to the Vietnamese accompanying our forces. There was initially some fear of U.S. Forces. This probably is the result of VC propaganda efforts. The Civic Action team reportedly was told by the local people that the VC informed them in advance of the Marine Landing, that the force was coming and advised them that Marines would steal and commit atrocities. When VCS were apprehended they and their families seemed convinced that they were to be killed and became extremely agitated. This area has been thoroughly propagandized by the VC with anti-American themes. A poster denouncing U.S. use of B-52 against innocent civilians was found by the landing force was typical. This poster was hand lettered on red paper and tied to a tree outside a hamlet. Poster was removed but rain destroyed it before it could be turned in to a intelligence collection point.

d. Hamlets

(1) HA BINH (2). Many fighting holes were hidden in the trees surrounding the village with very few in the village itself. Most of those in the village itself were along the main trails. Punji traps; mostly old, surrounded the village. Shallow trench lines with punji stakes placed in front, again mostly old, the stakes well weathered, covered the southern approach to the hamlet. The hamlet itself is oriented, east-west along the trail shown on the map. Most of the houses are separated from each other by small garden plots of table vegetables so that houses are 25-30 meters apart.

House types are bamboo mat and occasionally a stucco house. The populace appeared poor and avoided contact with Marines but otherwise did not act hostile.

Fishing obviously provided the main source of income for village and most of the people in the village were making or repairing nets using monofilament line.

Psychological warfare posters and handouts were distributed. Inhabitants did not want to take them directly and many were posted on fences and along trails.

A small school is located at (BT 251452). Nearby a trench line leads to the Southwest for approximately 450 meters and after a short gap across an open space, another trench line runs off in continuation for at least

100 meters and it is unknown how far it actually goes. This trench is under the trees but otherwise uncamouflaged. It averages about 4 feet deep and 2½ feet wide. Spoil is used as a parapet on the down slope side. It is not positioned to protect the village and apparently has no real defensive purpose.

(2) TAN AN (2). This village is more extensive than shown on the map but basically it reflects the same factors as HA BINH (2). Most fighting holes are outside the town with only a few inside along the main trail and these at the edge of town.

The houses are dispersed and well spaced. Shade trees and garden plants within the hamlet tend to give it more open appearance than the average central vietnamese hamlet.

Here again most of the people were gone leaving only the old men, cripples, women and children. Most of the girls aged late teen to mid-thirties were also missing, possibly as a result of VC propaganda.

(3) HA TAY. This is a large hamlet dependent on fishing for a living. Like the others along the coast it is oriented along a trail running east and west and in this case, also along the North-South trail.

The local people were neutral toward Marines but individual families became very upset when people were apprehended as possible VCS. In part their reaction was probably due to VC propaganda. The people attempted to remain aloof during the sweep through the hamlet. Some evidence of VC propaganda activity was found, notably a VC poster protesting U.S. use of B-52 against the Vietnamese.

Several punji traps lined with tile to prevent their collapse in the soft sand were found. Some of these traps were made with punji stakes in from the sides to prevent withdrawal of the trapped persons foot. Most of these punji traps were metal with piles of dried brush or markers of sticks tied to form a pyramid.

One elaborate but unoccupied spider trap was found at (BT 238486). It was lined with woven bamboo and shaped like a bell. Two bamboo pipes provided ventilation. The ends of these pipes were covered with bits of broken pottery. The camouflage was later found on several other spider holes. The hole was sited on a raised sand levee. No other holes could be found nearby. This hole was destroyed by engineers. Throughout the objective area this was typical of spider traps found.

(4) HA BINH (1) and TAN AN (1) run almost together to form one large hamlet. Rice paddies surround the area. Many of the paddies are separated by fairly high dikes, up to seven feet high and travel is difficult. Most of the paddies were flooded from one to two feet of water.

While uncomfortable and a hindrance, the area was not too difficult for foot troops. Vehicles would probably require engineer assistance to maneuver in this area.

The hamlets themselves were not as dense as most farm hamlets. They did not give the appearance of being overly prosperous.

Observation over the cultivated fields is good but the dikes provide concealment and cover for foot troops from ground observation. There are sufficient trees to give cover to foot troops from aerial observation.

The central hamlets of BAO BINH HA, BUO BINH THUONG, NGAI LE (1), (2), and (3) are so run together that distinguishing one from another is almost impossible.

Houses are spread out, separated by trees, fences, dikes and small garden plots and by occasional rice paddies. Usually trails from a connecting link between houses. Many areas have barbed wire fences, with trenches and punji stakes, for local defense. No booby traps were found in any of the villages except for two cross-bows found by "I" Company farther south at (BT 244449). This area has several open sand fields that make excellent helicopter landing zones but many of them have anti-helicopter stakes made of sharpened pine branches, from 3 to eight feet high and several have barbed wire strung twelve to twenty feet above the ground on the diagonal to interfere with helicopter operations. Extreme care must be exercised in using any open space as an LZ.

One difficulty that arose constantly was the virtual impossibility of accurately locating position on the ground after leaving the beach. Use of some standard signal to helicopters and having the AO locate the unit and report the unit's coordinates to ground units would seem to be the most immediately practical. Locations reported in this report are all estimates except those taken from the beach sites.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

a. The Civil Affairs Teams attached to the battalion were used to screen the local inhabitants with excellent effect. On the second day, C.I. people from the Vietnamese Districts were used. These were especially helpful in that they had a blacklist that speeded and enhanced the screening of VCS. USMC, C.I. personnel had no blacklist and were used in an advisory capacity only.

The presence of ITT personnel is an excellent idea, however evacuation of apprehended personnel from the apprehending unit to the collection point is a problem that remained unsolved. Lack of interpreters at company and platoon level hindered both tactical interrogation and civil affairs activity. Use of Military police for operations of the battalion collection point proved to be a most effective and efficient practice since it freed battalion personnel for performance of their primary duties.

b. It is recommended that all intelligence sources be made available to battalion. In this particular instance important information was available from advisors at TAM KY and HOI AN concerning friendly activities and the enemy situation in particular, results of previous operations within the objective area such as that of the 11th Ranger Battalion conducted about a week previous to Blue Marlin II in conjunction with Junk Force units.

c. Half-tone reproductions of aerial photos are sufficient for use by platoon and company commanders, but for detailed planning purposes prints of the photos are preferable.

3. VC casualties and losses. During the Operation there were 56 VCS apprehended with the following dispositions:

- a. 1 VCS & 1 VCC to ITT, DA NANG
- b. 1 VCS to "G" MED
- c. 13 VCS (probably civilians) to District Headquarters
- d. 40 VCS to HOI AN

6
C. G. DRAKE
Captain S-2

1. 3d Bn, 3d MARINES OPERATIONS.

- a. Company I - maintains positions on Hill 69, AN TAN Bridge and the MLR. At 010038H the platoon occupying AN TAN Bridge saw 10 people approximately 100 meters South of the bridge. Two rounds of small arms fire were fired. The platoon returned the fire and the area illuminated with 81mm Mortars. Subsequent investigations revealed nothing of interest. The company conducted one platoon size patrol in vicinity of Hill 69 and one squad size ambush patrol to West of AN TAN Village.
- b. Company K - maintained two platoons on the MLR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter.
- c. Company L - remains as Reg't Reserve Company and is maintaining positions on the airfield perimeter. At 011100H, the First platoon was alerted to be heliolifted by six H 34's to (AT 914246) an area approximately 35 miles to the North of CHU LAI to provide security for a disabled helicopter. At 011130H the entire company was alerted for possible deployment at the disabled helicopter site. The Helicopters arrived at the landing zone at 011131H and lifted out at 011138H. At 011250H the second platoon was alerted to also lift out.
- d. Company M - remains at DA NANG ENCLAVE.
- e. Other Organic Units - None
- f. Supporting Units - the Tank Platoon maintained positions on the airfield perimeter during the night.

g.	<u>S&C OPNS.</u>	<u>PATROLS</u>	<u>MDUSHES</u>	<u>LIST POST</u>	<u>SCOUT SNIPER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Fire Team						
Squad		1	1			2
Platoon		1				1
Company						
Total		2	1			3

h. Contacts - None

2. Plans Summary

- a. Company I - the company will continue to man positions on Hill 69, AN TAN Bridge and the MLR, aggressively patrolling their area of responsibility.
- b. Company K - the company will maintain two platoons on the MLR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter. The company will continue vigorous patrolling action to the front and rear of the MLR.

- d. Company M - the company is presently employed at DA NANG.
- e. Other Organic Units - None
- f. Supporting Units - the Tank Platoon will take up positions on the airfield perimeter.

	<u>S&C ORNS</u>	<u>PARCIS</u>	<u>AMUSSES</u>	<u>HEAT POST</u>	<u>SCOU SNIPER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Fire Team						
Squad		5	4			9
Platoon		1				1
Company						
Total		6	4			10

3. Civil Affairs

- a. Civil Affairs - None
- b. Psychological Warfare - The MEDCAP Patrol treated 85 people at AN TAN Village.

4. Miscellaneous - None

G. V. Gardner
 G. V. GARDNER
 By direction

3d Battalion, 3d Marines SITREP #165 as of 011800H to 021200H October 1965

1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines Operations.

- a. Company I. Company I continued to man and improve positions on Hill 69, AN TAN Bridge and the MLR. During reporting period one platoon size patrol in the vicinity of Hill 69 and one squad size ambush patrol was conducted.
- b. Company K. Company K occupied positions on the MLR with two platoons and on the airfield perimeter with one platoon. Two squad size ambush patrols were conducted during the night along likely avenues of approach forward of the Hill to guard against VC infiltration.
- c. Company L. Company L remains as Reg't Reserve Company and manned defensive positions on the airfield perimeter. At 011855H the remaining elements of the company returned to the airfield after successfully providing area security for a disabled helicopter at (AT 914246), an area approximately 35 miles North West of CHU LAI. The first and second platoons participated in this operation.
- d. Company M. Remains at DA NANG onclave under opcon of 3d Marines.
- e. H&S Company. A provisional platoon continued to provide CP security, tying in with Company K along the Northern edge of the airfield perimeter. One section of 81mm Mortars and one section of 106 Recoilless Rifles are presently deployed at DA NANG with Company M. Battalion Scouts manned a position on the airfield perimeter maintaining surveillance to the North along avenues of approach with tipsy-21 during hours of darkness. The 81mm Mortar Platoon provided illumination on call to assist in the airfield defense.
- f. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion placed five Tanks at strategic positions around the airfield utilizing their searchlight to illuminate critical area of possible VC infiltration.

	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	LISTENING POSTS	TOTAL
SQUAD	3	3	1	7
PLATOON	1			1
TOTAL	4	3	1	8

h. Contacts. None

2. Plans Summary.

- a. Company I. Company I will hold their positions on the MLR, the AN TAN Bridge and at the combat outpost on Hill 69, aggressively patrolling their area of responsibility.
- b. Company K. Company K will continue to deploy two platoons on the MLR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter. Vigorous patrolling action in the company's area will be conducted.

- c. Company L. Company L will remain as Reg't Reserve with the mission of defending the airfield and providing a rapid reaction force to be deployed, on order, anywhere in the CHU LAI area.
- d. Company M. Company M will continue to be deployed at DA NANG under opcon of 3d Marines.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will provide CP security tying into the airfield perimeter defense at the Northern approaches of the strip. 81mm Mortar Platoon will remain ready at anytime to fire illumination on call.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will take up strategic positions on the airfield defense during the night. Their searchlight will be positioned on likely avenues of approach.

	<u>PATROLS</u>	<u>AMMUSHES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
squad	6	5	11
platoon	1		1
total	7	5	12

3. Civil Affairs.

- a. Civil Affairs. None
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MEDCAP Patrol was canceled due to other commitments.

4. Miscellaneous. A provisional unit from MAES was placed under opcon of L Company during the night to assist in the defense of the airfield.

G. V. Gardner
 G. V. GARDNER
 By direction

3d Battalion, 3d Marines SITRF #166 as of 021800H to 051200H October 1965

1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines operations.
 - a. Company I. Company I continued to man and improve positions on Hill 69, AN TAN Bridge and the MLR. During reporting period one platoon size patrol in the vicinity of Hill 69 and one squad size ambush patrol was conducted.
 - b. Company K. Two platoons of Company K occupied positions on the MLR while one platoon occupied positions on the airfield perimeter. Two squad size ambush patrols were conducted during the night along likely avenues of approach forward of the MLR to guard against VC infiltration. Two squad size ambush patrols scheduled for last night were cancelled due to FF ambushes in the same area.
 - c. Company L. Company L remained as Regimental Reserve Company until 020600H. At that time the company took up positions in the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines MLR while the 7th Marines are conducting operation ELAC. Lift off for four days. At 021304H, one platoon from L Company was alerted to heliolift out to an area 24 miles North of here GC (BT 1329) where a disabled helicopter was located. At 021410H the 3d platoon of L Company lifted out. At the position of the disabled helicopter the platoon set up a perimeter defense and received sporadic small arms fire. The helicopter was determined to be unsalvageable and the platoon retracted. At 022005H the platoon was returned to its position on the airfield perimeter defense. During lift off from the area of operation the helicopters were fired on by carbine and light automatic weapons resulting in two Marine WIA who were flown immediately to B Company, 3d Medical Battalion. While in the objective area three VCS were apprehended and were subsequently turned over to the Regt Collection Point.
 - d. Company M. Remains at DA NANG enclave.
 - e. H&S Company. A provisional platoon continued to provide Battalion CP security, tying in with Company K along the Northern edge of the airfield perimeter. One section of 81mm Mortars and one section of 106 Recoilless Rifles are presently, deployed at DA NANG with Company M Battalion Security manned a position on the airfield perimeter maintaining surveillance to the North along avenues of approach with a TPS, -21 during hours of darkness. The 81mm Mortar platoon provides illumination on call to assist in the airfield defense.
 - f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion placed five Tanks at strategic positions around the airfield to utilize their fire power, as well as employing their searchlight to illuminate likely area of VC infiltration.

SQUAD	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
2			4
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	3	2	5

h. CONTACTS	DTG	OPN	FRIENDLY LOSSES	ENEMY LOSSES
GS (BT 1329)	021730H	Disabled Helicopter Security	2 WIA	3 VCS

2. Plans Summary.

- Company I. Company I will hold their positions on the MIR, the TAN TAN Bridge and at the combat outpost on Hill 69, aggressively patrolling their area of responsibility.
- Company K. Company K will continue to deploy two platoons on MIR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter. Vigorous patrolling action in the company's area will be conducted.
- Company L. Company L will continue to man positions on the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine MIR during duration of operation BLCK FERRET.
- Company M. Company M is expected to be returned from DA NANG and take up positions on 3d Battalion, 3d Marines MIR 3 November 1965.
- HES Company. HES Company will provide CP security, tying into the airfield perimeter defense at the Northern approaches of the airstrip. 81mm Mortar Platoon will remain ready to support the airfield defense with illumination on call.
- Other Organic Units. None.
- Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will take up strategic positions on the airfield defense during the night.

SQUAD	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
6		5	11
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	7	5	12

3. Civil Affairs.

- The Battalion received 1000 lbs. of Bulgar wheat, 40 cases of candy (sweet tarts), 1000 lbs of liquid soap, 3 cases of hard soap, one box of dolls and toys, 7 cases of salt and 36 gallons of salad oil for distribution in our civil affairs program. The Bulgar wheat was inspected by the Battalion Medical Officer and found unfit for human consumption. This wheat will be used as fodder for hogs. A delegation from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines will meet a delegation of the Counterpart Committee of LONG BINH Hamlet to arrange for equitable distribution among the villagers.
- Medical Officer W. R. . The med cap patrol treated 49 villagers in TAN TAN and 35 Villagers in LONG BINH village.

G. V. GARDNER
By direction

3d Battalion, 3d Marines SITREP #167 as of 031200H to 041800H November 1965

1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines Operations.

- a. Company I. Company I continued to man and improve positions on Hill 69, AN TAN Bridge and the MIR. During the reporting period one platoon size patrol to the North of Hill 69 and two squad size ambush patrols to front of the MIR were conducted. A patrol from Company I discovered a dead Vietnamese male in the water of a rice paddy at (BT 518062). He was wearing black shorts and had a wound in his right leg which was bandaged. It was estimated that he had been dead approximately 5-6 days. It is surmised that this man was one of the VC who attacked the airfield 28 October 1965, was wounded and later died of the wounds trying to escape.
- b. Company K. Two platoons of Company K occupied positions on the MIR while one platoon occupied positions on the airfield perimeter. Three squad-size ambush patrols were conducted during the night along likely avenues of approach forward of the MIR to intercept possible attempts by the VC to infiltrate. One patrol was cancelled due to a PF ambush in the same area.
- c. Company L. Company L continues to man positions on 1st Battalion, 7th Marines MIR during the 7th Marines operation BLACK FERRIS.
- d. Company M. Company M remains at the DA NANG enclave.
- e. H&S Company. A provisional platoon provided Battalion CP security, tying in with Company K along the Northern edge of the airfield perimeter. A road-block along the MSR was established to check and control all traffic during the night. One section of 81mm Mortars and one section of 106 Recoilless Rifles are presently deployed at DA NANG with Company M. Battalion Scouts manned a position on the airfield maintaining close and continuous surveillance to the North along avenues of approach with a TPB-21 during hours of darkness. The 81mm Mortar Platoon provided illumination on call to assist in the airfield defense.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five Tanks at strategic positions around the airfield to utilize their fire power as well as employing their searchlights to illuminate likely areas of VC infiltration.

g.	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	5	4	9
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	6	4	10

2. Plans Summary.

- a. Company I. Company I will hold their positions on the MIR, the AN TAN Bridge and at the combat outpost on Hill 69, aggressively patrolling their area of responsibility. One platoon from the company will conduct a patrol in the area of Hill 100 (BT 4206) to investigate reports of a VC Company operating in that location.

- b. Company K. Company K will continue to deploy two platoons on the MIR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter. Vigorous patrolling action in the company's area will be conducted.
- c. Company L. Company L will man positions on the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines MIR during the duration of operation BLACK FERRIT.
- d. Company M. Company M is expected to return from DA NANG and take up position on the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines MIR.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will provide CP security, tying into the airfield perimeter defense at the Northern approaches of the airstrip. 81mm Mortar Platoon will remain ready to support the airfield defense with illumination. The T.S-21 will continue to be employed on the airfield by the Battalion Scouts.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will take up strategic positions on the airfield defense during the night.

h. PATROLS AMBUSHES TOTAL

SQUAD	6	5	11
TOTAL	6	5	11

3. Civil Affairs.

- a. Civil Affairs. None
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MEDCAL Patrol was cancelled due to other commitments.

4. Miscellaneous. Three provisional platoons from MAG 36, FISU and the LAMM Battalion as well as a platoon from 1st Battalion, 4th Marines were placed under opcon of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. These platoons are presently manning positions on the airfield perimeter until Company L returns.

G. V. Gardner
G. V. GARDNER
By direction

1. 3d Bn, 3d Marines Operations

- a. A reinforced Platoon patrol was dispatched on short notice to the area West of Hill 100 (BT 4206), to investigate reports from LY TIN district headquarters of a VC Company in that vicinity. A thorough search of the area revealed no sign of VC activity and the patrol returned just prior to dark. Company I remained at their assigned positions on the MLR, AN TAN Bridge and the combat outpost at Hill 69. Two squad size ambush patrols were conducted during the night to intercept possible VC probes.
- b. Company K. One platoon of Company K occupied a position on the Northern portion of the airfield perimeter. The remainder of the company continued to be deployed along the MLR. Two squad size ambush patrols were conducted in front of the MLR to intercept possible enemy infiltrators. One squad size ambush patrol was cancelled due to a PF ambush in the same area.
- c. Company L. Company L continues to man positions on 1st Bn, 7th Marines MIR during the 7th Marines operation BLACK FERRET.
- d. Company M. Company M remained at the DA NANG enclave.
- e. H&S Company. A provisional platoon provided Battalion CI security. A road block was established to check and control all traffic on the MSR during the night. One section from both the 106 Recoilless Rifle platoon and the 81mm Mortar platoon are presently attached to Company M at DA NANG. Battalion Scouts continued their nightly surveillance of the area to the West and North of the airfield with the TIS-21. The 81mm Mortar platoon maintained a state of readiness to provide illumination for the airfield defense.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to augment the perimeter defense.

G.	PATOONS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	4	3	7
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	5	3	8

2. Plans Summary

- a. Company I. Company I will hold their positions on the MLR, the AN TAN Bridge and at the Battalion combat outpost on Hill 69 throughly patrolling their area of responsibility. One platoon will conduct a patrol in the forward of Hill 69 and a squad ambush patrol will be emplaced along a likely avenue of approach to the outpost on Hill 69.
- b. Company K. Company K will continue to man and improve their positions on the MLR and on the airfield perimeter.
- c. Company L. Company L will continue to occupy positions on 1st Bn, 7th Marines MIR. The company is expected to return to the Bn tonight.

- d. Company M. Company M is expected to return from DA NANG and take up positions on the Bn, MLR today.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will continue to provide C2 security and to employ the Bn Scouts on the airfield with a TIS-21.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will take up strategic positions on the airfield defense perimeter during the night.
- h.
- | | PATROLS | AMBUSHES | TOTAL |
|---------|---------|----------|-------|
| SQUAD | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| PLATOON | 2 | | 2 |
| TOTAL | 5 | 3 | 8 |

3. Civil Affairs

- a. Civil Affairs. The Battalion Chaplain in the capacity of the Battalion Civil Affairs Officer held a conference with the Hamlet Chief of LONG BINH re food distribution. 72 lbs of salt to 200 people, 100 bars of soap to 100 people were distributed through the LONG BINH Counterpart Committee.
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MEDCAL patrol treated 80 villagers in LONG BINH hamlet.

G. V. Gardner
 G. V. GARDNER
 By direction

1. 3d Bn, 3d Marines operations.

- a. Company I. As a result of intelligence from LY TIN District Headquarters of an attempt to infiltrate a 6 man demolition squad into the airfield, Company I and Company K set up additional ambushes along the supposed routes of the infiltrators. One ambush was set up at (BT 464063), another at (BT 495063). These ambushes were conducted between 052200H and 060600H at which time they returned and reported no indication of VC activity. Company I remained at their assigned positions on the MLR, AN TAN Bridge (BT 499068) and the combat outpost on Hill 69 (BT 466068).
- b. Company K. As a result of the intelligence before mentioned in the section "a", Company K placed five squad size ambushes along the two reported approach routes at (BT 514070), (BT 509062), (BT 509058), (BT 519065) and (BT 521060). The ambushes were in place by 052200H and returned at 060600H, reporting no indication of VC infiltration attempts. At the present time the company is deployed with one platoon on the airfield and two platoons on the MLR.
- c. Company L. Company L returned from manning portions of 1st Bn, 7th Marines T.AOR during operation BLACK FERRET and occupied positions on the airfield perimeter.
- d. Company M. Company M remained at the DA NANG enclave.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company provided one provisional platoon for Bn. CP security. A road block was manned to check and control all traffic on the MSR during hours of darkness. One section of 81mm Mortars and one section of 106 Recoilless Rifles are attached to Company M in DA NANG. Battalion Scouts continued their nightly surveillance of the area to the West and North of the airfield with the Bn. TES-21. The 81mm Mortar platoon fired illumination H and I fires during the night to assist in the defense of the airfield.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company G, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to augment the perimeter defense.

g.	INTROLS	AMBUSHES	LISTENING POSTS	TOTAL
FIRE TEAM			1	1
SQUAD		7		7
PLATOON	2			2
TOTAL	2	7	1	10

2. Plans Summary

- a. Company I. Company I will hold their positions on the MLR, the AN TAN Bridge and the combat outpost at Hill 69.


- b. Company K. Company K will continue to man and improve their positions on the MLR and on the airfield perimeter.
- c. Company L. Company L will continue to occupy positions on the airfield perimeter.
- d. Company M. Company M is expected to return from DA NANG and take up positions on the Battalion MLR today.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will continue to provide CP security and to employ the Battalion Scouts on the airfield with the TIS-21.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to augment the perimeter defense.

h.	MINOR	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	2	2	4
TOTAL	2	2	4

*NOTE. One platoon patrol was cancelled due to the extensive commitments and the alert last night.

3. Civil Affairs.

- a. Civil Affairs. An attempt was made to locate a Vietnamese child who is reported to have a harelip by the Bn, Chaplain in the village of KHUONG QUANG (3) village (BT 469075). When this child is located arrangements will be made to send the child to SAIGON for an operation.
 - b. Psychological Warfare. The MEDICAL patrol treated 51 villagers at AN TAN village and 25 villagers at LONG BINH village yesterday.
4. Miscellaneous. An artillery service practice for Popular Force platoon commanders was conducted from the hill mass to the West of Hill 69. The purpose of this exercise was to provide certain of the Popular Force platoon commanders, from LY TIN district, with an opportunity to become acquainted with the procedures and techniques involved in calling for and adjusting artillery fire. The exercise included a period of instructions, followed by a demonstration and concluding with a practical application period and a critique. Subsequent periods of this nature are being planned.
5. CP Locations of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Company I (BT 513058), Company K (BT 514058), Company L (BT 539059), Battalion 3/3 (BT 535076) and Company M (at DA NANG).


G. V. GARDNER
By direction

3d Battalion, 3d Marines SITREP #170 as of 071200H November 1965.

1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines Operations.

- a. Company I. Three Chicom Grenades and a cartridge belt with several 45 caliber rounds were found in the vicinity of the dead Vietnamese male (BT 518062) reported in SITREP #167 of 041200H November. This discovery would tend to confirm the fact that this man was one of the VC who participated in the attack of CHU LAI Airfield 28 October. One squad size patrol returning to Hill 69 received one round of sniper fire from (BT 469078). The patrol investigated the area without discovering any sign of VC activity. The company remained at their assigned positions on the MLR, AN TAN Bridge (BT 499068) and the combat outpost on Hill 69 (BT 468068).
- b. Company K. Company K remains deployed with two platoons on the MLR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter defense. Aggressive patrolling action was conducted in their assigned area of responsibility.
- c. Company L. At 061550 Company L was alerted to be lifted to the DA NANG area, mission and duration of deployment unknown. The first aircraft load took off at 1655H and by 061820H all elements of the company were airborne. Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines assumed Company L's positions on the airfield perimeter defense.
- d. Company M. Company M remained at the DA NANG enclave.
- e. IES Company. IES Company provided one provisional platoon for Battalion CP security. A road block was manned to check and control all traffic on the MSR during hours of darkness. One section of 106 Recoilless Rifles and one section of 81mm Mortars are attached to Company M at DA NANG. Battalion Scouts continued their nightly surveillance of the area to the West and North of the airfield with the Battalion TFS-21. The 81mm Mortar platoon fired illumination H and I fires during the night to assist in the defense of the airfield.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company L, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to utilize their fire power and mobility as well as employing their search lights to illuminate likely areas of VC infiltration.

	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	2	2	4
TOTAL	2	2	4

2. Plans Summary

- a. Company I. Company I will man and improve their positions on the MLR, the AN TAN Bridge and the combat outpost at Hill 69. Defensive positions at AN TAN Bridge will be reinforced with additional overhead cover today, in order to permit firing VT arty fires directly on position.

- b. Company K. Company K will continue to occupy their assigned positions on the MIR and the airfield perimeter.
- c. Company L. Plans for the employment of Company L in the DA NANG area have not been revealed to this command.
- d. Company M. Company M continues to be deployed in the DA NANG area for an unknown period.
- e. E&S Company. E&S Company will continue to provide Battalion CP security and to employ the Battalion Scouts on the airfield with the T1S-21.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will deploy five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield.

h.	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	4	4	8
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	5	4	9

3. Civil Affairs

- a. Civil Affairs. None
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MEDCAL patrol treated 36 villagers at AN TAN village.

4. Miscellaneous. The 3d Republic of Vietnam Marine Battalion arrived yesterday afternoon and was billeted on the beach adjacent to 3/3. This morning 4th Platoon, Company A, 1st Amphtrac Battalion conducted practice beach head assaults with the RVNMC to familiarize the Marines with the Amphtracs and give them an opportunity to become acquainted with procedures and techniques of USMC amphibious tactics.

G. V. GARDNER
By direction

1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines Operations.

- a. Company I. At 071245 the combat outpost at Hill 69 reported what appeared to be two 250 lb bombs struck a village at (BT 456075). A patrol was immediately dispatched to investigate and to render any help needed to the village. At the scene of the accident the patrol assisted in extinguishing fires and giving medical aid to the civilians who were injured. Three of the wounded were evacuated to B Company Med and the remaining eight went to the district dispensary at LY TIN. The injuries of the three evacuated were as follows; one old woman, 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree burns, one young woman with shrapnel wounds, one child with a bump on head. There were 4 pigs killed and one cow wounded and three buildings were destroyed. One Marine was overcome by smoke while fighting the fire and was also evacuated to B Company Med. One squad size patrol was dispatched this morning to assist the Reg't Civil Affairs Officer at the scene of the bombing. A subsequent visit to LY TIN dispensary revealed a report that one woman was killed by the bombs. As of now this report is unconfirmed. The company remained at their assigned positions on the NLR, AN TAN Bridge (BT 499068) and the combat outpost on Hill 69 (BT 468068).
- b. Company K. Company K remains deployed with two platoons on the NLR and one platoon on the airfield perimeter defense aggressive patrolling action was conducted in their assigned area of responsibility.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in the DA NANG area, duration of mission is still unknown.
- d. Company M. Company M remained at the D NANG area.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company provided one provisional platoon for Battalion CI security. A roadblock was manned to check and control all traffic on the MSR during the hours of darkness. One section of 106 Recoilless Rifles and one section of 81mm Mortars are attached to Company I at D. NANG. Battalion Scouts continued their nightly surveillance of the area to the West and North of the airfield during hours of darkness with the T-5-21. The 81mm Mortar platoon provided illumination on evil to assist in the airfield defense.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to utilize their fire power and mobility as well as their searchlights to illuminate likely areas of VC infiltration.

g.	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTALS
SQUAD	4	4	8
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	5	4	9

2. Plans summary

- a. Company I. Company I will man and improve their positions on the NLR, AN TAN Bridge and Hill 69.

- b. Company K. Company K will continue to occupy their assigned positions on the ILLA and the airfield perimeter.
- c. Company L. Plans for the employment of Company L in the DA NANG area have not been revealed to this command.
- d. Company M. Company M continues to be deployed in the DA NANG area for an unknown period.
- e. HES Company. HES Company will continue to provide Battalion CP security and to employ the Battalion Scouts on the airfield with the TIS-21.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will deploy five tanks at critical approach to the airfield.
- h.

	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	2	2	4
PLATOON	1		1
TOTAL	3	2	5

3. Civil Affairs.

- a. Civil Affairs. A patrol was quickly dispatched to assist the villagers who were wounded by the accidental bombing at (BT 456075) and help fight the fires resulting from the explosions.
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MEDCO patrol treated 136 villagers at AN TAN village.

G. V. GARDNER
By direction

3d Battalion, 3d Marines SITREP #172 as of 081800H to 091200H November 1965

1. 3d Battalion, 3d Marines Operations.

- a. Company I. Company I continued to man and improve their positions on the MLR, AN TAN Bridge and the Combat Outpost on Hill 69. Reacting to several reports of an impending attempt by VC demolition teams to infiltrate to the airfield and to the bridge at AN TAN, ambushes were established along likely avenues of approach.
- b. Company K. Two platoons of Company K occupied positions on the MLR while one platoon continued to man positions on the Northern portion of the airfield perimeter defense. Aggressive patrolling action was conducted in their assigned area of responsibility.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in the DA NANG area, duration of mission is still unknown.
- d. Company M. Company M remains in the DA NANG area, duration of mission is still unknown.
- e. H&S Company. A provisional platoon provided Battalion CP security, tying in with Company K along the Northern edge of the airfield perimeter defense. A roadblock was manned to check and control all traffic on the MSR during hours of darkness. Battalion Scouts continued their nightly surveillance of the area to the West and North of the airfield during hours of darkness with the TIS-21. The 81mm Mortar platoon provided illumination on call to assist in the airfield defense.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to utilize their fire power and mobility as well as their searchlights to illuminate likely areas of VC infiltration.

	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	2	4	6
TOTAL	2	4	6

NOTE: Two ambushes were added to last night's schedule in response to intelligence of an attempt to blow the bridge at AN TAN.

2. Plans Summary.

- a. Company I. Company I will man and improve their positions on the MLR, AN TAN Bridge and Hill 69. Additional defenses against VC swimmer/demo teams being installed at AN TAN Bridge.
- b. Company K. Company K will continue to occupy their assigned positions on the MLR and the airfield perimeter.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in DA NANG for an undetermined period of time.
- d. Company M. Company M continues to be deployed at DA NANG area for an unknown period.

- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will continue to provide CP Security and to employ Battalion Scouts on the airfield with the TIS-21.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will continue to deploy five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield.
- h.

	PATROLS	AMDUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	5	4	9
TOTAL	5	4	9

3. Civil Affairs.

- a. Civil Affairs. A patrol assisted the Reg't Civil Affairs Officer in obtaining statements from the villagers who were connected with, the accidental bombing 7 November 1965.
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MED CAI patrol was cancelled due to other commitments.

G. V. Gardner
 G. V. GARDNER
 By direction

3d Battalion, 3d Marines SITREP #173 as of 091800H to 10200 November, 1965

1. 3d Bn, 3d Marines Operations.

- a. Company I continued to man their positions on the MLR, AN TAN Bridge and the combat outpost on hill 69. Aggressive patrolling and ambush action were conducted in their assigned area of responsibility.
- b. Company K. Taking advantage of the cover of darkness, inclement weather and the terrain, a VC moved close to the Company K's lines in the vicinity of (T 515064) and threw one concussion type grenade which detonated harmlessly in a flooded rice paddy with out injury to any Marine personnel. One round was fired which frightened the grenade thrower away. A fire team was quickly dispatched to search the area from which the grenade was thrown, but the individual had apparently hastily departed.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in the DA NANG area, duration of the mission is still unknown.
- d. Company M. Company M remains in the DA NANG area, duration of the mission is still unknown.
- e. H&S Company. A provisional platoon provided Battalion CP security, tying in with Company K along the Northern edge of the airfield defense perimeter. A roadblock was manned to check and control all traffic on the MSR during hours of darkness. Battalion Scouts continued their nightly surveillance of the area West and North of the airfield during hours of darkness with the T/S-21. The 81mm Mortar platoon provided illumination on call to assist in the airfield defense.
- f. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion deployed five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield to utilize their fire power, mobility as well as their search lights to illuminate likely areas of VC infiltration.

G.	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	5	4	9
TOTAL	5	4	9

2. Plans Summary.

- a. Company I. Company I's positions at Hill 69, the AN TAN Bridge and the MLR will be relieved by units of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 11 November 1965. Extensive preparation is under way by the company for the move to DA NANG.
- b. Company K. Company K will be relieved of their assigned positions on the MLR by units of 2/4. One platoon of Company K will remain on the airfield perimeter the company is also preparing for the move to DA NANG.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in DA NANG for an undetermined period of time.
- d. Company M. Company M remains in DA NANG for an undetermined period of time.

- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will continue to provide CI Security and to employ Battalion Scouts on the airfield on the TIS-21.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- g. Supporting Units. 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion will continue to deploy five tanks at critical approaches to the airfield.

h.

	PATROLS	AMBUSHES	TOTAL
SQUAD	4	4	8
TOTAL	4	4	8

3. Civil Affairs

- a. Civil Affairs. None
- b. Psychological Warfare. The MED CAL patrol treated 30 villagers in AN TAN village.

G. V. Gardner
 G. V. GARDNER
 By direction

1. 3d Bn. 3d Marines Operations

- a. Company I. Company I was relieved of its positions on Hill 69, and AN TUN Bridge by 2d Bn. 4th Marines at 111200H. Company I still maintains one platoon on MLR. Extensive preparations are under way to move to DA NANG.
- b. Company K. Two platoons of Company K occupied positions on the MLR while one platoon continued to man positions on the Northern portion of the airfield perimeter defense. Aggressive patrolling action was conducted in their assigned area of responsibility. Extensive preparations are under way to move to DA NANG.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in DA NANG.
- d. Company M. Company M remains in DA NANG.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company is in the process of preparing to embark aboard ships for the move to DA NANG.
- f. Supporting Units. None

g.	PATROLS	UNITS	NONE
SUBJ	2	2	4
TOTAL	2	2	4

2. Plans Summary.

- a. Company I. Company I will embark aboard ships on 12 November 1965.
- b. Company K. Company K will embark aboard ships on 12 November 1965.
- c. Company L. Company L remains in DA NANG.
- d. Company M. Company M remains in DA NANG.
- e. H&S Company. H&S Company will embark aboard ships on 12 & 13 November 1965.
- f. Other Organic Units. None
- h. None

3. Civil Affairs

- a. Civil Affairs. None
- b. Psychological Warfare. None

G. V. GARDNER
By direction

3d Bn (Rein), 3d Marines After Action Report #42

Ref: (a) DivOro 321-65

(b) Map 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 66581 II and IV.

1. Units

3d Bn (-) (Rein) 3d Marines, 3d Mar Div
Btry C (-) 1st Bn, 12th Marines
SPQT, Hq Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
3d Plat, Co B, 3d Recon Bn
3d Plat, Co B, 3d AT Bn
3d Plat, Co B, 3d Engr Bn
1st Plat, Co C, 3d Tank Bn
4th Plat, Co A, 1st Amtrac Bn
Det, Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div
C. Tm
Psy War Tm
FLSU #3
Det, Co C, 3d Shore Party Bn
DLT Reserve
Co A, (Rein), 1st Bn, 7th Marines
FO Tm, 81mm Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 7th Mar
FO Tm, Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
Engr Tm, 3d Plat, Co B, 3d Engr Bn

Strength: 38 Officers; 1094 Enlisted

Time: 160700H to 191000H November 1965

Place: Bounded on the East by the SOUTH CHINA SEA; the North by the SONG CUA DAI; the West by the TRUONG GIANG and on the South by a line drawn through (DT 239416) and (DT 269428).

Nature of Action: Search and destroy.

Casualties: 1 KIA, 2 Non-Battle injuries.

2. Summary. DLT 3/3 conducted a three day search and destroy mission South of HOI AN bounded on the left by the TRUONG GIANG and on the right by the SOUTH CHINA SEA. Two companies landed on Beach Orange in LVT's and secured the beach unopposed. They were followed ashore by Battalion Command Group Alfa, a reserve company (which secured the forward portion of the beach), Command Group Bravo and attachments. The three companies were assigned objectives in their zones of action North of the beach and swept approximately six thousand meters to the North the first day. Two companies with Command Group Alfa, Bravo and attachments spent the night on the beach East of BAO BINH H., with one company North of AN PHU PHUONG. During the first day there was one VC wounded and twenty four VCS captured without sustaining any friendly casualties. On the second day the three companies continued to sweep generally North on an axis of advance. One company was detached from DLT 3/3 and returned to CHU L I. After sweeping North on their axis of advance approximately six thousand meters the two remaining companies turned East and moved to the beach North of DONG SON (1) where they spent the night.

On the second day two VC were wounded and twenty eight VCS were captured without sustaining any friendly casualties. On the third day DLT 3/3 moved South down the beach one thousand meters to be helilifted to DA NANG. A defense was established to secure the landing zone. All vehicles, equipment and accompanying personnel were backloaded aboard ship. The companies remained on the beach to be helilifted to DA NANG. Three VCS were captured without sustaining any friendly casualties. On the night of the third day one platoon was helilifted to D. NANG. Later that night an outpost had contact with approximately five VC which resulted in one friendly casualty and two unconfirmed VC casualties. During the entire operation DLT 3/3 met with light scattered, unorganized resistance. At 190700H DLT 3/3 commenced backloading aboard ships. By 191300H the backloading was completed and sailed for DA NANG. The operation developed several significant lessons described in paragraph 4 below.

3. Narrative Account

a. Company A, 1/7 at 160710H the company landed on Beach Orange and secured the forward portion of the beach from (BT 259435) to (BT 261429). No enemy contact was encountered during the landing phase. At 160930H the company moved to (BT 249443) to set up in a blocking position to cover the movement of I Co and K Co to their zone of action. At 161020H a platoon size patrol was sent to (BT 243432) to investigate a report received from an AO flying over the area that possible VC were seen in a trench line at the abcord. When the patrol arrived in the vicinity of (BT 243432) they located a trench one half mile long (BT 241435) to (BT 245428) with three bunkers lined with punjis. They did not destroy the trench line, but as the patrol was searching the area they captured a VCS hiding behind false wall in cave (BT 241432). The patrol returned to the company, tagged the prisoner and evacuated him to Dn collection point to be interrogated by ITT. At 161228H the company was assigned the mission to sweep from (BT 223458) to (BT 208472). The company swept their assigned area without making contact with VC and set up in a night defense (BT 208472) at 161750H. At 171200H the company began sweeping North on an axis of advance generally parallel to the TRUONG GIANG. During the sweep North the company made no contact with VC. At 171500H the company received a warning order to be prepared to be helilifted to CHU LAI from (BT 180522) at 171700H. At 171705H the company was helilifted to CHU LAI.

b. Company I at 160700H the first elements of the company landed at Beach Orange (BT 266435) and established positions from (BT 268431) to (BT 261429) by 160710H the entire company was ashore and moving into position no enemy contact was encountered during the landing. At 160930H the company moved North in their assigned zone of action. As they were moving into the first village in their zone of action, they received small arms fire from a shallow trench lined with punji stakes (BT 244449). The company returned and moved forward but were unable to maintain contact with the VC. Two cross bows were found in the vicinity where the small arms fire came from and they were destroyed. The people in the village (BT 242450) were frightened but friendly. A bundle of punji stakes were found in the same village and destroyed. The company continued to sweep North thru the village of TAN AN (1 (BT 235460) where they captured twelve VCS who were of military age but did not have ID cards. All prisoners were tagged and later sent back to Dn Collection Point to be interrogated by ITT.

At 161400H the company was again taken under small arms fire from five VC wearing dark green uniforms (BT 224454). The company returned fire, one VC was observed falling to the ground. A platoon was deployed to maintain contact with the VC who were fleeing in a North, North-Easterly direction. The VC broke contact and the platoon was unable to find traces of the wounded VC observed falling in the area. The company continued to move North in their zone of action receiving small arms fire from (BT 235485) no friendly casualties were sustained. At 1700H the VCS were captured (BT 230486) as the company was moving to their night defensive position (BT 236498). At 170845H the company swept West-North-West on an axis of advance to 300 meters East of grid line 20 where they turned and swept North. Two Vietnamese were attached to the company at 171030H to assist the Marines in identifying VC in the area. During the company's movement North twenty five VCS were captured after being pointed out by the attached Vietnamese as possible VC. At 171500H a heavy volume of small arms fire was received from (BT 197523), fire was returned and one VC was wounded but no weapon could be found. The wounded VC was tagged and later evacuated to C Med. Iunji traps were found throughout the village along the sides of the trails. At grid line 54 the company moved East to the beach (BT 225538) to spend the night. As the company was setting up its defensive positions three VCS were found hiding in a hole inside of their perimeter. All VCS captured during the day were kept in the company area over night and evacuated the next morning to Dn collection point to be interrogated by ITT. At 180730H the company moved South along the beach to (BT 228525) and set up defensive positions waiting to be helilifted to DA NANG. As they were moving South down the beach they captured three VCS who were hiding in boats. They were tagged and turned over to ITT. At 182055H one platoon was helilifted to DA NANG. The remainder of the company backloaded aboard ship at 190715H.

c. Company K At 160700H, the initial elements of the company landed at Beach Orange (BT 262443) and took up positions on the right flank from (BT 264437) to (BT 259435). By 160710H the entire company was ashore; no enemy contact was encountered during the landing phase. At 161015H the company moved North along their assigned zone of action and met with no opposition. Nine VCS were captured at (BT 256457). At 161236H the company picked up one wounded VC (BT 252454) believed to have been wounded in a fire fight with I Co earlier in the day. All prisoners were tagged and sent back to Dn collection point to be interrogated by ITT. The wounded VC was further evacuated to C Med. The company continued to move North in their zone of action until they set up in their night defensive position at (BT 234497). The second day at 170520H a VC was spotted in front of the company's defensive position. When challenge the VC started to run, a warning shot was fired but the VC continued to run. He was shot twice in the leg, tagged and evacuated to C Med. At 170845H the company swept on a West by North West axis advance inland to grid line 20. One VCS was captured at (BT 218494). He was tagged and evacuated to the Dn Collection Point, a trench line was found in the same vicinity and destroyed. When they reached grid line 20 they swept in a Northerly direction to grid line 54. At grid line 54 the company moved in a Easterly direction to the (BT 227535) where they set up in their night defensive position. The company met with small arms fire several times during their advance, but no friendly casualties were sustained and no known casualties were inflicted on the VC. At 180730H the company moved to (BT 228525) where they set up defensive positions waiting to be helilifted to D. NANG. At 181512H the company started patrolling action for local security with negative contact. The company remained in their defensive positions throughout the night and backloaded aboard ship at 190715H without incident.


4. Lessons Learned

a. In dense terrain there is a need for our AO to keep companies and battalion advised as to their exact position. It is impossible to tell ones position when in a hamlet or in heavy vegetation with out prominent terrain features. If the AO is unable to locate friendly units front lines due to thick vegetation, yellow smoke can be used as a marker.

b. When a company is sweeping an area with two platoons up and one platoon in reserve a fire team can be attached to the forward platoons to take control of all prisoners and evacuate them to the next higher echelon.

c. There is a definite need for interpreters at company and platoon level

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LANGRAN



A. G. COKER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) C&F OpPlan 1-65
(b) Maps; VIETNAM, 1:50,000 Series L701, Sheets 6658I, II and IV.

Time Zone: R

Task organization. Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 19-65

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 19-65.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) First Marine Aircraft Wing provides fixed wing and helicopter support as required.
- (2) CTG 76.3 (C&TF) provides support as required.
- (3) B&T 2/1 (SLF) will act as floating reserve. B&T 2/1 will not be committed during the initial landing.

c. Attachments and detachments.

- (1) B&T 3/3 attachments effective 130800H November 1965.

d. Assurance.

- (1) That sea and weather conditions will permit amphibious operations on or about 16 November 1965.

2. MISSION. B&T 3/3 conducts amphibious assault operation over beach Southwest of HOI AN and conducts search and destroy operation from the landing area to the BONG UY DAU.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. Annex C (Concept of Operation).

b. Company I (Rein)

- (1) Commencing at H-Hour land over South (left) half of Beach Orange, proceed to blocking position vicinity (WT 268431) to (WT 261429) to provide security for the left flank of the beach.
- (2) Be prepared to secure objective C on order.

c. Company K (Main)

- (1) Commencing at H-Hour land on Beach (right) half of Beach Orange, proceed to blocking position vicinity (T 264439) to (T 259435) to provide security for the right flank of the beach.
- (2) Be prepared to secure objective A on order.

d. Company C, 1/12

- (1) Be prepared to land Company C (-) on Beach Orange on order.
- (2) Immediately on landing set up firing positions in the beach area.
- (3) Direct Support BMT 3/3.
- (4) Be prepared to either displace forward or backload on order.

e. 1st Platoon, Company C 3d Tank Bn.

- (1) Stay aboard ship.

f. 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d AF Bn.

- (1) Be prepared to land on Beach Orange on order.
- (2) Be prepared for employment either as platoon or as Light Section and Heavy Section in direct support BMT 3/3.

g. 4th Platoon, Company A, 1st Afloat Bn.

- (1) Land assault elements of Company's I and F over Beach Orange.
- (2) Report to shore party for loading of supplies. See Ad in Order 19-65.
- (3) On order, effect attachments to units of BMT 3/3 in accordance with Ad in Order 19-65.

h. 3d Platoon, Latoon H&S Company.

- (1) Land on Beach Orange and immediately set up firing positions in the beach area.
- (2) General Support BMT 3/3.
- (3) Be prepared to displace forward on order.

i. 3d Platoon, Company B, 1st Eng Bn.

- (1) Attach one Engineer team each to Company's I, F and A.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct mine clearing operations, destroy tunnels, caves, or booby traps.

3. 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Division

- (1) Land on Beach Orange.
- (2) Direct support BMT 3/3.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance anywhere within the zone of action.

k. BMT Reserve, Company A (Main).

- (1) Land on Beach Orange and proceed to blocking position forward vicinity (BT 261429) to (BT 259435) linking up with Company I on the left flank and Company K on the right flank.
- (2) Be prepared to displace to objective B on order to provide a blocking force.
- (3) Be prepared to secure objective D on order.

i. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Annex D (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Annex E (Landing Plan).
- (3) Use CM/CS on authority this Headquarters only.
- (4) Minimize non-combatant casualties and damage to crops.
- (5) Civic Action Team will assist in removing the civilians from the immediate area of conflict, in screening the civilians, in rendering immediate medical assistance to those in need of same, in explaining to the villages what Government of VIETNAM is attempting to do for them, why the USMC is assisting the Government of VIETNAM and why this particular operation is necessary.
- (6) There will be no deliberate burning of dwellings. Every effort will be made to clear noncombatant civilians from shelters prior to using ordinance in shelters.
- (7) D-Day tentatively 16 November, H-Hour to be announced.
- (8) Rehearsal tentatively 15 November. Rehearsal to include scheduled waves only.
- (9) Subordinate units insure that reports of VC contact or sightings are complete - use SAUTE format.
- (10) Contact left to right.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Order 19-65.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex R (Communication - Electronics).

D. Command Posts
BLT 3/3

Afloat
USS Paul R. vere

Ashore
To be designated

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:



W. H. LAMAGAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operation
- D - Operation Overlay
- E - Landing Plan
- F - Fire Support
- G - Air
- H - Communication - Electronics
- I - Reports
- J - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution)
to Operation Order 19-65

BLT 3/3
CHU L.I, VIETNAM
G60900H Nov 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) CLF OpPlan 1-65

Time Zone: H

BLT 3/3

LtCol LANAGAN

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt ORSBURN

H&S Co (-)

Liaison Tm, Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Co I (Rein)

Capt MORRIS

Co I

FO Tm, 81mm Mtr Plat, H&S Co

FO Tm, Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Engr Plat, Co C, 3d Engr Bn.

NGST

FAC Tm.

Co K (Rein)

Capt RAMSEY

Co K

FO Tm, 81mm Mtr Plat, H&S Co

FO Tm, Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Engr Plat, Co C, 3d Engr Bn.

FAC Tm.

Btry C (-) 1st Bn, 12th Marines

Capt CIUBA

SFCP, Hq Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Marines

1stLt BEUERMAN

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn

1stLt OLEARY

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd AT Bn

1stLt MCCOY

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Engr Bn

1stLt BRENNAN

1st Plat, Co C, 3rd Tank Bn

2ndLt ROSE

4th Plat, Co A, 1st Amtrac Bn

2ndLt MUSSER

Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div

CA Tm

Psy War Tm

FLSU # 3

Plat, Co C, 1st MT Bn

Det, Co C, 1st Med Bn

Det, 3rd Dental Co (Rein), FMF

Det, Co C, 3rd Shore Party Bn

Sup Plat, Sup Co, 1st Serv Bn

Maint Plat, Maint Co, 1st Serv Bn

MT Det, H&S Co, 1st Serv Bn

1stLt ROESCH

BLT 3/3
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
060900H Nov 1965

BLT Reserve

Capt TARDY

Co A, (Rein), 1st Bn, 7th Marines
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 7th Mar
FO Tm, Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
Engr Tm, 3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Engr Bn

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LANAGAN



A. G. CONER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) Div 3000.1E
(b) CG 3dMarDiv msg 190845Z Oct 65
(c) Maps: Republic of VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS L701
Sheets 6658 I and 6658 II

Time Zone: H

1. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Composition, Strength and Disposition

(1) The following units are presently operating in and throughout the districts bounding NIS Beach # 8. The exact locations of these units are unknown however it is believed from presently available information that they are operating in the piedmont in the western portion of the objective area. It must be emphasized that VC units are generally less bound to geographic areas than USMC units.

- a. A-16 Company with a strength of 120 men with unknown arms. Believed to be operating in the vicinity of (BT 1924).
- b. A-19 Company has a strength of 140 men possibly as strong as 200 and unknown arms. This company is believed to be operating in vicinity of (BT 3411). Commanded by LIEN.
- c. A-21 Company has a strength of 80 men but is equipped with one 60 MM Mortar and a light machine gun. It is believed to be operating in the vicinity of (BT 3315).
- d. 108th Company of unknown strength and arms was reported on 25 September to be at the hamlet of THAN MY (BT 1853).

b. Reinforcements. The following units could reinforce (arrive) at the ORANGE BEACH area within 12 hours:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>ARMS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
45thBn	500	81 Mort. 60 Mort 57 RR	(BT 0524)	
49thBn	300	7-81 Mort 60 Mort 5-57 RR 2-BMG 3-IMG 2-AAMG	(BT 1430)	

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>ARMS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
60thBn	300	4-81 Mort 6-60 Mort 6-57 RR 3-AAMG 6-LEG	(BT 1336 ? Elms of Bn)	
70thBn	500	3-81 Mort 4-60 Mort 3-57 RR	(BT 1637 ? Elms of Bn)	
80thBn	UNK	2-81 Mort 4-57 RR 9-B40 (AT) 3-AAMG	(BT 2213)	
94thBn	300	1-81 Mort 6-60 Mort 2-57 RR 1-AAMG	(BT 3911)	Reported moving North probably at (BT 3911)

- (1) Unconfirmed reports indicate the VC may be planning to destroy the Highway 1 bridges at (BT 0955) and (BT 0558). For this, one or two guerrilla companies have been deployed in the vicinity of these bridges. Unconfirmed information indicates that the 60th, 70th and 80th Battalions also may have moved into this general area.
- (2) The objective area has not been under effective GVN Control for some time and it is unknown to what extent the VC has been able to influence the local populace. It is possible that VC propaganda may have made the populace hostile and suspicious of USMC/RVN intentions. Resistance from indigenous persons will probably be limited to small arms fire and mining and booby trapping.

c. Enemy Capabilities

- (1) Capability 1 - Avoid contact and withdraw from objective area.
- (2) Capability 2 - Harrass the landing force with small arms and light mortar fires in conjunction with guerillas.
- (3) Capability 3 - Attack the landing force with a force up to three companies reinforced by an undetermined number of guerillas at the time and place of their choice.
- (4) Capability 4 - Reinforce local force companies with up to five Battalions.

- (5) Capability 5 - Hide from the landing force in prepared tunnels and caves and by blending with the local populace, and clandestinely exfiltrate from the objective area.

d. Conclusions. The VC will most probably adopt Capability #1, switching to Capability #5 to implement Capability # 1 as the situation dictates. Capabilities #2, #3 and #4 are considered to be improbable because any intelligence gained by the VC to exploit these capabilities would more likely be used to implement Capability # 1.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather. See appendix (1).

b. Topography. The Battalion's objective area is bounded on the east by the South China Sea; the north by the SONG CUA DAI; the west by the TRUONG GIANG and on the south by a line drawn through (BT 239416) and (BT 463428). The area encompassed by these boundaries is basically a barrier reef composed mainly of sand lightly consolidated with scrub brush and pines. The area is approximately 3000 meters east to west at the south end and widens to approximately 6500 meters east to west at the north. The area is 15,000 meters north to south and the highest point is 24 meters above mean sea level at (BT 244432). A ridge runs parallel to, and approximately 1000 meters east of the TRUONG GIANG. The dunes slope rather steeply to the riparian flood plain along the TRUONG GIANG. The center of the area of operations is somewhat depressed as there is a ring of dunes along both sides of the area.

In general, the density of population increases towards the north and cut bound from the center of the area in response to more arable land. The area bounding the TRUONG GIANG is densely populated forming an almost complete border of houses along the western flank of the area of operation. The flood plain along the TRUONG GIANG is a low, fertile plain dissected by paddy dikes and small meandering streams. It is subject to partial and complete flooding. It affords poor to impassible trafficability for tracked vehicles when flooded and poor to moderate when dry. Wheeled vehicles will find it impassible in most conditions except when prior foot route reconnaissance can be made. It will afford poor to fair trafficability for foot troops.

In the sandy area pools of water remain after heavy rains. These should not affect tactical use of the terrain by foot troops or vehicles.

Trafficability of the sand areas will vary from fair to poor based on information from aerial photo interpretation. Tracked vehicles should be able to negotiate virtually all sandy terrain while wheeled vehicles will find trafficability usually poor improving to moderate on sand that is partly water saturated such as along the beaches.

There are no roads in the objective area. Most trails are mere foot trails without sufficient width to be classified as roads. Vegetation is mainly scrub pines and bushes and should not be impassable or, if locally impassable, it should be possible to maneuver around with tracked vehicles. Wheeled vehicles may find the combination of hummocks and vegetation locally impassable. Hummocks may make trafficability for tracked vehicles poor in places.

Air observation over the dune areas will be excellent. The trees and brush will provide some concealment for VC and foot troops. In built up areas concealment for foot troops from both ground and air observation will be excellent. Ground observation in the sand dunes will vary from excellent to moderately good. Cover will be lacking except in some of the more eroded areas. The rice paddies will provide little concealment for attacking troops and very little cover. Observation over these paddies should be excellent. Fields of fire generally correspond with observation. In built up areas fields of fire will be greatly reduced.

One political boundary crosses the area of operations. The boundary between the provinces of QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN crosses from west to east passing northeast from (BT 170496) to (BT 205523). This boundary should be noted as VCS apprehended must be sent to appropriate collective centers according to their home province.

In the area of operations the TRUONG GIANG is estimated to average about 0.8 meters (31 inches) varying in width from 15 meters minimum to 500 meters maximum. The streams width and depth are controlled by the tides in the South China Sea. The bottom is silt/sand as are the banks. The stream is navigable by shallow draft native boats. The current is normally weak but subject to tidal variation at the extremities.

Aerial photos indicate potential LVT entry points at (BT 218462) and (BT 216464). LVT will have difficulty leaving the river but ramps may be dropped on the bank and troops debarked at (BT 214463) and (BT 210463). The TRUONG GIANG has a number of fish traps located throughout its course along the objective area flank. These traps conceivably could interfere with LVTs operating in the stream.

- c. Hydrography. See appendix 2.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine if the VC will reinforce the objective area. If so, with what forces? Where?
- b. Determine if the VC will attack. If so, when? Where? In what strength? (Special attention to the landing beaches.)
- c. Determine strength, disposition, and equipment of VC forces in the objective area. Can the local VC provide an effective defensive force, if so, where, how soon, how strong?

- d. Determine trafficability of area of operations, will it support wheeled traffic, if so what type? Can artillery be moved by organic prime movers?
- e. Determine LWT entrance and exit points to and from TRUONG GIANG. Banks, depths, bottom type, etc.

4. SPECIFIC RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. Requests to Higher Headquarters

- (1) Commander Landing Force - Provide information concerning EEI's as obtained.
- (2) Commanding Officer, TG 76.3 Amphibious Task Group - Provide information on landing beaches and landing sites as obtained.

b. Orders to Subordinate Units

- (1) All units provide information pertaining to EEI's as obtained.

5. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTIVES, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATERIAL

a. Captured Personnel

- (1) See reference (a) as modified by reference (b).
- (2) The Landing Force Collection Point will be established at a point to be designated under interrogator/translator personnel from 3d ITC. All captives will be searched, segregated, tagged and evacuated to the LF Collection Point as expeditiously as possible. Women (unless armed or overtly engaged in hostile acts), children, the aged and infirm will not be evacuated as prisoners.
- (3) VCC will be expeditiously evacuated to the 3d Marine Division Collection Point, DA NANG, as screened by the Landing Force. Priority of evacuation by helicopter:
 - Priority I - VC Officers, Key Cadre
 - Priority II - VC noncommissioned officers, guerrilla leaders, communications personnel
 - Priority III - Other VCC
- (4) Wounded VCC will be processed as prescribed in reference (a).
- (5) VCS from Quang Tin will be evacuated to QUANG NGAI, VCS from QUANG NAM will be evacuated to HOI AN.

b. Captured Documents

- (1) All captured documents will be tagged and evacuated direct by this Headquarters to G-2, 3d MarDiv, except that documents captured with a prisoner will be evacuated with that prisoner to the Division Collection Point.
- (2) GVN ID Cards will not be taken from prisoners but will remain with them throughout the evacuation process.
- (3) Captured documents relating to communications, including codes, message books, frequency lists and call signs will be evacuated immediately by this Headquarters to G-2, 3d MarDiv.
- (4) Documents captured at communications installations will not be separated from the equipment unless recapture is imminent or evacuation of the equipment is impossible. Such equipment and documents will be tagged and evacuated together by this Headquarters to G-2, 3d MarDiv.
- (5) UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL A PLAIN LANGUAGE TRANSMISSION BE MADE TO REPORT CAPTURE OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS DOCUMENTS AND SECURITY MATERIAL.

c. Captured Materiel

- (1) Every effort will be made to capture and evacuate enemy material, with particular emphasis on weapons and communications/electronics equipment.
- (2) Expedite evacuation to LF Collection Point all equipment of a new or unusual nature.
- (3) An inventory of the stocks contained in storage sites will be made and forwarded to CATF/CLF as part of the after action report. Food-stuffs, clothing (non-military), and housekeeping supplies discovered will be turned over to attached civil affairs personnel for disposition; otherwise, such material will be destroyed. Unusual material that cannot be evacuated will be photographed prior to destruction. No high explosive ammunition will be evacuated unless rendered inert prior to evacuation.

6. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Submit requests for maps and photographs to this Headquarters in accordance with reference (a).
- b. Photographic beach panoramas and vertical mosaics of objective areas will be distributed by this Headquarters.


7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. The Landing Force will be supported by a detachment of the 3d CI Team, 900th will be located at the LF Collection Point.
- b. See references (a).
- c. Personnel having access to classified NOFORN information will be particularly careful in the security of information, during the planning phase of the current operations.

8. REPORTS AND COMMUNICATION

- a. Report by extended FLASH message the capture of Viet Cong Officers, political agents, communications personnel, communications equipment or documents, crew-served weapons and arms or ammunition caches.
- b. Report evaluation of captured personnel (giving mode of transport and priority category of captives if applicable), documents, and material.
- c. BITs submit reports on following, commencing H+2 and every 4 hours thereafter:
 - (1) Number VC KIA.
 - (2) Number of VCC.
 - (3) Number of wounded VCC.
 - (4) Number and type of captured weapons and material.(NOTE: Above information will be cumulative for the preceding period covered only; i.e., no duplication).
- d. BITs submit a comprehensive report of items of intelligence interest within 24 hours of termination of their respective phase of the operation.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LANAGAN


A. G. COMER
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Weather
- 2 - Hydrography
- 3 - Astronomical Data
- 4 - Helicopter Landing Zone Suitability Overlay (to be issued)
- 5 - Enemy Defense Overlay (to be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to OpOrder 19-65

Appendix 1 (Weather) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 19-65

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. The month of November marks the end of the Autumn transitional period from the Southwest to the Northeast Monsoon. The first half of the month is still transitional while during the latter half of the month conditions become more stable as the Northeast Monsoon becomes dominant. Weather conditions show a trend towards increasing cloudiness and precipitation. The present favorable weather will diminish with the advent of the increased rainy periods characteristic of the Northeast Monsoon season. The month of November, on the average, has more rainy days than October but almost equal average precipitation. The weather should be adequate for the operation but may become an important factor in helicopter operations.
2. SPECIAL PHENOMENA
 - a. Crachin: The objective area, being well north, is generally the first to feel the effects of the Crachin; a prolonged condition of widespread fog and drizzle or light rain. The clouds bring ceilings under 1,000 feet and frequently below 500 feet with visibility greatly reduced at the onset - generally below 2 miles, and frequently below $\frac{1}{2}$ mile. This condition becomes common the latter half of November but on occasion occurs as early as October and generally occurs in re-occurring periods of 2 to 5 days each. Reports indicate an average of 53 days at HUE, 41 days at DA NANG, and only 10 days at NHA TRANG.
 - b. Tropical Disturbances. November is the month of maximum activity for this type phenomena. Storms show a slight decrease in activity during the latter half of the month. Above 40% of the storms originating in the vicinity of Guam continue into Vietnam. An occasional disturbance will originate in the South China Sea, and continue westward into Vietnam disrupting the normal pattern, bringing increased winds, precipitation and reduced visibility.
3. STATISTICAL CLIMATOLOGY. The transitional period is the period of greatest precipitation, maximum cloudiness, and highest humidities.

<u>Precipitation</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Maximum	48	60
Mean	22	22
Minimum	4	5
Number of Days	18	20

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>Temperature</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Maximum	87	81
Mean	78	76
Mean Minimum	72	69

<u>Humidities</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Mean	91	92
Minimum	40	45
Maximum	100	100

<u>Visibilities</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Generally fair all seasons		
Less than 5 miles (% of time)	10	6
Less than 1 mile (% of time)	0.5	Less than 0.5

<u>Clouds</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Mean (% of the time)	72	78
Days 0.3 or less	5	2
Days 0.7 or more	22	25

<u>Winds</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Direction	NW	NW
Speed	5	5

Calm 13% of time; 1-16 kts 14% of time; 7-16 kts 10% of time.
Winds above 16 knots are infrequent.

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Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to OpOrder 19-65

Appendix 2 (Hydrography) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order
19-65

Time Zone: B

1. LOCATION. Orange Beaches are portions of NIS #8 Beach located south of CHU LAI, Republic of VIET NAM.

a. ORANGE Beach (landing)

Right Flank:	108-26-40E 15-45-45N	BT 262443
Left Flank:	108-26-53E 15-45-20N	BT 266435

Exits: See paragraph 6. (LVT Crossing Site)

Backload Area: BLUE Beach

b. BLUE Beach (backload)

Right Flank:	108-24-28E 15-49-45N	BT 230519
Left Flank:	108-24-55E 15-49-20N	BT 232512

2. DEPTHS AND GRADIENTS

- a. Gradient. 1:25 to 1:50 is L.W. to H.W. 1:15 at H.W.

b. ORANGE Beach

- (1) Distance to 1 fathom curve: 250 yards
(2) Distance to 3 fathom curve: 700 yards

3. APPROACH. Nearshore bottom is moderate to flat shoreward from the 3 fathom curve. There are no obstructions for the offshore approach of small boats and amphibian tractors.
4. TIDES AND SURF: Surf 4 feet or greater can be expected 34% of the time in the fall. Tidal range is $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet.
5. BEACH TRAFFICABILITY
- a. General. The beach is characterized by a berm ranging in height from one to 20 feet, and by semi-stabilized dunes ranging in height

up to 15 feet. The backshore consists of fairly dense tall tree growth, scattered houses, diked dry crop fields ringed by trees, and large pools of surface water.

- b. Personnel. Trafficability for personnel will vary from fair to good. Firm sand exists primarily along the nearshore and along the trails at the extreme backshore.
- c. Wheeled Vehicles. Trafficability for wheeled vehicles will vary from poor along the deep loose sand of the foreshore (and sand dunes) and in areas of surface water, to fair along the loose sand of the backshore area. Inundated rice paddy areas to the edge of waterways offer obstacles to LVTs as do narrow dike roads traversing flooded areas inland.

6. BVT CROSSING SITE (ORANGE Beach)

a. Site # 1.

- (1) Coordinate: BT 215464
- (2) Road Approach Width: Not Applicable. Across sand dunes.
- (3) Road Approach Composition: Sand.
- (4) River Bank Slope: Gentle to flat.
- (5) Debark Point: From BT 214463 to BT 210463.
- (6) River Gap: 700 feet.
- (7) Remarks: South boundary of debark point is cemetery, north boundary is small boat basin. Paddy dikes serve as troop exits from debark point.

b. Site # 2

- (1) Coordinate: BT 218463
- (2) Road Approach Width: Not Applicable (Across sand dunes).
- (3) Road Approach Composition: Sand.
- (4) River Bank Slope: Gentle to flat.
- (5) Debark Point: From BT 214463 to BT 210463.
- (6) River Gap: 1,400 Feet

- (7) Remarks: South boundary of debark point is cemetery, north boundary is small boat basin. Paddy dikes serve as troop exits from debark point.

c. Site # 3

- (1) Coordinate: Bt 174511.
- (2) Road Approach Width: Not Applicable. Across sand dunes.
- (3) Road Approach Composition: Sand.
- (4) River Bank Slope: Gentle to flat.
- (5) Debark Point: From BT 171511 to BT 168510.
- (6) River Gap: 1,500 Feet.
- (7) Remarks: Movement is cross-country over sand dunes. Paddy dikes serve as troop exits from debark point.

d. Site # 4

- (1) Coordinate: BT 171524.
- (2) Road Approach Width: 20 to 30 feet through village.
- (3) Road Approach Composition: Sand.
- (4) River Bank Slopes: Gentle to moderate.
- (5) Debark Point: BT 143527 which has gentle approach direct to road.
- (6) River Gap: 8,700 Feet.
- (7) Remarks: Water gap characterized by numerous fishing weirs and nets which constitute a navigation hazard.

G-2 Note: Since it must be assumed that the paddies in the area will be wet, none of the above listed crossing sites meet the necessary criteria, and thus from an imagery interpretation standpoint can not be classified as suitable.

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to OpOrder 19-65

BIT 3/3
CHU LAI, S. VIETNAM
060900H November 1965

Appendix 3 (Astronomical Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation
Order 19-65

Time Zone: H


1. TIDAL DATA for CHU LAI - Month of November 1965

<u>DATE</u>	<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>	
	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HT</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HT</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HT</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HT</u>
12	0749	2.0	2315	6.8	--	--	--	--
13	0849	1.8	--	--	--	--	--	--
14	0954	1.8	0034	7.1	--	--	--	--
15	1100	1.9	0122	7.0	--	--	--	--
16	1201	2.0	0218	6.8	--	--	--	--
17	1251	2.3	0325	6.3	--	--	--	--
18	1333	2.6	0445	5.9	2122	4.5	2340	4.3
20	1406	2.9	0613	5.5	2045	4.8	--	--

2. SUNRISE/SET - MOONRISE/SET TABLE for CHU LAI - Month of November 1965

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
12	0649	1814	2105	0941	3/4
13	0649	1814	2207	1043	3/4
14	0650	1813	2311	1144	3/4
15	0650	1813	NO	1239	1/2
16	0651	1813	0014	1328	1/2
17	0651	1813	0015	1413	1/2
18	0652	1813	0213	1455	1/4
19	0652	1812	0308	1536	1/4
20	0653	1812	0401	1514	1/4

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to OpOrder 19-65

BLT 3/3
CHU LAI VIETNAM
060900H Nov 1965

Annex C (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: CLF OP: M 1-65


Time Zone: H

1. MISSION. Phase II of Operation BLUE MARLIN will encompass the embarkation, movement to the objective area, amphibious assault landing and subsequent search and destroy operation by BLT 3/3, backloading on amphibious shipping and moving BLT 3/3 into the DA NANG TAOR.

2. CONCEPT.

- a. Phase II will commence with the embarkation of BLT 3/3 aboard amphibious shipping at CHU LAI about 13 November 1965. On completion of embarkation the ATF will conduct a rehearsal landing and then proceed to a point South of HOI AN and conduct an amphibious assault landing.
- b. BLT 3/3 will land with two companies in assault over Beach Orange vic (BT 2643), and conduct a search and destroy operation to the north between the sea and the TRUONG GIANG.
- c. BLT 3/3 will backload over Beach Brown for movement to DA NANG.
- d. Annex D, Operation Overlay.
- e. The amphibious operation will terminate on completion of Phase II. The ATF will proceed to DA NANG and off-load BLT 3/3. Company "A", 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, will be detached upon termination of the operation and returned to CHU LAI.

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Annex E (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) CLF Operation Plan 1-65

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL.

a. This plan provides for:


- (1) Landing BLT 3/3 over Beach Orange in an assault landing initially with two companies abreast utilizing LVTF-5's, LCM-6's, LCM-8's and an LCM.
- (2) Landing 3d Bn 14VNMCM over Beach Orange in two waves utilizing LVTF-5's.

b. For detailed instructions, see appendixes.

2. CONTROL MEASURES.

- a. Ship-to-shore movement control in accordance with reference (a).
- b. BLT 3/3 provides Taclog to PCS Beach Orange at H-1 Hour.

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APPENDIXES:

1. Serial Assignment Table, Phase II
2. Assault Schedule, Phase II

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
Operation Order 19-65

Appendix 1 (Serial Assignment Table) Phase II to Annex E (Landing Plan) to
 Operation Order 19-65.

Ref: CLF Operation Plan 1-65

Time Zone: H

SERIAL ASSIGNMENT TABLE

SERIAL UNIT	PERSONS	MATERIAL EQUIPMENT VEHICLES	LANDING CRAFT NO. TYPE	SHIPS	REMARKS	
100	Co I (-) Rein Co F Eng. sec, 3d Flt, Co B 3d Eng Bn Arty FO Tm 1/12.A	115 103 10 2	Normal Combat	5-INTP5	LST 1167	1st Wave
101	Co K (-) Rein Co K FAC Tm Eng sec, 3d Flt, Co B 3d Eng Bn	133 118 5 10	Normal Combat	5-LVTI 5	LST 1167	1st Wave
200	Co I (-) Rein Co I Arty FO Tm 1/12 81mm Mtr FO Tm H&S	74 70 4 4	Normal Combat	1-LCM 6	AFA 248	2nd Wave
201	Co K (-) Rein Co K 81mm Mortar FO Tm H&S Co Arty FO Tm 1/12 3d Flt Co B 3d Recon Bn	64 57 2 4 21	Normal Combat	1-LCM 6	AFA 248	2nd Wave
202	Det Bench Masters Det Co C, 1st Shore Party Bn.	12 18	TD-24 DUKW	1-LCM 8 1-LCM 6	LSD 22	2nd Wave
300	Co A 1st Bn, 7thMar Co A Arty FO Tm 3/11 81mm FO Tm H&S 1/7 S-2 Scouts./Interpreter H&S Co 1/7 FAC Tm 3/7 Eng sec, 3d Flt, Co B, 3d Eng Bn	196 173 4 2 3 4 11	Normal Combat	2-LCM 6	AFA 248	3d Wave

SERIAL ASSIGNMENT TABLE

SERIAL UNIT	ISS	MATERIAL EQUIPMENT VEHICLES	LANDING CRAFT NO. TYPE	SHIPS	REMARKS	
401	Slam Mortar Flt 3/3 Slam Mortar Flt	70 70	Normal Combat	1-LCH 6	APA 248	3d Wave
400	Btry C (-), 1st Bn, 12 Mar Btry C (-), 1st Bn, 12 Mar	35 35	3-105 HOW	6-LVT 5	LSD-22	on call
401	3d Flt, Co B, 3d At Bn 3d Flt	18 18	5-M 50's	5-LCH 6	LSD 22	on call
402	CMD G Tractor C D G Tractor	10 10	2-LVTC	2-LVTC 5	LST 1167	on call
Free Boat	BLT 3/3 CMD G	4 145	Normal Combat	2-LCH 6	APA 248	free boat

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 Operation Order 19-65

MP 3/3
 CMC L&I, WESTPAC
 C60900H Nov 1965

Appendix 2 (Assault Schedule Phase II) to Annex E (Landing Plan) to
 Operation Order 19-65.

Time Zone: H

WAVE	TIME	CRAFT/VEH SERIAL	UNIT
1	H-Hour	10 LVTF - 5's ser 100, 101	Co I (-) Rein, Co K (-) Rein
2	H+5 min	3 LCM - 6, 1 LCM - 8 ser 200, 201 and 202.	Co I (-) Rein, Co K (-) Rein, Det Beach Master, Det Co C, 1st Shore Party Bn
3	H+10 min	3 LCM - 6 ser 300, 301	Co A, 1st Bn, 7th Mar (Main), 81mm Mortar Plt 3/3.
on call		6 LVTF - 5 ser 400	Btry C (-), 1st Bn, 12th Mar.
on call		5 LCM 6 ser 401	3d PL Co B, 3d AT Bn
on call		2 LVTC 5 ser 402	operators & radio men
free boat		2 LCM 6 ser 001	Co LT Cmd GP

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
 Operation Order 19-65

Annex F (Fire Support Plan) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) Map VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6657 I, II, IV and 6658 I and III.

Time Zone: H


1. SITUATION. See basic order.
2. MISSION. Provide support for BLT 3/3.
3. EXECUTION.
 - a. 81mm Mortar Platoon
 - (1) General support BLT 3/3
 - b. Btry. C 1st Bn 12th Marines
 - (1) General support BLT 3/3 and 3d Bn. RVNMC
 - c. DD-836 (USS GEO MACKENZIE)
 - (1) Direct support BLT 3/3
 - d. DD-851 (USS RUFENIUS)
 - (1) Direct support 3d Bn RVNMC
 - e. AFD-123 (USS DIACHENKO)
 - (1) General support BLT 3/3 and 3d Bn RVNMC
 - f. Coordinating Instructions
 - (1) Fire Support Coordination, Do. Order F3000.1D (SOP for Operations and training).
 - (2) All NGF will be observed call missions unless otherwise requested by the supported unit commander.
 - (3) NGF standard salvos will consist of 8 rds (2 guns, 4 salvos), unless otherwise requested by spotters.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Normal

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. Electronics

a. FSCC located with Bn Command Group.

b. Communications. Normal

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
Operation Order 19-65

Annex G (Air) to Operation Order 19-65

- Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets and 6658I and III.
(b) COMFIBRON Five Operation Order 302-66
(c) 3dMarDiv O 02000.2C (OOI)
(d) CLF Operation Plan 1-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- (a) Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 19-65.
- (b) Friendly Forces.
- (1) CTC 76.3 monitors all air operations in the air/amph objective area, in command capacity, ready to assume control in case of an emergency ashore.
 - (2) Interdiction and direct air support capability provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing.
 - (3) Logistical and tactical lift capability is provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing.

2. PROCEDURES.

- a. All air strikes will be conducted within the currently established Rules of Engagements, and under positive control of TACP, TAC(A) or ASRT within the AOA.
- b. Mark targets for air strikes with white phosphorus, white or red smoke, in that order of preference, if possible to mark.
- c. Panels marking front lines will be displayed prior to calling in air strikes. Red panels primary, yellow panels as alternate.
- d. Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid will be used as designator for all close air support strike missions.
- e. Alert Status of on call Close Air Support Aircraft. See Appendix 1 (Alert Status of Close Air Support Aircraft).
- f. Schedule of Air Support. See Appendix 2 (Air Support for the Landing Forces).

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

- a. See Annex H (Communications)
- b. For Appropriate Air Nets see Appendix 3 (Communications for Air)

c. Control Agencies Ashore.

- (1) DASC. Vicinity of Da Nang.
- (2) FSCC. Vicinity of Landing Force CP.
- (3) TACC. Vicinity of III MAF CP, Da Nang.

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Appendixes:

1. Alert Status of on call Close Air Support Aircraft.
2. Air Support for the Landing Forces.
3. Communications for Air.

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 19-65

Appendix 1 (Alert Status of on call Close Support Aircraft) to Annex G (Air)
to Operation Order 19 - 65.

Reference: CLF OpPlan 1-65

Time Zone: H

Alert Status--Time to Become Airborne

Condition I -	2 minutes
Condition II -	5 minutes
Condition III -	15 minutes
Condition IV -	30 minutes
Condition V -	Secured on as ordered

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BLF 3/3,
Chai Lai, Vietnam
060900 H Nov 1965

Appendix 2- (Air Support for the Landing Forces) to Annex G to Air Operation Order 19-65.

Reference: 3dMarDiv Bul 3700.8 dated 5 November 1965 (Detailed requirements for air support for the landing forces; Operation Blue Marlin).

Time Zone: H

Supporting 3/3 and 3d Bn RVNMC

(1) D-Day Requirements

(a) VA Support

<u>Event</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>#A/C</u>	<u>TCS</u>	<u>Ordinance</u>
1	CAS	2	150645-1900	D2, D5, D20
2	CAS (15 Min GA)	2	0700-2400	D2, D5, D20
3	Helco Escort on call	2	On Call	D5, D20

(b) Helicopter Escort

<u>Event</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>#/Type</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>TCS</u>
1	SAR/Med Evac	2	UH 34	150630-2400
2	Resupply/Evac USS Paul REVERE	2	UH 34	0630-1900
3	Resupply/Evac USS FT MARION	2	UH 34	0630-1900
4	Lift DASC (FWD)	2	CH 37	On Call
5*	Emerg Troop Lift-Cond IV	20	UH 34	0700-1900

* Event 5 may use A/C Assigned to events 2 and 3 as required.

(2) D+1 Requirements.

(a) VA Support

<u>Event</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>#A/C</u>	<u>TCS</u>	<u>ORDNANCE</u>
1	CAS (15Min GA)	2	160001-Completion	D2, D5, D20
2	CAS (15Min GA)	2	0630-Completion	D2, D5, D20
3	Helco Escort (On Call)	2	On Call	D5, D20

(b) Helicopter Support

<u>Event</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>#/Type</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>TCS</u>
1	SAR/Med Evac	2	UH 34	160001-Completion
2	Resupply/Evac USS Paul REVERE	2	UH 34	0630-Completion
3	Resupply/Evac USS FT MARION	2	UH 34	0630-Completion
4	Retro DASC (FWD)	2	CH 37	On Call
5*	Emerg Troop Lift/Retro Cond IV	20	UH 34	160630-Completion

* Event 5 may use A/C assigned to events 2 and 3 as necessary.

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
(5) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) D-Day 15 November 1965: H-Hour 0700H

(b) Communication

1. CATF on USS Paul REVERE initially on Net as TACC-Call Sign UNIQUE.
2. CLF Call Sign - SPRINGCLEAN
3. 3/3 Call Sign - WAREHOUSE
4. All flights RIO LANDSHARK RED/MAROON for handoff

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Appendix 3 (Communications) to Annex G (Air) of Operation Order 19-65.

Ref: (a) CLF Operation Plan 1-65

Time Zone: H

<u>Net</u>	<u>Tactical Air Nets</u>
<u>TAD #1</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
TAD #1	F-7995
	S-2196
TAD #2	F-4631
	S-5270
D/O	13.7
TAD (ORANGE)	283.4
TAD #. (RED)	312.0
TAD #2 (GREEN)	325.0
TAD #3 (PURPLE)	285.8
TAD #4 (VIOLET)	318.5
TAD #5 ()	269.5
TAD #6 (BROWN)	383.5

Helicopter Nets

HST Logistics	506.9
LZ Control	49.8
HD #1 (MAROON)	273.8
HD #2	320.6
HD #3	43.5
HD #4 (PINK)	396.5
<u>TAGI LOCAL</u>	46.7

Helicopter Med/Evac Frequencies

- (1) Dn CF Group
 UHF-HD #1 (MAROON) - 273.8
 FM-DnTac #2 42.9
 - (2) 81mm Mort 44.7
 - (3) Company I 46.7
 - (4) Company K 48.6
 - (5) Company L 57.8
 - (6) Company M 50.2
- If Company has a FAC team, the FAC team will request Med/Evac Helos on HD #1 or TAGI local-----46.7

Visual

Landing Zones will be marked by:

1. Day

- a. Primary -----Yellow smoke and/or Red Panels
- b. Secondary-----Green smoke and/or Red/Yellow Panels

2. Night

- a. Primary-----Flashlights (4) arranged as indicated below:

				wind
O - Steady	O	O	&	←
& - Flashing	X			
X - Helo Landing Point	O			

- b. Secondary-----Hand Flare ignited on ground
- c. Must have communications (UHF or FM) at night.

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BLT 3/3
Chu Lai, Vietnam
060900 H Nov 1965

Annex H (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) 3rdMarDivO D2000.2c (COL)
(b) CLF Operation Plan 1-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 19-65
- (2) The enemy has the capability to conduct jamming, traffic interception and to insert deceptive traffic on any radio net.
- (3) Abandoned enemy communication equipment may be booby trapped.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) See Operation Order 19-65.
- (2) Amphibious Task Force (CTG 76.3) provides communication and cryptographic guard for embarked landing force units until the conclusion of the operation.

(3) Command Posts.

(a) Afloat.

CTG 76.3	USS PAUL REVERE
CLF	USS PAUL REVERE
BLT 3/3	USS PAUL REVERE

(b) Ashore.

CLF	With BLT 3/3
BLT 3/3	As established ashore
Others report when established.	

2. MISSION. BLT 3/3 communicationselectronic elements provide communications for the landing and subsequent operations ashore.

3. Execution.

a. Communication Platoon, BLT 3/3

- (1) Land on order and install command post communications vicinity of Beach Orange using LVTC as base unit.

4. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) See references (a) and (b).
- (2) Messenger Service established by CLF as required.
- (3) Radio.

- (a) Radio silence on D-Day until lifted by CLF
- (b) All units guard assigned nets commencing at H -1 hour on D-Day.
- (c) Coordinate personnel and equipment to provide the following radio nets for Command Group Alpha:

Landing Force Tactical Net
BLT 3/3 Tactical Net
BLT 3/3 Admin Net
81mm Mortar Conduct of Fire Net
Arty Liaison Net
Tactical Air Request Net
Tactical Air Direction Net
Naval Gunfire Support Net
Naval Gunfire Spot Net
LVT Plt Cmd Net

- (d) Provide personnel and equipment to provide the following radio nets for Command Group Bravo:

Landing Force Tactical Net
BLT 3/3 Tactical Net
BLT 3/3 Admin Net

- (e) Provide personnel and equipment for BLT 3/3 Tac Log aboard USS MARION COUNTY.
- (f) Radio nets, frequencies and call signs in accordance with Appendix 1 to Annex H to Operation Order 19-65.

(4) Wire

- (a) Provide one wire team to each command group for night defenses when ashore.

(5) Authentication Instructions.

- (a) Internal authentication for BLT 3/3 will be in accordance with locally produced shackles and brevity code systems.
- (b) Authentication and numerical code from BLT 3/3 to higher

headquarters will be in accordance with KAA-60 and KAC-138 respectively

- (6) Naval gunfire communications. See Annex F (Fire Support Annex) to Operation Order 19-65.
- (7) Air support communications. See Annex G (Air Annex) to Operation Order 19-65.
- (8) Visual. Operation of signal lamps ashore restricted to landing beaches seaward.
- (9) Pyrotechnics. See Annex G (Air Annex) to Operation Order 19-65.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Administrative Order 19-65.
- b. Each rifle company carry sound powered telephones and a minimum of one mile of wire.
- c. All units using radio equipment carry two days supply of dry cell batteries.
- d. Report failure of communication equipment by any available means.
- e. Emergency repair facilities available at either command group CP after initial landing.

BY COMMAND OF Lieutenant Colonel
W.H. LANAGAN

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Executive Officer

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Radio Call Signs and Frequencies, switchboard call signs

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Operation Order 19-65

SWITCHBOARD CALL SIGNS

UNIT	SWITCHBOARD CODE NAME
CG 3d Mar Div	Shove
ADC	Finch Hitter
9th Marines	Senator
1st Bn 12th Marines	Goose
3d Bn 3d Marines	Swain
3d Marines	Crowl
1st Amphib	Dream
3d At Bn	Heavy Fist
3d Tk Bn	Smcke Room
3d S. Bn	Fan Handle
9th NF Bn	Donote
3d Recon Bn	Saint Joe
2d Bn 7th Marines	Fat Stuff
3d MA2	Parchment

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ANNEX I (Reports) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: (a) CLF OTO 1-65

Time Zone: H

1. The following reports will be submitted:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>TO</u>
MOVEREP	Upon Emb	See NWIP10-1(R)	CG 3dMarDiv
SAILREP	Upon Sailing	DivO 4600.1	CG 3dMarDiv
TOUCHDOWN	Upon initial landing on beach	Time, location, unit	CLF
SITREF	Every two hours	Troop movements, activities, supporting arms, all incidents	Co's to BIF Cmd BIF to CLF
SPOT	As occurring	Friendly casualties, capture of VCC, VCS, weapons, equip, documents supply caches, (SAUTE)	Co's to BIF and BIF to CLF
FLASH	As occurring	Upon contact with enemy forces, incoming artillery or mortar fire	Co's to BIF and BIF to CLF
SITREP	By 1400 daily	DivO 3100.1A	BIF to CLF
BACKLASH	As occurring	ForO 5830.4	BIF to CLF
After Action	Five days after completion of operation	DivO 3100.1A	BIF to CG 3dMarDiv

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Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 19-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Copies</u>
CMC	2
CMCS	2
COM HIRON V	2
TCLF	2
CG III MAF	2
I COMS	2
CG 3d MAH DIV	2
1st MAW	2
ADCCMD GHT, CHU LAI	2
CO 4th MAR	2
CO 9th MAR	2
3d Bn. RVNMC	1
USS Paul Hevere (ATA-248)	1
USS Seminole (AKA-104)	1
USS Fort Marion (LSB-22)	1
USS Terrell County (LST-1157)	1
USS West Chester County (LST-1157)	1
USS Windham County (LST-1170)	1
CO 1st BN, 12th MAH	1
ETA Y C, 1st BN, 12th MAR	1
FLSG	1
CO, 3d TANK BN	1
CO, COA, 3d TANK BN	1
CO, 3d AT BN	1
CO, COA, 3d AT BN	1
CO, 1st AMTRAC BN	1
CO, COB, 1st AMTRAC BN	1
FLSU #1	1
CO, 3d ENGT BN	1
CO, COB, 3d ENGT BN	1
CO, (3d) SHORE PARTY BN	1
CO, CO C, 3d SHORE PARTY BN	1
BLT 3/3	<u>46</u> 89

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to
Operation Order 19-65

XO

3d Bn
CHU LAM, VIETNAM
251800H Oct., 1965

Frag Order No. 39-65

Ref: (a) Map VIETNAM, 1:50,000, JNS Series L701, sheet 6757 III

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces - Current INTSUMS

b. Friendly Forces -

(1) 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, General Support, 4th Marines

c. Attachments and Detachments - No change

2. MISSION Commencing L-Hour on D-Day, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines conducts cordon and search operation of XUAN NGOC (1) and XUAN NGOC (2). One company returns to battalion area on order and one company sweeps TIN XUAN (1) and continues South to conduct a two day patrol.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations - One company (-) moves on foot to cordon position West and South of village vicinity grid squares (BT 3912) and (BT 3911). One platoon (rein) secures landing zone vicinity (BT 403121) and on order searches hamlet (obj 1). One company lands at L-Hour by helicopter in LZ (BT 403121) and searches hamlets (objectives 2, 3, and 4). (Operation overlay). Helicopter landed company, on order, sweeps TIN XUAN (1), establishes Patrol Base vicinity grid square (BT 4007) and patrols in general area for two days.

b. Company K

- (1) At L-Hour on D-Day land by helicopter in LZ (BT 403121).
- (2) On order conduct thorough search of hamlets (objectives 2, 3, and 4) (Operation Overlay).
- (3) On order, sweep TIN XUAN (1), patrol South to vicinity grid squares (BT 3808), (BT 3908), (BT 4008), (BT 3807), (BT 4007), (BT 3806), (BT 3906), (BT 4006), and conduct patrols until 30 October 1965.

c. Company L

- (1) Two platoons move by foot to Line of Departure by L-30.
- (2) One platoon (rein) move by foot to secure LZ (BT 403121) by L-30.
- (3) At L-Hour 2 platoons move into cordon positions on West and South sides of village vicinity grid squares (BT 3912) and (BT 3911).
- (4) On order LZ security platoon searches hamlet (obj 1).
- (5) On order move to LZ (BT 403121) for helilift to Battalion area.

d. Company I

- (1) Furnish one platoon to man Company M positions on the MLR.

e. Company M

- (1) Man the airfield defense positions.
- (2) Assume duties of Regimental Reserve Company.

f. H&S Company

- (1) Furnish one platoon to man Company M positions on the MLR.

g. 81 Mortar Platoon (-)

- (1) At ~~3~~ Hour on D-Day land by helicopter in LZ (BT 403121).
- (2) On order displace to firing position (BT 397116).
- (3) General Support
- (4) On order, displace to LZ (BT 403121) for helilift to Battalion area.

h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) I-Hour _____
- (2) D-Day 26 October 1965

- (3) Exercise caution for mines and booby traps.
- (4) Frivolous destruction of personal property or mistreatment of civilians or prisoners will not be tolerated.
- (5) Operations overlay

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS


a. Supply

(1) Initial Levels

- a. Company K, as prescribed by Company Commander.
- b. Command Group and S1's
 - (1) Class I each Marine carry one MCI.
 - (2) Class II one day supply of batteries.
 - (3) Class III none
 - (4) Class IV none
 - (5) Class V basic allowance.
 - (c) Water - Two full canteens per Marine.
- c. Re-Supply - None
- d. Evacuation & Hospitalization - Normal


5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- a. Normal communications and pyrotechnics.
- b. Companies report CP Locations as established.
- c. Bn Tac Net relay will be established on Hill 69.


W. H. DeNAGAN
Lieutenant Colonel USMC
Commanding

3dE 33 MARINES
Chu Lai, Vietnam
251800Z Oct 65

Operation One of 4
Ref: (a) Map Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet 6757 III
Time Zone H



42
+09

Assembly Area
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Commanding